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Design, Control, Predict: Cultural Politics In The Actually Existing Smart City
Abstract
Design, Control, Predict: Cultural Politics in the Actually Existing Smart City studies the discourses,
rhetorics, intuitions, logics, policies, imaginaries, and imageries that animate the intersection between
computational media technologies and cities. It presents three case studies in which a diverse array of
actors and institutions engage in struggles to articulate, define, and render legible highly complex, unruly,
and often woolly urban processes as problems of efficiency to be solved through technocratic
intervention.
The introductory chapter, “Cultural Politics, Smart Cities, Logistical Media” (Chapter 1), theorizes the
relationship between two ways of studying the smart city as a cultural-political object. On one hand is a
global imaginary that takes shape in pristine architectural renderings, diagrams detailing the embedding
of data-generating technologies within urban spaces, and city-scale prototypes built de novo on greenfield
sites (such as Songdo in South Korea, Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, and PlanIT Valley in Portugal). On the
other is the “actually existing smart city”—the piecemeal interventions that take hold in extant cities.
These two versions of the smart city are considered in tandem for two reasons: first, to understand the
way that imaginaries shape actual interventions, and second to avoid hierarchical categorizations of the
smart city based on their formal qualities (the “top-down” and “bottom-up” smart city). The chapter then
moves to detail the dissertation’s media-theoretical approach to the smart city. It argues that the smart
city’s computational media should be noted for their logistical affordances. Smart city technologies, like
logistical media broadly, operate by orientating, arranging, and tracking mobile objects and people within
urban spaces. Their principal concern is to eke out new efficiencies that can be mined and exploited to
produce value. The chapter argues that a more nuanced approach is needed to study the smart city, one
that accounts for the logistical affordances of urban computational media technologies while
simultaneously situating those within cultural-political struggles around the legitimacy of smart city
interventions.
The dissertation then moves to consider three case studies, each of which focuses on the culturalpolitical dimensions of smart city interventions. The selection of these case studies is meant to reflect
the wide range of interventions taking place in the actually existing smart city.
The first, “Interface, Imaginary, and the Future of Public Space” (Chapter 2), engages with theoretical
debates about smart city interfaces as points of exchange between citizens and the smart city, focusing
specifically on the case of LinkNYC. LinkNYC is a network of kiosks installed throughout New York to
replace the city’s aging public payphones and is the product of a public-private partnership between the
City of New York and a consortium of technology manufacturing and design firms. The chapter traces the
development of LinkNYC. It begins with a design competition in which New York City’s design and
technology communities were invited to “reinvent the payphone.” It then details the request for proposals
(RFP) phase, the franchise award, and the franchisees’ buy-out by a Google-backed company called
Sidewalk Labs. Throughout, the chapter examines some of LinkNYC’s core failures and concerns that
were raised by citizen groups and local politicians. It then returns to the beginning of this history—the
public design competition phase—to examine four prototypes that offer alternatives to LinkNYC’s
commercially-driven business model. These provide empirical points of departure for a critique of
LinkNYC’s kiosk interfaces.
The second case study, “Autonomy and Control in the On-Demand Economy” (Chapter 3), considers
discourses of technologically-driven transformations in work and labor in the smart city. The so-called
“gig,” “sharing”, or “on-demand” economy is framed as an innovative application of Internet of Things (IoT)
concepts to urban spaces. Mainstream rhetoric suggests that networked computational media and

commercial platforms can provide new market opportunities by linking demand (consumers) with
providers of goods and services. On-demand companies frame themselves as “technological middleman”
to mediate these interactions and exchanges. I contest these assumptions by considering the
experiences of workers (“service providers”) at courier and ride-hailing companies. I focus on the
centrality of workers’ designation as independent contractors and company strategies to ensure that they
remain as such. I describe these as “strategies of arbitrage” because companies are constantly
arbitraging between competing demands: allowing workers enough autonomy that the independent
contractor designation can be maintained, while also exerting enough control over workers to maintain
smooth operations. The chapter concludes by theorizing the intuitions that workers develop in response
to such strategies, and consider how these affect their calculations in everyday on-the-job decisions.
The third and final case study, “Performance and Performativity in Predictive Policing” (Chapter 4),
considers debates about police uses of technology—whether they ameliorate or exacerbate bias and
discrimination in urban policing. The chapter focuses on HunchLab, a “predictive policing” software suite.
Predictive policing refers to police departments’ use of algorithms to make data-analytic predictions
about the locations, times, and types of crimes that will occur to inform resource allocation and patrol
deployment decisions. The chapter looks to how the product managers and developers at HunchLab
engage with the debates about police use of predictive algorithms, and traces attempts to instill
progressive values in algorithm design. I argue that in order to understand how HunchLab is approaching
these issues, one must turn from questions of predictive performance—how accurately the model
predicts crimes—to those of performativity—or how acting on predictions affects the conditions
represented within the model. The chapter then moves to situate predictive policing—and, specifically,
HunchLab’s engagement with predictive performativity—within a longer lineage of “police media” in order
to discuss its historical precedents and future ramifications.
The dissertation then concludes by asking what it would mean to re-politicize the smart city (Chapter 5,
“Conclusion: A Repoliticized Smart City?”). The chapter provides a summary of key themes that emerge
across the case studies. These include: how system managers seek to maintain legitimacy when
challenged by critics; the centrality of interface design and information asymmetries in smart city
infrastructures; the modulation of controls at the level of fleets and statistical aggregates; and the role of
cultural foundations to compensate for smart city systems’ inability to automate key functions. I argue
that the coordinative functions of smart city systems need to conceptualized at their logical extreme in
order to highlight their dangerous potential. Researchers need to expand the scope of what can count as
a smart city intervention, and the chapter offers the example of an immigration “raid response” system
called Sanctuary in the Streets. In Sanctuary in the Streets, community members not at risk for
deportation rally at the physical sites where immigration raids are taking place to conduct civillydisobedient actions. I argue that this exemplifies all of the features of an urban data infrastructure but
avoids the pitfalls of typical smart city solutionism: it operates according to an ethics of care and
community maintenance, rather than exploiting efficiencies to produce value for system managers.
The dissertation offers a much-needed critical, ethnographic perspective on technology-based urban
interventions. It shows how these over-emphasize logistical efficiencies as an ideal to be realized over
competing demands, and, in the process, drown out competing claims about what cities are and how
municipal services should be delivered and to whom. By highlighting the cultural-political struggles that
attend smart city interventions, the dissertation adds nuance to ongoing debates about the future of the
city. It will be useful to both practitioners and critical scholars of cities and technology.
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ABSTRACT
DESIGN, CONTROL, PREDICT:
CULTURAL POLITICS IN THE ACTUALLY EXISTING SMART CITY
Aaron Shapiro
Carolyn Marvin
Jessa Lingel

Design, Control, Predict: Cultural Politics in the Actually Existing Smart City studies the
discourses, rhetorics, intuitions, logics, policies, imaginaries, and imageries that animate
the intersection between computational media technologies and cities. It presents three
case studies in which a diverse array of actors and institutions engage in struggles to
articulate, define, and render legible highly complex, unruly, and often woolly urban
processes as problems of efficiency to be solved through technocratic intervention.
The introductory chapter, “Cultural Politics, Smart Cities, Logistical Media”
(Chapter 1), theorizes the relationship between two ways of studying the smart city as a
cultural-political object. On one hand is a global imaginary that takes shape in pristine
architectural renderings, diagrams detailing the embedding of data-generating
technologies within urban spaces, and city-scale prototypes built de novo on greenfield
sites (such as Songdo in South Korea, Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, and PlanIT Valley in
Portugal). On the other is the “actually existing smart city”—the piecemeal interventions
that take hold in extant cities. These two versions of the smart city are considered in
tandem for two reasons: first, to understand the way that imaginaries shape actual
interventions, and second to avoid hierarchical categorizations of the smart city based on
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their formal qualities (the “top-down” and “bottom-up” smart city). The chapter then
moves to detail the dissertation’s media-theoretical approach to the smart city. It argues
that the smart city’s computational media should be noted for their logistical affordances.
Smart city technologies, like logistical media broadly, operate by orientating, arranging,
and tracking mobile objects and people within urban spaces. Their principal concern is to
eke out new efficiencies that can be mined and exploited to produce value. The chapter
argues that a more nuanced approach is needed to study the smart city, one that accounts
for the logistical affordances of urban computational media technologies while
simultaneously situating those within cultural-political struggles around the legitimacy of
smart city interventions.
The dissertation then moves to consider three case studies, each of which focuses
on the cultural-political dimensions of smart city interventions. The selection of these
case studies is meant to reflect the wide range of interventions taking place in the actually
existing smart city.
The first, “Interface, Imaginary, and the Future of Public Space” (Chapter 2),
engages with theoretical debates about smart city interfaces as points of exchange
between citizens and the smart city, focusing specifically on the case of LinkNYC.
LinkNYC is a network of kiosks installed throughout New York to replace the city’s
aging public payphones and is the product of a public-private partnership between the
City of New York and a consortium of technology manufacturing and design firms. The
chapter traces the development of LinkNYC. It begins with a design competition in
which New York City’s design and technology communities were invited to “reinvent the
payphone.” It then details the request for proposals (RFP) phase, the franchise award, and
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the franchisees’ buy-out by a Google-backed company called Sidewalk Labs.
Throughout, the chapter examines some of LinkNYC’s core failures and concerns that
were raised by citizen groups and local politicians. It then returns to the beginning of this
history—the public design competition phase—to examine four prototypes that offer
alternatives to LinkNYC’s commercially-driven business model. These provide empirical
points of departure for a critique of LinkNYC’s kiosk interfaces.
The second case study, “Autonomy and Control in the On-Demand Economy”
(Chapter 3), considers discourses of technologically-driven transformations in work and
labor in the smart city. The so-called “gig,” “sharing”, or “on-demand” economy is
framed as an innovative application of Internet of Things (IoT) concepts to urban spaces.
Mainstream rhetoric suggests that networked computational media and commercial
platforms can provide new market opportunities by linking demand (consumers) with
providers of goods and services. On-demand companies frame themselves as
“technological middleman” to mediate these interactions and exchanges. I contest these
assumptions by considering the experiences of workers (“service providers”) at courier
and ride-hailing companies. I focus on the centrality of workers’ designation as
independent contractors and company strategies to ensure that they remain as such. I
describe these as “strategies of arbitrage” because companies are constantly arbitraging
between competing demands: allowing workers enough autonomy that the independent
contractor designation can be maintained, while also exerting enough control over
workers to maintain smooth operations. The chapter concludes by theorizing the
intuitions that workers develop in response to such strategies, and consider how these
affect their calculations in everyday on-the-job decisions.
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The third and final case study, “Performance and Performativity in Predictive
Policing” (Chapter 4), considers debates about police uses of technology—whether they
ameliorate or exacerbate bias and discrimination in urban policing. The chapter focuses
on HunchLab, a “predictive policing” software suite. Predictive policing refers to police
departments’ use of algorithms to make data-analytic predictions about the locations,
times, and types of crimes that will occur to inform resource allocation and patrol
deployment decisions. The chapter looks to how the product managers and developers at
HunchLab engage with the debates about police use of predictive algorithms, and traces
attempts to instill progressive values in algorithm design. I argue that in order to
understand how HunchLab is approaching these issues, one must turn from questions of
predictive performance—how accurately the model predicts crimes—to those of
performativity—or how acting on predictions affects the conditions represented within the
model. The chapter then moves to situate predictive policing—and, specifically,
HunchLab’s engagement with predictive performativity—within a longer lineage of
“police media” in order to discuss its historical precedents and future ramifications.
The dissertation then concludes by asking what it would mean to re-politicize the
smart city (Chapter 5, “Conclusion: A Repoliticized Smart City?”). The chapter provides
a summary of key themes that emerge across the case studies. These include: how system
managers seek to maintain legitimacy when challenged by critics; the centrality of
interface design and information asymmetries in smart city infrastructures; the
modulation of controls at the level of fleets and statistical aggregates; and the role of
cultural foundations to compensate for smart city systems’ inability to automate key
functions.
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I then argue that the coordinative functions of smart city systems need to
conceptualized at their logical extreme in order to highlight their dangerous potential.
Researchers need to expand the scope of what can count as a smart city intervention, and
the chapter offers the example of an immigration “raid response” system called Sanctuary
in the Streets. In Sanctuary in the Streets, community members not at risk for deportation
rally at the physical sites where immigration raids are taking place to conduct civillydisobedient actions. I argue that this exemplifies all of the features of an urban data
infrastructure but avoids the pitfalls of typical smart city solutionism: it operates
according to an ethics of care and community maintenance, rather than exploiting
efficiencies to produce value for system managers.
The dissertation offers a much-needed critical, ethnographic perspective on
technology-based urban interventions. It shows how these over-emphasize logistical
efficiencies as an ideal to be realized over competing demands, and, in the process,
drown out competing claims about what cities are and how municipal services should be
delivered and to whom. By highlighting the cultural-political struggles that attend smart
city interventions, the dissertation adds nuance to ongoing debates about the future of the
city. It will be useful to both practitioners and critical scholars of cities and technology.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL
POLITICS, SMART CITIES, LOGISTICAL MEDIA
Design, Control, Predict: Cultural Politics in the Actually Existing Smart City studies the
discourses, rhetorics, intuitions, logics, policies, imaginaries, and imageries that animate
the application of computational media technologies to urban processes. It analyzes the
conflicting narratives and contradictory accounts of seemingly neutral and disinterested
technological solutions to longstanding “urban problems.” The term cultural politics is an
apt descriptor for these issues, as the case studies presented here detail struggles to
articulate, define, and render legible highly complex, unruly, and often woolly urban
processes as technical deficiencies to be resolved through technocratic intervention.
What can be made to count as an urban problem is highly contestable. It depends
a great deal on who is defining the problem and how it is represented. Foucault uses the
term “problematization” to refer to how certain fields, sites, and practices are constructed
as objects of thought, of representation and intervention. A “problematization,” Foucault
writes, “does not mean the representation of a pre-existent object nor the creation through
discourse of an object that did not exist. It is the ensemble of discursive and nondiscursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and
constitute it as an object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific
knowledge, political analysis, etc)” (quoted in Rabinow, 2003, p. 18; see Foucault, 1998).
This use of the term distinguishes Foucault’s conceptualization of problematics from
semiotic, representationalist, and even “social constructivist” theoretical orientations to
cultural politics. Problematization is not about the greater or lesser fidelity of
representational practices, nor the peeling back of discourse to reveal the constructedness
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of seemingly natural phenomena, but rather the ways that something as abstract and
variable as “the city” can cohere as an object of truth and action—as a discrete set of
problems which motivate and respond to particular sets of solutions.
Struggles to define urban problems have long beleaguered scholars and
practitioners, from state and municipal governments to religious and humanist reformists
to private interests (Castells, 1973; Herbert & Smith, 1979; Poovey, 1995). On one hand,
cities are seen to be invaluable as engines of economic activity: they provide the spaces
and means for the manufacture, circulation, trade, and exchange of commodities, goods,
information and services (e.g., Glaeser, 2011). But in the same breath they can also be
defined as troublesome and unruly, hotbeds of vice, poverty, and congestion (Bishop &
Phillips, 2013; Foucault, 2007; Osborne & Rose, 1999; Poovey, 1995; Sennett, 1991;
1994). This presents authorities with an ambiguous object, both in terms of knowledge
and of intervention (Castells, 1973; Merrifield, 2014; Wachsmuth, 2014). History is
populated by problematizations of the urban—attempts to identify and eliminate urban
problems while still preserving the virtuous quality of cities (Osborne & Rose, 1999;
2004). In certain cases, this has led planning experts and politicians to re-engineer city
forms wholesale (Berman, 1983; Harvey, 2008; Holston, 1989; Scott, 1998). But “urban
problems” nonetheless persist, often in unanticipated ways. What changes are how the
problems are defined, by whom, and with what solutions in mind.
If the identification of urban problems is contestable, so too are the technocratic
solutions that have come to dominate responses to the “urban problematic” in recent
years (Bishop & Phillips, 2013; 2014). The case studies presented in this dissertation look
specifically at how data-generative, computational media technologies—sensors
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embedded in urban infrastructures, smartphone-enabled service provision, predictive
algorithms—get framed as solutions, and how these solutions, in turn, affect what kinds
of urban problems can become addressable. Morozov (2013) describes the belief that
social problems can be solved by technology as “digital solutionism.” Digital solutionism
requires cultural work. It rests upon discursive framings, iconographies, and historicallycontingent ideologies of objectivity, scientific rationality, and neutrality (Daston &
Galison, 2010). But these cultural groundings are so often overlooked precisely because
they claim to be non-cultural (Latour, 1993; Mazzarella, 2004). As I argue throughout the
dissertation, the application of computational media technologies to urban problems
formalizes ways of seeing the world and acting in it. Technologies institutionalize
categorizations and classifications (Bowker & Star, 1999; Dourish & Bell, 2007; Pinch,
2008). When applied as solutions to urban problems, they affect how mundane material,
spatial, and social arrangements of the city take shape (Simone, 2004; Winner, 1980).
Of course, the application of computational technologies and scientific
rationalities to urban problems is not new (e.g., Rand, 1970; cf. Halpern, 2014; Kargon &
Molella, 2008; Light, 2003; Mattern, 2016). Assertions of scientific objectivity were
deployed by progressives and reformers beginning in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries (Poovey, 1995; Wiebe, 1966), and then again after the Second World
War, as an expert class of private consultants and engineers emerged in the US seeking to
“rationalize” the management of urban spaces and infrastructures (Light, 2003).
Midcentury rationalist interventions emphasized partitioning cities into discrete and tidy
zones of activity. Such zoning quickly led to de facto forms of segregations, most
perniciously by race, ethnicity, and class, and resulted in disastrous unintended
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consequences that sowed the seeds of new urban crises (Harvey, 2006; Hirt, 2014;
Kargon & Molella, 2008; Katz, 2012; Katznelson, 1982; Massey & Denton, 1993;
Sugrue, 2014).
The solutionism of the current moment updates these logics, albeit on a more
granular scale. Particularly notable is the extent to which digital urbanism has become
consensus amongst urban experts and practitioners (e.g., Goldsmith & Crawford, 2014;
Townsend, 2013; 2015). It has also become big business. A market has emerged for datadriven urban solutions and, as of 2014, is expected to be worth upwards of $1.5 trillion
by 2020 (Frost & Sullivan, 2014). In January, 2018, the Consumer Electronics Show—
arguably the most important single technology convention—featured more urban
technological applications than gaming products or drones for the first time (Bliss, 2018).
Private companies—from global consulting firms like Deloitte to tech giants like
Microsoft, Google, and IBM, to smaller-scale data analytics firms and “last mile”
logistics providers—jockey to peddle software suites and urban dashboards to municipal
and state governments (Kitchin, Maalsen & McArdle, 2015). But the supply is matched
by demand. Even as some progressive consumers decry corporate-governance, the
widespread adoption of the conveniences peddled to them by corporations like Amazon
and Uber complicates questions of resistance and complicity (Durrani, 2017). City
governments, for their part, are eager to partner with these companies, to offer up their
citizens and places as “laboratories” for innovation (Schrock, 2016), often in exchange
for discounted rates on software suites or hardware or for the complete outsourcing of
analytics to firms. On offer for municipalities is the almost-magical ability to “do more
with less” (Lohr, 2009), to enhance productivity through the discovery of new
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efficiencies (Gabrys, 2014)—to provision public goods despite dwindling public
resources (Zook, 2017).
The “smart city” is the term of art for these novel entanglements between
computational media technologies and technocratic urban governance. Although the
phrase first emerged as a corporate buzzword—leaving it ambiguous and open to
strategic recoding and appropriation (Kitchin, 2014; Söderström, Paasche & Klauser,
2014)—it nonetheless continues to be used widely by practitioners when referring to
urban technological innovation and public-private partnerships between municipalities
and tech companies (Sterling, 2018). In this sense, the smart city is less a theoretical
concept than an object of inquiry—an intellectual technology at work in social worlds
(Miller & Rose, 2008). For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the term “smart city” to
refer to the integration of privately-held data infrastructures with publicly-managed
physical infrastructures, fomenting new mediations of urban processes through statistical
data. Computational media technologies analyze this to “optimize” the management of
urban systems and services through the discovery of “actionable insights”—correlations
and connections between disparate phenomena as revealed through the data (e.g., IBM,
2016). The goal is to maximize efficiency and control on all fronts (Gabrys, 2014;
Vanolo, 2014; Zook, 2017).
Perhaps most troublingly, the solutionism of the “smart city” promotes data
generation and analysis as core tasks for governing, even as these tasks are outsourced to
private firms. To advocates, the smart city and its closely-related developments (the
“Internet of Things,” ubiquitous computing, etc.) herald a new urban-industrial
revolution—analogous to the steam engine, the electricity grid, and the automobile
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(Townsend, 2013; see also Mattern, 2017)—and thus call for a new logic of data-driven
governance. While these grand claims may be little more than techno-urban boosterism
(Pollio, 2015), they are also important indices of the smart city’s fetishization of
technology—what Graham and Marvin (2001, p. 135) describe as “the celebration of
[technology’s] surface appeal whilst ignoring or covering up the broader social relations
that produce and surround it.” This becomes problematic when it leads to an overdetermination of the urban problem-solution relationship—a confusion between the
means and ends of technological upgrading and, as a result, a distortion in the
commitments and priorities of urban governing. As Matthew Zook (2017, p. 5) puts it, in
the smart city, “urban governance becomes a matter of managing information technology
to efficiently construct data flows (big or otherwise), which by their enactment defines
what constitutes an ‘urban problem.’” Problems, in other words, can be defined the
available solutions. Gabrys (2014) uses the term “programmability” to describe the way
that computational technologies and logics are applied to different urban contexts, “where
computational approaches to perceived urban ‘problems’ may inform how these issues
are initially framed in order to be computable” (p. 40, original emphasis).
This fetishization of computational media technologies blurs the line between
infrastructures for urban data flows as a means to identify and represent urban problems,
and as solution unto themselves. The cultural politics of the smart city, then, orients to
the role that discourses, iconographies, and practices necessarily play in bringing these
data-centric logics of governing to fruition—or, in many cases, in dealing with the
unintended consequences, negative externalities, and new problems that stem from the
application of computational logics to urban problems.

7

THE SMART CITY AS GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGE
There are two ways that the smart city might be conceptualized as an object of culturalpolitical inquiry. On the one hand is a placeless imaginary of the city of the future—what
James Merrick White (2016) calls the “global smart city imaginary.” This vision of the
smart city disengages from any specific context. It takes shape in diagrams that detail
interconnections between physical architectures and computational infrastructures (see
Figure 1.1), or in the speculative architectural renderings of pristine, unpopulated urban
districts (see Figure 1.2). These are the imageries put forth by companies seeking
lucrative partnerships with city governments—IBM, Cisco, Siemens, Microsoft, and
Google, among others. They present a specific vision of the smart city—the kind on
display at conferences like the IEEE International Smart Cities Conference or the Smart
Cities Innovation Summit, which are attended by thousands of industry representatives,
engineers, academics, technologists, and city, state, and national government officials
(Greenfield, 2013; Söderström, Paasche & Klauser, 2014; Townsend, 2013; White,
2016).
This imaginary is further propped up by a small number of paradigmatic and
spectacular case studies of self-contained smart cities—city- or district-sized smart city
prototypes, funded through public-private partnerships and built from scratch on
greenfield sites. These include New Songdo in South Korea, Masdar City in Abu Dhabi
(Figure 1.2), and PlanIT Valley in Portugal. These “cities” have an undeniably
expositional quality to them, reminiscent of World’s Fairs and the Epcot Center (Bennett,
2010; Halpern, 2014; Rydell, 1984). Their streets and surfaces are inundated with sensor
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networks and “doubly communicative” interfaces, which both collect data and distribute
information (Halpern et al., 2013). Their architecture is pristine; their streets and districts
are streamlined, seamless, orderly, efficient. And they can be operated by city and
corporate agents from command-and-control centers. As Halpern et al. (2013) suggest,
more than actual cities, these canonic exemplars function as “testbeds,” experimental
laboratories for a future of urban governance in which data collection becomes a
ubiquitous feature of the physical landscape itself.

Figure 1.1 Diagram of a smart city.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/5G_plans.jpg

Considering Figures 1.1 and 1.2 together—as different ideals of datafied urban
space—it becomes clear that there is a politics of urban form and morphology within
global smart city imaginaries. Figure 1.1 is borrowed from a European Union-sponsored
international workshop on the expansion of 5G cellular data standards and spectra. It
shows a series of “smart” connections between objects distributed throughout the urban
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environment. The image hints at how expanded communicability would lead to improved
infrastructures, from “Smart mobility,” “eHealth,” the “Connected house,” and “Security
& surveillance.” This diagram-like figure is indicative of the straightforwardness with
which smart city proponents assume informational extension and connection will
improve urban processes and conditions. It is clearly not meant to be life-like, but rather
to denote an any-place that, in its non-specificity, promotes an entirely status quo vision
of the city: for example, rather than challenge the premise that cars be the center of urban
life, the imagined landscape here bends to suit the unrivaled dominance of automobility
(Featherstone, 2004; Sheller & Urry, 2000); rather than probing humans’ entanglement
with material and technological infrastructures, the diagrammed city is neatly partitioned
into zones of human and infrastructural activity.

Figure 1.2 Architectural rendering of Masdar City, Abu Dhabi.
Source: https://c1.staticflickr.com/2/1230/5122241191_f3972b6474_b.jpg
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Figure 1.2, by contrast, invites the viewer into an urban realism. We are presented
with a “god’s eye view” of Masdar City—one of the canonical smart city prototypes
mentioned above: a planned, self-contained, sustainable enclave currently under
construction about ten miles east of Abu Dhabi. Given that Masdar, at the time of writing,
is not yet complete (at least, not as depicted), the image can be understood as presenting
an anticipated reality. It conveys not the virtuality of a potential any-place, but an
imminent actuality of a specific place: the city that will be. The angle at which the viewer
glimpses the city mimics the way its urban footprint would be seen if approached by jet.
The clouds give the viewer a sense of anticipatory aerial movement. In place of the
diagram-like components in Figure 1.1, we are shown Masdar’s architectural majesty and
wholeness. The city, resembling a computer chip, takes shape in its concise and legible
rows of buildings, trees, and energy facilities, which appear intended to be read from
above (Scott, 1998). The only remotely non-linear component appears to be a light-rail
line, which cuts an organic-looking “S”-shape through the grid form. Jutting out from the
surrounding desert like order amid chaos, the image foretastes a future city in which the
congestion, pollution, and decay of the metropolis are designed and planned away before
they can ever materialize.
Despite these differences, the two images help to illustrate what White means by a
global smart city imaginary. They anticipate a city or a set of relations within a city in
which smoothness and legibility are baked into the very essence of the built environment;
where technological connectivity and the flow of information serves as an urban pulse.
The images operate on morphological and topological scales that exceed the human,
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while simultaneously promising a more humane geography as a result of technological
overture.
The contrast to the global smart city imaginary is what Shelton, Zook and Wiig
(2015) call the “actually existing smart city”1—the geographically- and historicallysituated manifestations of smart city interventions. The actually existing smart city calls
attention to the contingencies that affect the digital reorganization of urban
infrastructures. Rather than the smooth surfaces and rational arrangements of the global
smart city imaginary, the actually existing smart city is uneven, maldistributed, and
contested (see Hoyng, 2015). It has false starts, unpopulated spreadsheets, shuttered
websites, and defunct platforms (Wiig, 2016). It resides in the bureaucracy of city
governments, the austerity of budgets, the precarity of workforces, and the whims of
start-ups and entrepreneurs. The actually existing smart city focuses on the negotiations
of what counts as an urban problem in need of solving, and how this in turn affects local
institutions. It connects how “problems are conceived to the material effects of datadriven policy initiatives in actual cities around the world” (Shelton, Zook & Wiig, 2015,
p. 14). If the global smart city imaginary is, like ubiquitous computing, always on the
temporal horizon—a proximate future to which we never seem to arrive (Bell & Dourish,
2007, p. 134)—then the actually existing smart city is about the ways in which this vision
is already here, on the ground, and being deployed in fitful starts and stops through
existing channels and infrastructures. “Rather than constructed on tabula rasa according

1

The term “actually existing smart city” is a reference to Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) use of
“actually existing neoliberalism,” which in turn refers back to 20th century debates about “actually
existing capitalism” and “actually existing socialism” (e.g., Williams, 1980). See specifically
Shelton, Zook & Wiig, 2015.
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to the centralized plans of multinational technology corporations,” the actually existing
smart city is “always the outcome of, and awkwardly integrated into, existing social and
spatial constellations of urban governance and the built environment” (Shelton, Zook &
Wiig, 2015, p. 14).
This is not to say that global smart city imaginaries do not play a role in local
interventions. As White (2016) suggests, smart city imaginaries motivate and animate
actual implementations. Global visions provide the conceptual language for local
projects, defining the terms of debate, delimiting the kinds of problems that city
managers and urban experts can articulate, and setting expectations about what
technology-based solutions can accomplish. In one example of this, consider IBM’s
partnership with the City of Portland, Oregon, to “develop an interactive model of the
relationships that exist among the city’s core systems, including the economy, housing,
education, public safety, transportation, healthcare/wellness, government services and
utilities” (IBM, 2011). IBM offered Portland’s government a computer simulation to
simplify systemic complexities through data visualizations. Portland’s mayor apparently
took the corporate rhetoric of urban intelligence and data omniscience so literally that
city employees had to constantly “make sure that he understood that models aren’t
oracles” (Townsend, 2013, p. 89).
Orienting to actually existing smart city interventions means examining how
smart city imaginaries and visions are translated and implemented in local initiatives. The
smart city is not reinvented by every state or municipal government when a new initiative
is conceived (Söderström, Paasche & Klauser, 2014; White, 2016), but plans never come
off exactly as predicted or anticipated.
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The relationship between the smart city’s global imaginary and its actually
existing, localized manifestations reflects what anthropologists Stephen J. Collier and
Aihwa Ong (2005) have theorized as a “global assemblage.” Global assemblages refer to
the ways in which abstract conceptual phenomena—“intellectual technologies” (Miller
and Rose, 2008), “cultural techniques” (Siegert, 2015), and epistemologies (Halpern,
2014)—manifest within particular contexts and situations. Global assemblages are
“abstractable, mobile, and dynamic, moving across and reconstituting ‘society,’ ‘culture,’
and ‘economy’ [as they] are articulated in specific situations—or territorialized in
assemblages” (ibid., p. 4). They are globalizing in scope and intent, but require the
“friction” of contact points in local, institutional and cultural contexts in order to take
hold (Tsing, 2005).
Approaching the smart city through the conceptual lens of the global assemblage
is useful for avoiding reductionist dichotomies. Dichotomies can easily turn into
hierarchies, with de facto moral valences ascribed to different forms. One such distinction
is between “top-down” and “bottom-up” configurations of the smart city. A number of
smart city critics employ this distinction, arguing that the paradigmatic smart city
exemplars—Songdo, PlanIT Valley, Masdar City—rely on an overly rationalized and
unrealistic orchestration of social life, reminiscent of 19th and 20th century master
planners from Baron Haussmann to Le Corbusier to Robert Moses (e.g., Greenfield,
2013; Townsend, 2013). Richard Sennett (2012), for example, describes the smart city’s
conjunction of architectural uniformity, ubiquitous surveillance, and centralized
command-and-control operations as “stupefying,” and likens the Songdo development in
Korea to midcentury British public housing estates. Technologist Adam Greenfield
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(2013) connects formal features of Portugal’s PlanIT Valley with the “strict functional
segregation of activity into designated, single-purpose districts” characteristic of Le
Corbusier’s rationalist vision for the city in his 1924 Plan Voisin. According to these
critiques, if the smart city demonstrates the same top-down tendencies of high modernist
urbanism, it is likely already doomed to repeat old mistakes and reproduce the modernist
city’s unintended consequences for social life: rigidity, homogenization, and inequality.
The issue is not that these critiques are unfounded. Rather, it is that they limit
themselves to the formalism of global smart city imaginaries without engaging with their
local, contextualized manifestations. In doing so, they imply that differently configured
arrangements of computational media technologies and urban spaces might be inherently
less power-laden, simply by virtue of their form.
The alternative to the top-down smart city approach is the “bottom-up” smart city.
The bottom-up smart city is not driven by city-scale data infrastructures, but by consumer
technologies like the smartphone. In this imaginary, power shifts from city governments
and their corporate partners into the hands of (some) citizens, by dint of their newly
acquired computing power. For example, Tim Smedley (2013) argues in The New
Scientist that the bottom-up smart city is not motivated by the “billion-dollar investments
made by city authorities, but [by] the smartphones we carry and our internet-connected
homes”—by the apps and social networks that “allow us to navigate, edit and influence
the cities we live in, telling authorities rather than waiting to be told.” Free market and
urban development blog Market Urbanism echoes this view when its authors suggest that
smartphone “apps allow solutions to urban problems to develop from the ground up”
(Gray, 2016).
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Approaching the smart city as global assemblage complicates the hierarchy of
top-down and bottom-up smart urbanisms. Because the global assemblage approach
focuses on how imaginaries are translated into concrete situations, it becomes impossible
to distinguish, a priori, between progressive and regressive digital configurations of
urban infrastructures. In their actually existing contexts, “bottom-up” approaches can
easily be coopted by corporations’ attempts to define the urban problems that need
solving in ways that adhere to the “solutions” that they are promoting, and to then secure
those specific configurations of computational media technologies through lucrative city
and state contracts.
Consider the practice of sourcing of public inputs for smart city projects. This is
often assumed to be a bottom-up antidote to top-down planning and implementation, as it
promises to include “the public” in articulating what urban problems should and can be
addressed by data-driven solutions. However, examining community inputting on a
digital survey, Matthew Wilson (2011) shows this assumption to be unfounded. Even
when local publics are enrolled in data-driven interventions, institutional categories like
“asset” or “deficit” can impose moral order on how community members see and encode
the physical landscape as data. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, titled “Interface,
Imaginary and the Future of Public Space,” I explore how a public design competition
aimed at sourcing public inputs on a smart city infrastructure was used to lend legitimacy
to partnerships between the City of New York and major corporate interests. In this case,
what looks prima facie like a bottom-up intervention can easily be reconfigured to suit a
vision of the smart city that is driven by advertising revenue rather than public benefit.
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Another implicit assumption of the bottom-up smart city is that the growing
ubiquity of consumer-grade mobile computing (i.e., the smartphone) will lead to a
democratization of power and agency amongst urban publics. For example, former
Executive Architect to IBM UK’s Smarter Cities division, Rick Robinson (2014), writes
that smartphones “make immense power available to bottom-up, small-scale activity.”
But, as Alan Wiig (2016) points out, this same “easy utility of personal connectivity to
the mobile internet” has enabled cities to put a digital spin on austerity measures,
replacing physical offices for city services with low-cost (but often unused) online
platforms. Further, as Robinson (2014) continues, the mobile computing power of
smartphones is seen to pave the way for “local innovations, [which] have resulted in the
emergence of significant economic trends such as the ‘sharing economy.’” I challenge
these assumptions in Chapter 3, “Autonomy and Control in the On-Demand Economy.”
Here I dispute claims like Robinson’s, which argue that business models built around the
“sharing economy”—in which smartphone apps are designed to connect independent
service providers with customers (also referred to as the “gig” or “on-demand”
economy)—are democratizing labor in the service sector. Such assertions overlook the
fact that smartphones’ “easy utility of personal connectivity” can be as easily leveraged
by large corporate actors as by small business owners or citizens. Further, this allows ondemand firms—many of which are backed by venture capital and operate in dozens of
cities internationally—to use the language of technology to shroud their exploitative
labor practices and develop subtle design mechanisms to skirt regulations. Looking to
actually existing arrangements of technology and service labor in cities, what might seem
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from the outside as an exemplar of “bottom-up” smart urbanism instead appears as
regulatory arbitrage and an outsourcing of overhead costs to service workers themselves.
As a final assumption about the inherent progressiveness of bottom-up smart city
configurations, consider the push toward open data. Open data refers to the maintenance
and publication of data sets by governmental bodies, typically in spreadsheets or other
machine-readable formats, and is closely associated with ideals of enlightened
governmental transparency (cf. Ananny & Crawford, 2016). In the context of the smart
city, open data is often discussed as a tool of empowerment for citizenries. Urban planner
and digital services manager Alicia Rouault (2013) suggests that, “As the municipal open
data movement spreads across the globe… we can begin to redefine the role of the citizen
group within the context of data. We can see data as a currency of legitimacy and a
strategy for influencing the very scale of information upon which political leaders make
development decisions.” But open data sets—for instance, real estate data—are also
utilized by tech-savvy and wealthy neighborhood residents in ways that might reinforce
already fractured and uneven patterns of local development (Burrows & Ellison, 2004),
or by companies that one would more readily associate with a top-down smart city
approach—for instance, in the world of police technology and predictive crime analytics
(cf. Sadowski & Pasquale, 2015). As I show in Chapter 4, “Performance and
Performativity in Predictive Policing,” start-ups in the police technology sector are taking
advantage of open data in ways that some proponents might find to be ethically
compromised. In the context of predictive policing, open data can serve as training fodder
for machine learning algorithms to hone their predictive accuracy when targeting police
patrols, typically without checks or balances to ensure fairness or accountability (Brayne,
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Rosenblat & boyd, 2015; Ensign et al., 2017). The openness of the data, in other words, is
not enough to ensure that it will be used in ways that benefit all constituencies.
Conceptualizing the smart city as a global assemblage—as a dialectic between the
abstract global smart city imaginary and its actually existing implementations—unsettles
hierarchical dichotomizations of the smart city into top-down and bottom-up variations.
This has a number of implications for how we go about understanding urban applications
of digital solutionism. For one, whether any individual intervention can be categorized as
progressive or regressive cannot be determined a priori. The political nature of a digitalurban intervention is not inherent to the formal properties of its configuration, but rather
an emergent and relational quality, contingent upon the specific circumstances of its
concrete implementation. One antidote to this type of thinking might build on Adam
Greenfield’s (2010) notion of “read/write urbanism,” which describes a more nuanced
way of thinking about city governments and citizens identifying urban issues in need of
attention. Greenfield’s schema of addressability, queryability, and scriptability calls
attention to the fact that supposedly “bottom-up” and “top-down” interventions are
always mutually imbricated—citizen groups identify a problem (say, a downed telephone
line) and call municipal agencies’ attention to it through a platform like 311—and allows
for analysis that focuses on how agency is performed as such interactions take shape.
Building on this, another implication of departing from the “top-down” / “bottomup” dichotomy is that given the political a posteriori of the smart city, these descriptors
might be best understood as legitimating frames for smart city interventions—attempts to
provide an authoritative interpretation of a given smart city project. The ideological
connotations of the hierarchy are impossible to ignore: where “top-down” suggests a
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dictatorial or sovereign-like power to intervene, “bottom-up” connotes efforts that seem
to be free of power—grass roots or citizen-driven, rather than state- or corporate-backed.
Both of these conclusions point to the need for in-depth and careful analysis of the
cultural-political struggles that play out in, and shape the circumstances of, attempts to
reconfigure urban infrastructures through data-driven intervention.

THE SMART CITY MEDIA AS LOGISTICAL MEDIA
In addition to analyzing the cultural politics that animate the field of smart city
solutionism, Design, Control, Predict also offers a media-centric approach to the study of
the smart city. The seemingly disparate case studies presented here—designs for a digital
advertising and Wi-Fi infrastructure in New York (Chapter 2), smartphone interfaces and
workforce control in the “on-demand economy” (Chapter 3), and a software suite for
predicting crimes (Chapter 4)—are connected through a common theorization of smart
city media as logistical media.
The concept of logistical media has recently come to the fore in Anglo-American
media studies, following its theorization by English-speaking scholars influenced by
German and Canadian media theory (see Packer, 2013; Rossiter, 2015; Young, 2015).
John Durham Peters’ (2013) essay on the logistical media of calendars, clocks, and
towers has been particularly influential. Citing the coordinative functions of these ancient
media formats, Peters suggests that calendars, clocks, and towers are bust understood as
logistical in their functioning: their primary concern is with the arrangement of “people
and property into time and space” (ibid., p. 41). Peters views logistical media as operating
in parallel with other media—such as those that transcend time (as in texts or other
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recordings) or extend over space (as in transmission, broadcast, etc.) (cf. Carey, 2009;
Innis, 1951). Peters even goes so far as to suggest that logistical media precede these
other functions, operating “prior to and form[ing] the grid in which messages are sent”
(Peters, 2013, p. 41). They “establish basic coordinates of time and space” and, as such,
appear “neutral and given—something which gives them extraordinary power” (ibid., p.
42).
As with Peters’ logistical media exemplars of calendars, clocks, and towers, the
computational media technologies of the smart city are concerned principally with the
arrangement and movement of people and property. They operate on what AbdouMaliq
Simone (2011, p. 356) describes as the surfacing of urban spaces—“the provisionally
stitched together, jigged up intersections of bodies and materials upon which things are
both moved and caught.” Of course, the smart city’s technological fetishism updates old
logistical functions with flashy new capabilities—for instance, with the observation and
optimization of arrangements and mobilities in real-time (Kitchin, 2014), or by applying
advanced computational techniques to discover new efficiencies and then capitalizing on
that information (Andrejevic, Hearn & Kennedy, 2015). The complexity of contemporary
computational strategies shrouds the extent to which smart city media overlap and
intersect with objects and formats that are quite ancient—objects like sun-dials, structures
like religious cycles, and architectures like the minaret or steeple. Like these logistical
media of old, smart city technologies are coordinative, allocative, and organizational.
Theorists of logistical media argue that these functions require a departure from
media’s more “culture”-oriented roles—as narratival, symbolic, ritual, or representational
(Andrejevic, Hearn & Kennedy, 2015; Young, 2015). Peters (2013, p. 41), for instance,
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suggests that logistical media do not have cultural “content” as such, but “establish the
central points about which culture rotates” (Peters, 2013, p. 41). This aligns with German
media theory’s turn away from an analytics of culture and toward “cultural techniques”
(kulturtechniken; see Siegert, 2015). A cultural-technical approach abandons societal
level formations like “discourse,” “network,” or “media,” to instead focus on the ways in
which specific configurations of humans, objects, tools, and environments “assemble
basic categories of space, time and being” in and through their organization (Young,
2015). It privileges “inconspicuous techniques of knowledge like card indexes, media of
pedagogy like the slate, discourse operators like quotation marks, uses of the phonograph
in phonetics, or techniques of forming the individual like practices of teaching to read
and write” (Siegert, 2011, p. 14). Logistical media theory, with its focus on the
coordinative, allocative, and organizational, has an affinity with this lineage.
A major concern, however, is that by jettisoning the “cultural” for its
“techniques,” a logistical media approach runs the risk of missing the cultural-political
struggles that play out as computational media technologies are deployed in novel
institutional contexts. As such, this dissertation adopts a less rigid interpretation. Rather
than a discrete category of medium, logistical media might instead be understood as an
affordance of all media technologies. Affordances point us to the distributional and
relational structuring of possibility across entanglements of humans, objects, and
environments (Hutchby, 2001). As Hutchby (2001, p. 444) writes, focusing on
technological affordances avoids a reductive dichotomy between technologies’ purely
“interpretive textual” properties and their “essential technical” properties. From this
perspective, even the heavily content-oriented mass media of the 19th and 20th centuries
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would have their own logistical affordances. For example, as Benedict Anderson (1983)
shows, the newspaper and the novel both played an important, coordinative role in the
development of affective attachments to national identity (see also Mazzarella, 2004). Or
consider that the television, along with its itinerant practices of sampling and ratings, has
been used to coordinate a market in audiences-as-commodities, to be bought and sold by
advertisers and other industry brokers (McGuigan & Manzerolle, 2014; Smythe, 1981).
The same is true of the ancient media that Peters considers: calendars, clocks, towers.
Each is laden with rich symbolism, ornate imagery, and ritual import that simultaneously
serve a logistical-coordinative function.2
From the perspective of affordance, then, the computational media technologies
currently being employed to reconfigure urban infrastructures are indeed oriented toward
the logistical rather than the cultural. Of course, the technological fetishism and digital
solutionism of the smart city may be largely ideological—for example, as a form of
“corporate storytelling” (Söderström, Paasche & Klauser, 2014; Vanolo, 2014; White,
2016). Yet the ways in which these technologies are designed and intended to function
emphasizes coordination, arrangement, and allocation over symbolism, ritual, or
narrative. Smart city media promise to aggregate data and metadata, and analyze them
using advanced machine learning techniques to discover new efficiencies and dynamics
in the movement of people and things in time and space. They claim to leverage

2

Marshall McLuhan (1964) would likely attribute media’s coordinative affordances to the power
of the forms that media technologies take—that is, as distinct from the content they convey. By
parsing medium from message, McLuhan sought to consider media as comprising a discrete set
of epistemological affordances (and constraints), with the societal adoption of a new medium
impacting how social dispensations could be coordinated, convened, and conceived of
(Mazzarella, 2004). “Profound changes… ensue from revolutions in cultural techniques of
information processing and consumption” that “new media” herald (Hansen, 2010, p. 175).

23
ubiquitous connectivity to “infrastructure” previously disparate materials, creating new
urban surfaces (Bowker & Star, 1999; Simone, 2011).
Smart city media require thinking beyond (but not discounting) traditional
commitments in Anglo-American media and cultural studies—representation, discourse,
and interpretation (Andrejevic, Hearn & Kennedy, 2015). This is not because
representation, discourse, and interpretation are no longer important, but rather because
the institutional imperatives driving smart city interventions have shifted toward the
logistical. Their focus is on tracking, sensing, and “locationing” (Kanngieser, 2013;
Rossiter, 2015; 2016), analyzing and optimizing, eking out new efficiencies that would
be inexplicable without the computational tools used to uncover them. As one computer
programmer put it during the course of my research, “I once heard a quote that said,
nobody really figured out what to do with computer technology until the 1990s. That’s
when they figured out what you could do is big-box chain stores and it just completely
wiped mom and pop stores off the map… Because what they realized was that what you
could do with computers is logistics.”3 Of course, one can do many other things with
computers: word processing, gaming, social networking, the manipulation of aesthetic
objects, surveillance. But as the programmer points out, it was the discovery of
computers’ logistical affordances—not its ritual, textual, or symbolic affordances—that
transformed the retail-industrial landscape.
As I show throughout the dissertation, tuning our attention to the smart city’s
exploitation of logistical affordances tracks with shifts in how media operate in relation
to institutional imperatives—the practices and negotiations by which social and cultural

3

Derek, computer programmer and coder at Azavea. Interview conducted Oct. 30, 2015.
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power is revealed and concealed. To put it another way, in the smart city, logistics and
logistical affordances are the ends to which other media strategy and tactics serve as the
means. For example, computational media technologies create patterns by which power is
differentially displayed or negated to differently-positioned actors, often fostering
asymmetries in information about systemic operations (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016;
Rossiter, 2016). Such asymmetries are fundamental to operations in the smart city. Smart
city systems—whether a Wi-Fi infrastructure, a worker-facing app in the on-demand
economy, or a predictive policing platform—selectively reveal information to users,
while simultaneously shrouding details about their own operations. “We’re empowered to
report failed trash pick-ups or rank our favorite hospitals, but not entitled to know what
happens to our personal data each time we pass through a toll booth” (Mattern, 2014).
But these asymmetries at the level of interface require subtle representational techniques:
with what aesthetic conceits is the interface designed to reveal only select information?
As the case studies probe how informational asymmetries influence the users of smart
city systems, the goal for system managers becomes clear—to discover ever finer-grained
sources of value to be extracted from mobile urban consumers (Chapter 2), to manage of
fleets of ostensibly independent and autonomous workers (Chapter 3), or to amplify the
surveillant capabilities of police patrols (Chapter 4). The collection, collation, and
analysis of big data and metadata across urban contexts produce logistical insights—
when and where to display messaging or when and where to locate a resource.
Notably, a distinguishing feature of the smart city’s digital solutionism is the
attempt to automate the discovery of such logistical efficiencies, typically through
algorithms that parse through and mine vast data sets generated automatically. Crandall
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(2010) refers to the application of such systems to the urban context as “calculative
mobilizations.” With technologies of calculative mobilization, “the urban realm is
understood through the spatialization of algorithmic operations” that predict and cluster
disparate phenomena in time and space, but which are largely concealed from general
awareness and knowledge (ibid., p. 68; Beer, 2009; Thrift, 2004; 2011). Arguably, the
calculative mobilizations that Crandall identifies share more in common with cultural
studies of “data mining” than with traditional analyses of urban mobility, such as de
Certeau’s (1984) distinction between tactical and strategic trajectories through city
spaces. Data mining refers to the application of machine learning algorithms to big data
sets in order to identify correlations amongst sometimes wildly disparate phenomena—
connections often undetectable and inexplicable to traditional statistical analysis.4 For
example, in their primer on cultural studies of data mining, Andrejevic, Hearn and
Kennedy offer the example of Google’s mining of Gmail users’ emails and the concerns
that this has raised with privacy activists. Rather than denying the surveillance, Google
has continuously sought to calm concerns by reiterating that “no humans read your
email.” This would of course be the fear if what Google was after was an interpretation of
the symbolic or ideological content of users emails. But that is not the case. Google is not
interested in interpreting, but in “arrang[ing] and sort[ing] people and their interactions

4

In general, data mining refers to computational processes that search for “actionable”
correlations in big data sets, but without necessarily starting from a hypothesis or theoretical
framing. Its applications in decision-making—from marketing to criminal justice sentencing
guidelines (Angwin et al., 2013; Barocas, Hood & Ziewitz, 2013)—suggests a departure from the
scientific method as it is traditionally understood (Popper, 1959). Data mining is not concerned
with why correlations might exist, but in rather what insights they can offer for predicting future
behaviors or events (see Mayer-Schönberger & Kukier, 2013). I explore this in greater detail in
Chapter 4, “Performance and Performativity in Predictive Policing;” see also Shapiro, 2017.
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according to the priorities set by Google’s business model”—functions which computers
are capable of performing without a human ever laying eyes on the contents of an email
(ibid.). The computational media of the smart city adapt techniques like Google’s mining
of users’ data and apply them to urban spaces, practices, and processes.
Jeremy Packer (2013) urges media and cultural studies scholars to be more
attentive to computational media technologies and their specific affordances. He suggests
that these can easily be overlooked if scholars remain committed to traditional “cultural”
commitments—interpretability, signification, and obfuscation. The central problem, as
Packer sees it, is that computational media are “first and foremost epistemological, not
ideological” (ibid., p. 295). They structure how we see and know the world. A computer
“predicts, collects, assesses, guides, directs, processes, opens, shuts, invades,
experiments, and expands every data-producing moment” (ibid.). Packer even goes so far
as to suggest that from the perspective of communication theory, such “epistemological”
functions stand in opposition to the “ideological”: while ideology “adds noise to the
system in order to obfuscate and mask the truth,” the computational attempts to “reduce
all noise and allow the truth of the universe to speak itself” (p. 296).
Of course, this distinction between ideology and epistemology is exaggerated.
After all, any claims to “the universal” are a sure sign that the ideological is alive and
well.5 Nonetheless, in its hyperbole, the dichotomy calls attention to shifts in emergent

5

Wendy Chun (2006; 2011) argues that the software and interfaces of computational media have
always mimicked and simulated the formal qualities of ideology. In one sense, following Kittler
(1995), Chun claims that users’ relationship to their hardware is always mediated by an
ideological relationship; the interface shrouds the material inscription processes occurring at the
device level. It functions, like Althusser’s definition of ideology, as a “’representation’ of the
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logics of mediation, which, in turn, shape how cities are to be understood as objects of
knowledge and intervention. In the 1970s, Castells (1973) and other critical urban
scholars focused on “urban ideologies”—how mediations and representations of the city
were made to serve the imperatives of capital (see Harvey, 1973; Wachsmuth, 2014).
These imperatives, of course, still motivate the identification of urban problems and the
appropriate solutions. But the media logics that play out in constructing the city as
such—the “discursive and non-discursive practices” that make the city “enter into the
play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought” (Foucault, quoted in
Rabinow, 2003, p. 18)—have changed.
As an example of how the media logics of representing the city have changed,
consider what Anthony Townsend (2015) calls the “new urban science.” The new urban
science refers a growing academic sub-discipline based on the application of data
analytics and computer science methodologies to urban problems (e.g., Batty, 2013; see
Mattern, 2013; Shelton, 2017). Like the “epistemological” for Packer, the new urban
science’s methodologies seek to cut through the noise of urban politics and allow the
truth of the city “to speak itself.” For example, as Townsend (2015, p. 207) writes,
“advocates of the new urban science hope that the great urban scholars of the future will
be as likely to be trained as theoretical physicists as sociologists.” This is not because
cities will have become less of a social phenomenon and more like the natural or physical
phenomena that physicists study, but because “the methods of these disciplines are well
matched to the scientific opportunity provided by the expanding array of observational

imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (quoted in Chun, 2006, p.
20). There is also a subjectifying function to the software-interface. An operating system “hails”
the user, “calls it and offers it a name or an image with which to identify” (ibid.).
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data about cities… [New urban scientists] possess a fascination for the great complexity
of cities, which they hope can be revealed and understood through better theory, better
models, and better data” (ibid.). One need only consider a controversial and oftendiscussed New York Times Magazine article titled “A Physicist Solves the City” (Lehrer,
2010) to get a sense of how the new urban science thinks about the city: as a problem of
complexity and natural law, not a messy conjunction of people, cultural intersections, and
capital. A “physicist solving the city” implies that the city adheres to the universal tenets
of mathematical formulae and that it could not be shaped by local contingencies and
cultural histories of urban disinvestment and inequality.
As emblematic of smart city logics, the new urban science parallels shifts in
media affordances from ideology, culture, and politics, to epistemology and logistics. But
the question remains as to how these shifts are justified and what effects they have on the
actually existing contexts in which they are deployed. This is where the cultural and
ideological come back into play. Completely jettisoning ideology in favor of
epistemology—to use Packer’s dichotomy—is wrongheaded for a number of reasons. To
do so, for example, would be to corroborate the boosterism of smart city vendors and the
methodological assumptions of new urban scientists, both of whom seek to define the city
as a series of technical problems. It would also miss the cultural work that these actors
perform in the world. The most fruitful approaches to the smart city will be those that can
address the epistemological functions of computational media technologies while at the
same time situating those interventions within their power-laden and ideologicallyfraught contexts. If a purely ideological approach misses computational media’s logistical
turn, then a purely epistemological approach would erroneously affirm claims about
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universal truths, the predictability of human behaviors, and technology’s inherent
democratic empowerment.
A more nuanced approach is needed. One example is Brett Neilson’s (2014)
analysis of supply chain management and just-in-time production systems—what he
describes as “the infrastructural conditions of contemporary capitalist production” (p. 78).
Today, these spaces are animated by “the controlled feedback of logistical data into
production and distribution” (ibid., p. 85)—a data-infrastructural ecology similar to the
calculative operations of smart city media. For Neilson, studying these conditions does
not entail a strict dichotomization between culture and coordination, ideology and
epistemology. Culture is not somehow excluded from these spaces. Building on Anna
Tsing’s (2009) research on the interpellation of cultural difference in “supply chain
capitalism,” Neilson finds that logistical practices—coordinative functions, arrangements,
sortings, spatializations—are “both productive of subjectivity and crucial to the
articulation of cultural difference,” even as they negate their own cultural foundations
(Neilson, 2014, p. 78; see also Cowan, 2014).
Approaching the smart city requires a similarly nuanced approach—an
engagement with the entanglements of computational media’s epistemological logics and
logistical affordances on one hand and, on the other, the ideological underpinnings and
cultural-political struggles that shape their manifestations in concrete contexts.

CASE STUDIES
The case studies presented in the dissertation were chosen to reflect the diversity of
social, economic, and political arenas to which smart city solutions and interventions
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have been applied. These include: a telecommunications infrastructure, new labor
management models, and predictive analytics in law enforcement. While not an
exhaustive cast of examples, the case studies nonetheless demonstrate the variety of
problematizations that play out as city infrastructures are rendered digital through data
collection, aggregation, and analysis. Each case study connects with much broader issues
of concern to critical social scientists: socioeconomic inequality and access to
information technology; workers’ autonomy and algorithmic management systems; and
the efficiency and biases of police patrols. But they also speak to the nuance and
contingencies of interventions situated in real contexts. What the case studies share in
common is an orientation to the cultural-political struggles that arise from, and often
come to define, the implementation of smart city solutions—the debates that take place as
corporate and governmental actors turn their attention to the “optimization” of urban
processes and the identification of “efficiencies.”
In Chapter 2, “Interface, Imaginary and the Future of Public Space,” I explore
how Google and its affiliates are working to expand their advertising-driven online
business model (Auletta, 2009) into New York City's public spaces. This is being
spearheaded with a network of “public communications structures” called LinkNYC. In
2016, a newly-founded company called Sidewalk Labs, a subsidiary of Google parent
company Alphabet, Inc., purchased a majority share of two firms—advertising and media
company Titan Outdoor and technology design consultancy Control Group—and merged
them into a single entity called Intersection. In partnership with technology manufacturer
Qualcomm and smart city infrastructure development firm Civiq Smartscapes,
Intersection is currently overseeing the installation of LinkNYC, replacing New York’s
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public payphones with networked digital kiosks. These look like large technological
monoliths, cast in matte metal and adorned with two 55” digital LED screens that display
a continuous rotation of advertisements, along with a much smaller touchscreen interface
for wayfinding services and telephone calls. When installation is complete, LinkNYC
will comprise between 7,500 and 10,000 Wi-Fi enabled kiosks distributed throughout the
city’s boroughs.
Behind the immediate interface and hidden from view, the Links are equipped
with an array of sensors and other measurement devices. These gather data about urban
populations and environments. Based on statements from executives at both Sidewalk
Labs and Intersection, this sensing equipment will be used to track, trace, and aggregate
the movements and browsing histories of New Yorkers—not only LinkNYC users, who
opted in to the terms and conditions of the free Wi-Fi, but any passerby carrying a Wi-Fi
enabled device, including smartphones. This data collection revolutionizes “digital outof-home” advertising, as it promises to directly measure the effectiveness of ads on
display by tracking viewers’ behaviors in real-time. Capturing smartphones’ unique, but
non-identifying, information in public space, LinkNYC’s managers will be able to create
dynamic pricing models for their ad sales based on quantitative measures of exposure—a
strategy that effectively reproduces Google’s online advertising model within the
physical space of the city (Auletta, 2009; Turow, 2013; 2017).
The chapter argues that the design of the LinkNYC kiosks is not incidental, that it
is in fact integral to the business model, as it shrouds the system’s surveillant functions
behind a smooth façade. Looking back to 2012 and 2013, prior to the city government’s
selection of LinkNYC to replace the payphone, the chapter shows that alternative designs
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and prototypes were considered but ultimately discarded in favor of LinkNYC’s
advertising-intensive business model. Specifically, I examine entries into a public design
competition held by New York City’s Department of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (DoITT) under Mayor Michael Bloomberg. The competition
challenged New York’s design and technology communities to “reinvent the payphone”
for the 21st century. Over 120 prototypes and designs were submitted, displaying a
striking diversity of imagination in what the future city might look like. While a number
of submissions were not dissimilar to LinkNYC—insofar as they were also interested in
the tracking, tracing, and monitoring of urban populations—others presented alternative
visions entirely, eschewing commercially driven omnibus data collection in favor of
public benefit. I conduct close readings of four designs entered into this competition—
NYC Via, Smart Sidewalks, Windchimes, and Digital Democracy—to explore the role that
interface design plays in shaping what Lisa Parks (2014) calls “infrastructural
imaginaries”: ways of thinking about urban infrastructures and whom they serve.
In Chapter 3, “Autonomy and Control in the On-Demand Economy,” I focus on
ride-hailing and delivery services in the on-demand economy. On-demand companies
(sometimes called “gig” or “sharing” economy firms) manage technological
marketplaces, purporting to simply connect independent service providers with
customers. They have been hailed as an exemplary application of the “Internet of Things”
to the smart city: customers place an order for goods or services on their smartphone, and
service providers, logged into the company app, receive the work order. The chapter
shows that the profitability of the business model depends on a thin veneer of worker
autonomy. Allowing workers autonomy in on-the-job decisions enables firms to
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designate them as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby avoiding costly
overhead expenses and regulations: minimum wage, overtime, anti-discrimination laws,
contributions to Social Security, Medicare, workers’ compensation, unemployment
coverage, and health insurance. Job-associated costs are instead incurred by the workers
themselves. For example, in order to work as a driver for ride-hailing firm Uber or
courier service Postmates, workers must provide their own smartphone, their own data
plan, their own vehicle, and cover their own insurance costs.
However, maintaining the independent contractor designation and ensuring
workers autonomy implies a set of criteria to which companies must adhere. Workers
must have a certain degree of autonomy relative to traditional employer-employee
relationships. This includes worker self-scheduling and the option to reject orders that
they find undesirable or unprofitable. The problem is that these criteria present
companies with pragmatic managerial challenges. For instance, when workers are able to
self-schedule, they might choose to not work during inconvenient periods (for example, a
major holiday or in bad weather). If too many workers decide not to work during a high
demand period, this could lead to patchy coverage and customer dissatisfaction (Gurvich,
Lariviere & Moreno, 2016).
Companies have thus developed strategies to have it both ways—to both ensure
that workers have sufficient autonomy to maintain the independent contractor designation
and to exert enough control over the workforce that the pragmatic challenges of fleet
management can be overcome. I describe these strategies as a form of arbitrage that
exploit extant labor regulations in order to outsource the majority of overhead costs to
workers. The chapter explores these arbitrage techniques through the lens of worker
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experiences at courier and ride-hailing on-demand companies. Ethnographic observations
and interview data reveal that a key component of companies’ managerial strategizing
entails the selective display of information on worker-facing smartphone apps. These are
the programs through which workers receive information about jobs (a ride pick-up
location, or a restaurant order), and often serve as the only point of contact between
workers and company management. As a result, how information is conveyed and
structured can influence workers’ supposedly autonomous decision-making. I show how
workers become savvy of these strategies and that they cultivate intuitions and tactics of
their own, often in response to specific strategies, and finally that these tactics have the
potential to undermine company attempts to influence workers’ on-the-job decisionmaking.
Chapter 4, “Performance and Performativity in Predictive Policing,” looks to the
application of artificial intelligence to automate crime data analysis and to make finegrained, block-level predictions about the locations and times of crimes. Predictive
policing systems are a prominent and widely criticized smart city application. Austere
police department budgets have led law enforcement leaders to seek out third-party
technologies to enhance the efficacy of police patrol resources in the field—to serve as
“force multipliers.” At the same time, critical observers of predictive policing and other
technologies have raised serious concerns about the likelihood that such predictions will
cause vicious performative feedback loops, in which the police’s discriminatory patrol
patterns are reinforced through the data that train predictive algorithms, ultimately
resulting in further harm to already poor and over-policed communities of color. The
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chapter looks to one predictive policing product suite, HunchLab, to examine the ways
that these critiques shape technology design.
In order to do so, the chapter examines the difference between the performance
and performativity of predictive analytics. Performance refers to the accuracy of
predictions relative to ground truth data (that is, how likely is it that a predicted crime
will actually take place in the designated place and time), while performativity speaks to
the effects that acting on predictions has on the conditions being predicted.
Performativity occupies a more complex register than performance, and in the context of
predictive policing, is animated by a competing set of tensions. I address two such
tensions. The first deals with officers’ “buy-in” or belief in a predictive system’s
accuracy, as this affects their willingness to adhere to predictions in their patrolling—to
actually patrol in predicted crime hot spots. The second tension deals with officers’
presence in the field, as this affects system managers’ ability to test the accuracy of
predictions—whether crime actually takes place in predicted hot spots. Once a predictive
system has been deployed across a jurisdiction and patrols are directed according to the
crime modeling, the predictions becomes unfalsifiable: the observer effect of the police
officer in the predicted hot spot affects and alters the contexts in which crimes take place.
The product team at HunchLab has developed a number of strategies both to
mitigate the likelihood for harmful performative feedback loops and to find ways to
measure the performative effects that predictions have in the field. I identify three such
strategies: randomization, diversification, and experimentalization. Taken together, these
strategies suggest that data-driven policing systems like HunchLab will be forced to
account not only for crime and its geographic, temporal, and contextual correlates in the
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data (which is what they do currently), but also for how officers move and behave in the
field. As with online contexts (where many predictive analytics techniques were
developed), these strategies work to “fold the performativity of models back into the
modelling process” (Mackenzie, 2015, p. 443).
Despite HunchLab’s efforts to mitigate police harms by measuring performativity,
it remains unclear whether such strategies will do enough to curtail the harmful and
discriminatory feedback loops that critics are concerned about. In order to gain a fuller
perspective, I conclude the chapter by situating predictive policing within a long history
of “police media” technologies (Reeves & Packer, 2013). Understanding how police have
used media technologies historically to extend control over time (through police
intelligence) and space (through logistical techniques of surveillance) suggests that even
HunchLab’s progressive approach to predictive policing will not be enough to mitigate
status quo issues of bias and discrimination in policing. Situated adjacent to other patrol
technologies like the squad car and two-way radio, I show that predictive policing is best
understood as a technology that economizes urban space and argue that this may
ultimately maximize surveillance capacities rather than minimize bias.
Although diverse, the case studies together reveal deep contradictions at the heart
of the smart city: openness, autonomy, and certainty give way to closed systems,
techniques of control, and unknowability. Taking stock of these wide-ranging issues—
public interfaces, labor management systems, and algorithmic crime predictions—helps
to illuminate the irreducibly political dimension of urban technologies. This is especially
important, as such systems seek to cut through the qualitative entanglements of urban
problems with computation and quantification. That these seemingly apolitical and
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technocratic solutions provoke contestation and debate suggests that we need to attune
more actively to the smart city’s entanglement of social and technical—and public and
private—infrastructures. The concluding chapter takes up this issue. It considers what an
explicitly political smart city intervention might look like in the Trump era. It focuses on
a technologically-mediated network of activists who respond to Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) deportation raids in real-time with civil disobedience. This
concluding example illustrates how logistical affordances might serve more progressive
or community-driven interests, rather than the institutional imperatives of state and
corporate actors.
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CHAPTER 2. INTERFACE, IMAGINARY AND THE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC SPACE
Perhaps the best way forward is to avoid thinking of interfaces in isolation
as discrete technologies in their own right, and to conceive of them
instead as membranes or mediating devices that are not only integrated
into our everyday routines, but tied to a deeper set of social and cultural
processes.
—Gane and Beer, 2008, p. 61

Interfaces themselves are effects, in that they bring about transformations
in material states. But at the same time interfaces are themselves the
effects of other things, and thus tell the story of the larger forces that
engender them.
—Galloway, 2012, p. vii

There is a visual language to the smart city. It shapes how we imagine and envision what
a “data-smart” city might look like—on its physical surfaces, its iconic infrastructures,
and in its civic spaces. Much of this imagery is produced by multinational corporations
operating in the smart city industry—companies like Cisco, Siemens, IBM, Microsoft,
Google. It circulates alongside the stories that these companies tell as they engage in a
“struggle over the definition of what smart cities are about” (Söderström, Paasche &
Klauser, 2014, p. 308). Imagery and rhetoric thus circulate together as corporate
variations on what Lisa Parks has called “infrastructural imaginaries”—“ways of thinking
about what infrastructures are, where they are located, who controls them, and what they
do” (2014, p. 355).
Being corporate media-artifacts, the smart city’s infrastructural imaginaries are
most often employed to secure a place for private companies as “obligatory passage
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points” in city governments’ efforts to update urban infrastructures through technological
intervention (Callon, 1984). Given the competition in the smart city marketplace, one
might imagine these infrastructural imaginaries to be somewhat diverse. However, in
reality this is hardly the case. There is a strange consistency to smart city narratives, both
in terms of their rhetoric and imagery. Söderstrom, Paasche and Klauser (2014), for
example, show how, rhetorically, “smart city corporate storytelling” dependably rests on
two tropes: a narrow conceptualization of the city as a system of systems and a utopian
discourse that exposes urban pathologies only to define them as amenable to
technological solutions. This finding is consistent with a host of critical research on smart
city discourses (Halpern et al., 2013; Sadowski & Pasquale, 2015; Vanolo, 2014, Wiig,
2016). As Zook (2017) argues, smart city rhetoric is especially good at wedding
technocratic solutions to free market ideologies of government austerity and competition
for corporate investment (see Harvey, 1989). Smart city solutions provide “a way for
urban managers to continue to provide public goods as before—such as functioning
transportation systems to allow movement of goods and people—but with fewer
resources brought about by the austerity measures associated with competitive (i.e.,
lower) taxes” (Zook, 2017, p. 5).
As for imagery, smart city visuals fall in with other future-oriented agendas in the
computing world: they establish a visual rhetoric of proximate futurity that is both
“intelligibly familiar, and recognizably new” (Suchman, Trigg & Blomberg, 2002, p.
164; see also Galloway, 2010; Kinsley, 2010; 2011; 2012). One ubiquitous and iconic
feature across smart city imageries is the digital urban interface. The digital urban
interface is imagined as the point of exchange between an informed urban citizenry and
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the city’s data infrastructures. The most iconic smart city interfaces mimic the design of
smartphone operating systems—Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android. They feature apps
and digital maps on “doubly communicative” touchscreen surfaces, designed to relay
information to citizens at the same time that they capture new data to be fed back into the
system (Halpern et al., 2013). In many imaginings, such interfaces are distributed
throughout urban spaces, much like a mailbox or payphone might be—“embedded in
buildings, kiosks and furnishings” (Townsend et al., quoted in Mattern, 2014).
But even as speculative designs for a speculated urban future, smart city
interfaces are never neutral. In her poignant critique, Shannon Mattern (2014) takes issue
with the shallowness by which public interfaces and urban screens are designed. For all
the information that they purport to reveal, they stand to conceal much more. One
immediate issue is that information on display on such screens comes pre-processed,
typically in the form of colorful info-visualizations or digitally-rendered maps. But more
troubling are the broader aesthetic tropes that allow interfaces to negate their own
mediation. They urge citizens toward an unreflexive info-consumerism, steering users
away from critical engagements with the infrastructures of urban data collection and
analysis. “We citizens are empowered to report failed trash pick-ups or rank our favorite
hospitals, but not entitled to know what happens to our personal data each time we pass
through a toll booth. We often have little understanding of how and where the mediation
of urban systems takes place within the city itself” (ibid.).
The interface thus nurtures a disconnect between the kinds of urban “intelligence”
that corporate actors value, and citizens’ ability to learn about the technologies that
harvest their data. Corporate boosters, who stand to profit off of partnerships with city
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governments, have only disincentives to promote users’ engagement with the political
economy and infrastructural operations of the smart city—to reveal how data is collected,
by whom, and toward what ends. This disparity should prompt critical inquiry. How do
the speculative designs and visual rhetoric of the smart city shape the way that we come
to know and understand infrastructure? How might alternative designs for smart city
interfaces restructure our imagination of what a smart city is and should be, or affect how
we envision the relationship between citizenries, urban spaces, and data infrastructures?
What logics of data collection and mediation are embedded in interface design, and what
political economies of data do they presume? Are other smart city imaginaries possible?
These questions are at the heart of this chapter. It focuses on the case study of
LinkNYC, a public-private partnership to develop an extensive network of no-cost,
gigabit speed Wi-Fi kiosks distributed throughout New York City’s five boroughs.1
LinkNYC replaces New York’s aging and often ill-maintained payphone structures with
nine-foot tall, monolithic kiosks, each adorned with two 55” LED screens for digital
advertisements and a touchscreen interface for users. This relatively straightforward
interface design conceals some of LinkNYC’s core functions. Within each kiosk are
multiple sensors, microphones, cameras, and other measurement devices, all hidden from
view. In addition to ambient environmental data, this sensing assemblage will be able to
detect how many people are in proximity to the kiosks and what they are browsing on
their Wi-Fi-connected devices. Although this data is purported to be anonymized, it
nonetheless stands to provide system managers with real-time information on mobile

1

Gigabit speed Wi-Fi is approximately 125 MB/s in download speed. The average download
speed for commercial ISPs in 2016 was 54.97 MB/s (Coldewey, 2016).
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populations and at a scale never before realized. When the installation and
implementation of LinkNYC is complete, there will be somewhere between 7,500 and
10,000 such kiosks across the city.
Even before ground broke, LinkNYC’s scale and reach quickly attracted the
attention of some of the largest players in both the tech and urban development worlds. In
June 2015, Google CEO Larry Page announced the formation of a new affiliate company
called Sidewalk Labs, to be headed by Dan Doctoroff, former Bloomberg CEO and
Deputy Mayor of Economic Development and Rebuilding for the City of New York for
Mayor Bloomberg (Page, 2015). Sidewalk Labs’ mission would be to “focus on
improving city life for everyone by developing and incubating urban technologies to
address issues like cost of living, efficient transportation and energy usage” (ibid.). The
company’s first (publicly-announced) order of business was to purchase a leading share
in Intersection, the company that had secured a contract to install and manage the
LinkNYC system. Despite the New York City government’s rhetoric, which framed
LinkNYC as a way to bridge New York City’s growing wealth disparities, statements by
executives at Sidewalk Labs and Intersection suggest that the real value of the system is
in data-driven advertising. With its potential for omnibus data-collection combined with
digital advertising signage, LinkNYC heralds a new frontier for advertising—a way to
expand the surveillant, calculative, and anticipatory tracking and metrics of online
advertising into physical spaces, reproducing Google’s wildly profitable online
advertising schema in public spaces (Auletta, 2009).
The chapter offers a critique of LinkNYC. It focuses on alternative infrastructural
imaginaries that the New York City government solicited from the public but which were
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ultimately discarded in favor of an advertising-driven model. Specifically, the chapter
looks back to 2012, prior to the selection of LinkNYC, when New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg and the Department of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (DoITT) held a public design competition to “reinvent the
payphone.” I focus on four prototype designs that were submitted to the competition and
which offer alternative ideals for smart city imaginaries—“NYC Via,” “Windchimes,”
“Smart Sidewalks,” and “Digital Democracy.” These designs included elements common
to many other smart city interfaces, but they also differed in significant ways. Unlike
LinkNYC, which links ubiquitous sensing technologies to advertising revenue, these
designs touched on specific urban issues—transportation, environmental data,
infrastructural failure, and free expression. Taken together, they illustrate a wide and
diverse array of infrastructural imaginaries. They demonstrate that LinkNYC’s
commercially-motivated vision of the smart city was not inevitable.

METHODS, ARGUMENT, AND CHAPTER STRUCTURE
The research for this chapter combined qualitative data sources and methods. First, it
involved following popular reporting about LinkNYC’s development. To do this, I
created Google Alerts for keywords relating to the companies involved, including
“CityBridge,” “LinkNYC,” “Sidewalk Labs,” “Intersection,” “Qualcomm,” “Comark,”
“Civiq Smartscapes,” “Titan Outdoor,” and “Control Group.” These news alerts helped
facilitate background research on the companies involved with the manufacture and
implementation of LinkNYC, along with any developments and hurdles that came up
during its installation. I also used the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine
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(https://archive.org/web/) to access documents on the New York City DoITT’s webpage
which have since been taken down, including a Request for Information and a Request
for Proposals dealing with the 2014 payphone franchise agreement.
The primary source of data for the chapter comprised semi-structured interviews
conducted with fifteen representatives from ten entries to the Reinvent Payphones
Challenge (see Appendix A for the schedule of interviews conducted and interview
questions). In March 2016, I filed a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request with the
City of New York to obtain information about who had entered the design competition. I
received the entire list of entries. This list included the entry name and the names of the
individuals associated with the entry. But because information beyond this was
excluded—including contact information—it was difficult to track down team members
associated with each of the 122 submissions.
For example, Mary Solomon (a hypothetical name) might be associated with an
entry called “CityDigital” (a hypothetical entry). To track down this person, I would
conduct Google searches for different combinations of words connected with “Mary
Solomon,” such as “‘Mary Solomon’ AND ‘CityDigital’ AND/OR ‘designer’” or “‘Mary
Solomon’ AND ‘Reinvent Payphones.’” In many cases, there was no public record or
internet trace of a name in association with the project. In some cases, entry names were
included in designers’ online portfolios and it was easy to determine that I had the right
Mary Solomon. Even in these lucky circumstances, I then had to find contact
information, which could be quite hard to locate. In certain cases, I reached out to
individuals by Facebook or LinkedIn if no email was available; others I contacted
through their professional email addresses. Still other submitters created websites for

45
their entries back in 2013, but included no emails or contact pages. In total, I interviewed
fifteen individuals who were associated with ten different submissions. Four of these
submissions had made it to the finalist or semi-finalist stage. The other six had not been
acknowledged previously and seemed excited for the opportunity to discuss their visions.
This research was complemented by informal conversations and consultations
with key stakeholders in the world of community Wi-Fi and privacy activism, who were
knowledgeable about LinkNYC. This included a lengthy conversation with Greta Byrum
who runs the Resilient Communities Initiative for the Open Technology Institute at the
New American Foundation, as well as discussions with members of a privacy rights
group called RethinkLinkNYC, the latter having invited me to attend one of their
meetings to present on research about the Reinvent Payphones Challenge. This led to
more in-depth discussions with Jonah Bossewitch and Irene Meisel, both of whom hold
doctoral degrees in social science or the humanities and devote much of their spare time
to researching public technology issues. These conversations proved extremely helpful in
developing lines of question for further interviews with Reinvent Payphones designers
and employees at the New York City Department of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (DoITT).
Taken together, these data sources shape the argument of the chapter: that looking
to discarded designs for the smart city interface can help to illuminate alternative
infrastructural imaginaries at play amongst urban citizenries. These imaginaries, in turn,
can work as a form of critique of the existing LinkNYC system by highlighting
contradictions at the heart of its advertising-driven business model. Looking to alternative
designs motivates questions such as: What kind of city do we want to build towards?
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How can infrastructural systems be designed to be equitable and accessible to all citizens,
rather than controlled by corporations under a thin veil of pretense to public benefit? Who
is the designing “we”? What other smart city infrastructures are possible?
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the origins of the
Reinvent Payphones Challenge, the public design competition that Mayor Bloomberg’s
administration held in 2012 and 2013. I then move to LinkNYC and examine some of the
controversies that have cropped up since its implementation in early 2016. I then return to
the design competition to consider four entries that offered alternative visions for the
smart city as structured by the interface.

REINVENTING THE PAYPHONE
In October 2014, the franchise agreement between the City of New York and the 39
private companies operating the city’s 11,412 public payphones was set to expire.
Typically the expiration of a public payphone franchise would not warrant much
attention. But in the 15 years since the agreement began, the political economy,
technology, and social norms of telephony had changed dramatically. The explosion of
mobile telephones threatened the status of the payphone as an icon and staple of
electronic communication in public spaces. In 1999, the year that the New York City
franchise agreement started, the number of payphones in the United States reached an alltime high, with more than 2.1 million in operation. By March 2014, the year the franchise
expired, this number had plummeted to a mere 150,000 (Blumenthal, 2014). Over the
same period, cellular subscriptions in the US jumped from 30.6 per 100 people to more
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than 110 (World Bank, 2016).2 The Federal Reserve (2015) estimated that in 2015, 87%
of adults in the US owned a mobile phone, while 71% had an internet-enabled and
location-aware smart phone. In New York City the estimates were even higher: almost
96% of city residents reported owning a mobile phone, nearly 80% of which were
smartphones (NYC Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 2015).
Despite this sharp decline, payphone structures remained a persistent presence in
New York City—even if most were left neglected and inoperable by their franchise
holders. The reality was, payphones were no longer generating income from phone calls,
but instead from their advertising. The payphone had become less a telecommunications
structure than a billboard (McGinty, 2007). In 2012, for example, New York City
payphones were bringing in an estimated $1 million a year from coin-drop and dialaround payments. But compare that to the $50 million that they brought in from ad sales
(Flamm, 2012). Indeed, it is likely that the “billboarding” of payphones was already on
the horizon for the New York City government at the start of the 1999 franchise
agreement. Thanks to the passing of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which opened up
urban and regional markets to competition between telecommunications companies, the
payphone franchise was for the first time open to any phone company operating in New
York City. However, in order for a company to compete in the market, they first had to
hire full-time marketing and ad sales representatives to sell ad space on the structures’
exteriors (McGinty, 2007). As of 2003, the City of New York began requiring all newly-

2

An estimate of 110 cellular subscriptions per 100 people does not indicate saturation. This is
because these estimates include individuals with separate work and private phones. This slightlyconfusing statistic was included to highlight the dramatic rise in cellular subscriptions over a 15
year period between 1999 and 2014.
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installed telecommunications structures to be moved to the curbside to accommodate the
Department of Transportation’s regulations on advertising in common throughways and
sidewalks (ibid.).
To Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration, the expiration of the 1999
franchise presented an opportunity, not just to spruce up existing structures or to ensure
ad revenue, but to wholly reimagine what a payphone might look like in the 21st
century—the era of the smart, internet-enabled, location-aware device; the era of the
smart city. As the City’s Chief Information and Innovation Officer Rahul Merchant put it,
payphones are “technologically the most valuable asset we have in the city, and it’d be
wrong of us to replace one payphone with just another payphone” (Hardawar, 2012).
“Reinventing” the payphone resonated with the Bloomberg administration’s
penchant for updating city infrastructures through public-private partnerships. The
creation of the High Line park on a defunct stretch of raised railway is one example. To
launch the High Line, the administration created a special economic development zone in
Chelsea to spark investment in real estate development around the future park, thus
prompting private rail line holders to sell off chunks of the adjacent properties to eager
real estate developers (Bowen & Stepan, 2014). Another example is the Citi-Bike system:
a bike share program sponsored by—and featuring ubiquitous advertising for—CitiBank.
These projects, along with the replacement of the payphones, were part of the
administration’s lofty goals to make New York a hub for tech sector innovation: to attract
talent and capital to the city (see Scott, 2016). The City’s white paper, titled Road Map
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Figure 2.1 Projected video of Mayor Bloomberg announcing the “Reinvent Payphones” design
competition at the NYC Tech Meetup, December 2012. Source: Hardawar, 2012

for the Digital City: Achieving New York City’s Digital Futures (City of New York,
2011), makes this clear. The Road Map “outlines a path to build on New York City’s
successes and establish it as the world’s top-ranked Digital City, based on indices of
Internet access, Open Government, citizen engagement, and digital industry growth”
(ibid.). Replacing payphones with advanced “public communications structures” fit
squarely within this vision.
Bloomberg’s administration made its excitement known at an NYC Tech Meetup
in December, 2012. On stage, in front of a crowd of hundreds of “tech enthusiasts”
gathered in a large auditorium at New York University, the City’s Chief Digital Officer
Rachel Haot introduced a “challenge” issued by Mayor Bloomberg to the tech and design
communities. From a prerecorded video projected onto a large screen, Bloomberg spoke
into a payphone next to a map of New York and a “Made in NY” emblem (Figure 2.1).
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“From Wi-Fi in public spaces to the High Line, our Administration has continuously
reinvented City infrastructure by matching innovative concepts with extraordinary
designs. Now we’re doing the same for the thousands of public pay telephones across the
five boroughs, and we’re challenging our dynamic and ever-growing tech community to
‘re-own the phone’ and provide their ideas on what the future of payphones could entail”
(Bloomberg, 2012).
The video ended and Haot explained Bloomberg’s message. The administration
was launching a design competition, run by the City’s Department of Information
Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT), to engage the tech communities in
envisioning what the payphone of the future might look like (NYC DoITT, 2014). “It
doesn’t even have to look like a payphone,” Haot explained. “We want to invite your
prototypes and help build something that could potentially impact the future of payphone
infrastructure in NYC” (Hardawar, 2012). Audience members tweeted out their support
the same night. One attendee wrote: “I have never, and I mean NEVER been as amped
about payphones as I am at this very moment. It's on. Come and #ReinventPayphones.”
Publicly-Sourced Designs?
In January 2013, a month after the NYC Tech Meetup, DoITT held an information
session for anyone interested in entering the Reinvent Payphones Challenge—“students,
urban planners, designers, technologists, architects, creators and legal and policy experts”
who wanted to “build physical and/or virtual prototypes imagining a new public utility
through payphone infrastructure” (NYC.gov, 2012). Chief Digital Officer Haot hosted
the event, accompanied on stage by a panel of employees at DoITT as well as experts in
public space management, from both the private and public sectors. The point of the
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session was to communicate the sense of opportunity that the Challenge presented for the
City. “Our goal,” Haot explained, “is, how can we set the global standard for what the
future of urban connectivity can mean?” (NYC.gov, 2013).
But as the meeting got underway, it also became clear that DoITT needed to set
and temper participants’ expectations. After declaring the stakes, Haot was quick to point
out that the winners of the competition themselves would “not go on to change—
formally—the city’s payphone infrastructure. This is something that will follow the
City’s official procurement process and RFP [request for proposal] process” (NYC.gov,
2013).
The tone for the Reinvent Payphone Challenge was thus slightly ambiguous. On
the one hand were “blue sky” notions about unleashing citizens’ talent and creativity.
“Above all, this is about innovation and doing this in a collaborative way because we’ve
got the best and brightest here in New York City, at our design firms, at our academic
institutions, at our tech companies, in the private sector and in New York City
government” (NYC.gov, 2013). But the blue sky did not quite square with the rather gray
reality of procurement, RFPs, and zoning codes. On the other hand were the much more
pragmatic considerations of regulations—the tangle of sometimes-conflicting sets of
municipal codes that Mariana Valverde (2012) argues can work to secure political and
institutional power at the expense of individual citizens or citizen groups. “The most
striking feature of law at the local level is its heterogeneity and lack of clear organizing
rationales” (ibid., p. 7). In the context of the Reinvent Payphones competition, the
prospect of procurement processes appeared to preemptively foreclose on citizens’
extended involvement in the reinvention and implementation of whatever design would
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eventually replace the payphones. “Obviously, we will be constrained by the laws of
what’s allowed on the streets and what has to be on the streets, but aside from that we are
looking for ideas without constraint” (NYC.gov, 2013).
The disconnect between designers’ creativity and the pragmatics of procurement
processes was exacerbated by the expectations of attendees at the information session.
They seemed incredulous that the winning entries would not actually determine what the
future of payphones might look like. Some attendees inquired about the kind of
ownership or authorship they could expect to retain if they won the competition and
helped influence the RFP, or whether there would be any revenue sharing should they
win. They seemed far less interested in having their input crowdsourced than in direct
authorship—in some way, shape or form—of the next generation of payphone. One
participant asked if designers would receive credit or royalties if their entry were to
influence the official RFP. Would they have to give up rights to their design or prototype
should it be adopted by the city? Haot’s responses began to sound repetitive and
programmatic: “The idea is to be the spark for innovation, and again, this is completely
distinct from any formal procurement processes for the City of New York” (NYC.gov,
2013).
This distinction between “creativity” and pragmatics reflects contradictions at the
heart of a particular logic of capitalist urban governance—one which David Harvey
(1989) has dubbed “entrepreneurial urbanism.” Entrepreneurial urbanism reconfigures
city governments’ commitments to their citizen base, favoring an imperative to attract
capital investment and wealthy residents over the management of urban welfare services
(Harvey, 1989; Molotch, 1976). As Graham and Marvin (2001) argue, the signature
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feature of this governance logic is the privatization of public infrastructures—from public
spaces to electricity and communications networks.
In more recent years, the entrepreneurial imperative has also become enamored
with the idea of revitalization through “human capital”—that attracting a “creative class”
of knowledge workers and artists could catalyze urban regeneration (Florida, 2002; Peck,
2005). In smaller, economically-depressed, post-industrial cities like Scranton,
Pennsylvania (Rich, 2012) and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Zimmerman, 2008), the idea of
attracting creatives has led to major downtown or riverside developments, grant programs
to spark arts scenes, and consultancy-derived benchmarks to quantify and calculate how
far along cities are on the road to being “creative.” But in large already-wealthy cities like
New York, one is more likely to find the local creatives being enrolled directly into
project planning and development—to both garner local support for projects and lend
them legitimacy (Love, 2013).
Of course, the entrepreneurial urbanist imperative in New York was not new.
Scholars have even tracked connections between investment boosterism and the brand of
tech sector development that Bloomberg sought to make as his trademark (e.g., O’Mara,
2005). Indeed, the Bloomberg administration had held similar design competitions in the
past for land-based urban development initiatives. For example, prior to the RFP and
procurement phases for the High Line, Bloomberg launched a competition to source park
designs (Bowen & Stepan, 2014). For both the High Line and the Reinvent Payphones
Challenge, the administration stood to benefit from the enrollment of creative
constituencies—in the latter case, the design and tech communities—as a way to
legitimate private ownership of large-scale developmental projects. Design competitions
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booster the appearance of public participation side of the public-private partnership
arrangement (e.g., Garde, 2014). At the same time, they suggest a certain level of
humility from the city agencies, whose agents appear to yield expertise to public input.
As Haot put it at the Reinvent Payphones information session, “What will come of this
will be a lot of designs and ideas that people sitting at desks in city offices wouldn’t have
thought about” (NYC.gov, 2013).
In the context of high-profile smart city interventions, the public-participatory
element on display in the Reinvent Payphones Challenge felt rare, even progressive: a
“bottom-up” approach to what are otherwise almost always “top-down” processes (e.g.,
Smedley, 2013). As detailed in the introductory chapter to the dissertation, the dichotomy
between top-down and bottom-up distinguishes two visions for the smart city, one driven
by large-scale investment in centrally-controlled sensor networks and the other by
technologically-connected citizenries. The Reinvent Payphones Challenge was lauded as
a prime example of this “bottom-up” logic at work since, it appeared, it would be New
Yorkers’ envisioning of the urban interface driving the plans, not the authorities’.
But this is not the whole story. Despite the rhetoric and excitement about the
competition—all the back and forth between Haot, DoITT, and the design and tech
communities—it is not clear how seriously DoITT had ever planned to take the publiclysubmitted designs. In fact, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that DoITT’s
vision for the reinvented public communication structures was already articulated in a
Request for Information (RFI), drafted five months prior to the launch of the Reinvent
Payphones competition (NYC DoITT, 2012). Examination of the RFI reveals that the
agency—those “people sitting at desks in city offices”—had already given considerable
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thought to the new payphone structures’ design. The Request included a series of
questions about the feasibility of specific features for the reinvented payphone:

In response to the decreased use of payphones, the City is reviewing whether
some or all of the sidewalk capacity currently dedicated to payphone installations
might be used for other communication services. Alternatives might include…
Wi-Fi antennas that would create public wireless hotspots, touch-screen way
finding panels, information kiosks, charging stations for mobile communications
devices, electronic community bulletin boards, or other types of innovative
sidewalk amenities. (NYC DoITT, 2012)
This letter was sent to a number of different stakeholders in the
telecommunications and advertising worlds: franchisees in the 1999 payphone agreement,
business improvement districts (BIDs) in Manhattan, and non-franchisee corporations
including JCDecaux and Cemusa—two prominent out-of-home advertising firms that
manage ad sales on New York City’s street architecture (e.g., bus shelters). Responses,
posted to DoITT’s webpage,3 suggested that the companies in the 1999 franchise were
eager to incorporate digital signage into telecommunications structures as a means to
expand on advertising opportunities in public spaces. For example, in response to the
RFI’s inquiry as to whether “a two-sided, single-panel design with a relatively slim
profile [could] replace the current three-sided, curb line payphone enclosures as a
primary design” (NYC DoITT, 2012), Titan Outdoor—the largest payphone franchise
holder in the 1999 agreement—noted that “the loss of the third panel would significantly
diminish the revenue potential of the New Franchise” because it “remove[d] the lucrative

3

The website has been taken down, but can be retrieved using the Wayback Machine:
https://web.archive.org/web/20130311085555/http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/business/futur
e-of-public-pay-phone.shtml
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‘street’ panel, which is very attractive to advertisers” (Titan Outdoor, 2012). However,
Titan’s response continued, the “loss of potential revenue could be solved by allowing the
installation of digital panels that would increase revenue due to the yield associated with
digital advertising” (ibid.).
Comparing the RFI and its responses to the RFP suggests that DoITT and the
Bloomberg administration knew quite well what they would be asking for during
procurement. There is striking similarity in how the two letters frame the new structures.
For example, the 2014 RFP calls for,

The installation, operation, and maintenance of up to 10,000 Public
Communications Structures providing advertising, Wi-Fi, and phone services in
all five boroughs… The selected proposer… will not be permitted to charge a fee
for Wi-Fi service but may charge a fee for phone services with the exception of
911 and 311 phone calls. The option to install cell phone charging stations and
permission to charge a fee for cell phone charging station services” (NYC DoITT,
2014).
These similarities to the 2012 RFI fly in the face of the rhetoric behind the Reinvent
Payphone Challenge—of creativity, innovation, and public engagement.4 They suggest
that DoITT had a highly specific vision for the “public communications structure” of the
21st century already in mind, even as they turned, publicly, to the design and tech
communities to source ideas. That all but one of the entries selected as finalists by the
Reinvent Payphones’ panel of judges displayed a striking uniformity in form and function
should thus not come as a surprise.

4

To inquire about these similarities, I was in contact with Stanley Shor, Assistant Commissioner
for Franchise Administration at NYC DoITT. Before agreeing to an interview, Mr. Shor
requested that I send a list of questions. His response was that, in conjunction with the DoITT
legal team, determined that the questions prompted confidential information and could not be
answered. See Appendix A.
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From the Bottom-Up Smart City to the Politics of Anticipation
Entries to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge were due in February 2013. In all, DoITT
received more than 120 designs. A panel of judges comprised of entrepreneurs and
executives at New York City-based start-ups selected eleven of the submissions as
semifinalists according to five distinct categories: connectivity (the “ability to connect
New Yorkers and enable communication, including for safety and emergency purposes”);
creativity (“originality, innovation, and quality of idea”); visual design (“including visual
appeal and user experience”); functionality (“flexibility, versatility, scalability,
accessibility, and sustainability”); and community impact (“support of local residents,
businesses and cultural institutions”). Quirky, a now-defunct New York City start-up,
hosted a demonstration day in which the eleven semifinalists presented their designs,
ideas, and prototypes in front of the judges as well as employees at DoITT and members
of the press. From these eleven, six were then selected as finalists—one for each of the
five categories, with a tie for community impact. Descriptions and images of these final
six were then uploaded onto Facebook, where observers could select a “popular choice”
winner from the finalists.
The Facebook vote came in for an entry called “NYFi,” the finalist in the
connectivity category (see Figure 2.2). Submitted by boutique New York City-based
design and architecture firm Sage and Coombe, NYFi draws on the minimalist aesthetic
of the Apple iPhone. It departs from the traditional three-sided structure of the payphone,
standing instead as a sleek two-paneled monolith, as suggested in the Request for
Information. NYFi features two large, touch-screen interfaces, one to allow users access
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Figure 2.2 “NYFi.” Winner, connectivity, and popular vote.

to a range of services, from calling a cab to reading reviews on Yelp, and the other
dedicated to advertising. Although few details were released about its hardware
components, NYFi promised “to help reduce the amount of clutter on the street and
reinforce the Apple-inspired minimalist feel” by integrating with structures like parking
kiosks that already crowd the New York City sidewalks (Flaherty, 2013).
NYFi illustrates how influential the design and feel of the digital touchscreen
interface of the smartphone had become for designers. Aside from “Windchimes,” the
only award-winning entry that maintained the prototypic shape of the standard payphone
(and the only entry submitted by students and recent graduates unaffiliated with a
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professional design or architectural firm; discussed in more detail later), all of the designs
that reached the finalist stage drew inspiration from the app-based mobile operating
systems of the Android and iPhone—albeit stretched and extended to occupy full panels.
These included “Beacon” by Frog Design (Figure 2.3), “NYC Loop” by FXFOWLE
Architects (Figure 2.4), “Smart Sidewalks” by a team of professional and academic
designers from Syracuse University, UC Davis, and Parsons (Figure 2.5), and “NYC
I/O,” submitted by a partnership between Titan Outdoor, New York City’s largest
payphone franchise holder, and Control Group, a technology design and consulting firm
(Figure 2.6). Again, with the exception of “Windchimes,” each of these winning designs
featured a nearly identical roster of functionalities that clearly drew on the smartphone
for inspiration, including a way-finding function (interactive maps), location-based
services (finding a nearby business or restaurant, for example), USB ports for cell phone
charging, traditional telephone calls, emergency services, and a Wi-Fi hub. NYFi,
Beacon, NYC Loop, and NYC I/O each reserved space explicitly dedicated for
advertising.
As Suchman, Trigg and Blomberg (2002, p. 163) argue, design prototypes like
those in the Reinvent Payphones Challenge become successful when they are both
“intelligibly familiar to the actors involved, and recognizably new.” The Reinvent
Payphones finalists drew on the smartphone in this way, invoking its familiar look and
feel, while simultaneously reconfiguring its social emplacement (Amin, 2008, p. 12)—on
the street or in the park—and its relationship to human scale in recognizably new ways.
This is accomplished through imagery of mundane scenarios of embodied human-
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Figure 2.3“Beacon.” Winner, visual design.

Figure 2.4 “NYC Loop.” Winner, creativity.
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Figure 2.5 “Smart Sidewalks.” Winner, functionality.

Figure 2.6 “NYC I/O.” Tie, with “Windchimes,” community impact.
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machine interactions, which are, likewise, equal parts familiar and new.
Samuel Kinsley's (2012, p. 1565) work on ubiquitous computing suggests that the
“proximate future” on display in the diegetic worlds of design prototypes is made
palpable for viewers through “anticipatory objects.” Anticipatory objects might be virtual
or physical—a digital rendering or a tactile prototype. In either case, an object becomes
anticipatory as it operates on the “tension between imagination and practice” (ibid.).
Depictions of anticipatory objects allow users to envision themselves “interact[ing] with
objects in the physical environment, spontaneously and effortlessly as they go about their
everyday lives” (Begole & Masuoka, 2008, quoted in Kinsley, 2011, p. 237). The
Reinvent Payphones finalists similarly evince in viewers “anticipated sensations of
technological experience based on pre-existing bodily knowledge” (2010, p. 8).
The anticipatory nature of the Reinvent Payphones design-objects becomes
significant when one considers, again following Kinsley (2010), that there is a politics of
anticipation animated by such objects. This perspective is helpful for considering why
specific forms (designs and prototypes) and forms of action (e.g., embodied interactions)
can “evoke and produce futurity” (p.7) while others do not. There is a contestable
semiotics of futurity, with recognizable norms, tropes, and performative effects (Agha,
2006) that can be located in the images and prototypes of design fictions, images, and
scenarios. But unlike other “politics of x,” the politics of anticipation is less about a
clambering for power, with different groups vying to stake their claim on the future, than
it is about the management of desire and the negotiations around what futures can be
made present (Adam, 2009). When anticipatory objects become mutually intelligible to
different groups, “communities of anticipation” coalesce around anticipated technological
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experiences; new participants are then enrolled and cued into the formal signs and
codings of that particular futurity (Kinsley, 2010).
It is in the enrollments of anticipatory communities that the politics of anticipation
intersects with urban politics: when the logics of entrepreneurial urbanism collide not
only with the loose promises of smart city boosterism, but with the specific designs,
formats, prototypes, and interfaces around which cultural expectations and imaginaries
coalesce. In this light, the Reinvent Payphones Challenge functions less like a
participatory design showcase than a cultural campaign set out to establish a consistency
in the semiotic formats that the smart city imaginary should take—and, consequently, to
secure communities of anticipation around those forms. As variations on the theme of the
smartphone—wrenched from the hand and pocket, stretched to fill the space left by the
old public payphone—the remarkable consistency across these finalist entries is as good a
sign as any that diversity and public input was not, in fact, a top priority for the City,
even as it pursued such input in the name of a “bottom-up” version of smart city
urbanism. As will become evident throughout the remainder of the chapter, LinkNYC,
the system eventually selected to replace the payphone, adheres more closely to these
semiotic tropes than to the diversity of ideas sourced during the Reinvent Payphones
Challenge.

LINKNYC
DoITT released its “Request for Proposals for a Franchise to Install, Operate and
Maintain Public Communications Structures in the Boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens and Staten Island” [RFP] on April 30, 2014 (NYC DoITT, 2014). In
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the 13 months since the Reinvent Payphones Challenge wound down, Michael
Bloomberg’s third term as Mayor had come to an end. He was succeeded by Bill de
Blasio, who stepped into office on January 1, 2014. Mayor de Blasio continued to pursue
Bloomberg’s mission to update the payphones. But he also made the effort his own,
shifting the rhetoric around the new infrastructure to match his campaign commitments to
fighting the sources of New York City’s growing inequalities. More than merely
connecting “innovative concepts with extraordinary designs,” as Bloomberg (2012) had
promised, de Blasio claimed that the new infrastructure could be leveraged to bridge New
York City’s growing digital divide (cf. Misra, 2015).
De Blasio’s commitments were reflected in the RFP, which sought to ensure free
public internet access on these structures. But to do so, de Blasio would peg this public
benefit to advertising. Given the “billboarding” of payphones that had already begun by
the 1990s, it is unsurprising that the City would be concerned with the new structures’
marketing potential. But the City also wanted a new deal on advertising. According to the
terms of the 1999 franchise agreement, the City was receiving only 36% of payphone
advertising revenue. The RFP for the 2014 contract would require that partners now share
50% (NYC DoITT, 2012; 2014). In line with de Blasio’s rhetoric that the new system
should bridge digital divides, however, advertising revenue would be pegged to free WiFi: “Each Franchise Structure with advertising on it must also provide, in addition to
telephone service, completely free Wi-Fi” (NYC DoITT, 2014, p. 6). With this provision

65
in the RFP, it is unlikely that any proposal would come in without free Wi-Fi as its
central feature.5
The City ultimately awarded the 2014 franchise to a consortium led by outdooradvertising firm Titan. Along with technology design and consulting company Control
Group, Titan had entered and won the community impact category for the Reinvent
Payphones Challenge with an entry titled “NYC I/O”—a large, curved touchscreen that
mimics the enclosed feel of a phone booth while also evoking speculative technology
(see Figure 2.6 above). After the RFP was released, Titan and Control group partnered
also with Qualcomm, a large telecommunications manufacturer, and Civiq Smartscapes,
a Comark company focused on smart city systems, forming a new consortium called
CityBridge. CityBridge is the entity that officially won the 2014 franchise bid. Their
prototype jettisoned the circular design and enclosure of NYC I/O, opting instead for
something more akin to Sage and Coombe’s design for NYFI (see Figure 2.2). The result
was LinkNYC, a two-paneled, monolithic advertising and Wi-Fi enabled structure with a
touchscreen interface for users to access way-finding services, place phone calls, charge
cellphones, and access an internet browser (see Figure 2.7).
Unlike the 1999 franchise agreement, which opened the telecommunications
market to competition, the 2014 agreement was awarded exclusively to CityBridge. This
raised some eyebrows. Titan was the largest payphone provider in the 1999 agreement,
having purchased the entirety of Verizon’s payphone stock in 2009 (Chiasson, 2010), but

5

Although the RFP was posted publicly on DoITT’s webpage, no information was available
about proposals submitted in response to the Request.
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they still had competition. Other franchise holders in the 1999 agreement quickly called
foul (Gibson Dunn, 2014). But it was perhaps because of this exclusivity that DoITT was
able to dictate favorable terms for the City government.6 CityBridge would install up to
10,000 Links across New York’s five boroughs, without receiving a single tax payer
dollar. This would entail laying hundreds of miles of new fiber optic cable throughout
New York’s five boroughs, including through Manhattan’s complex underground
conduits. It also required a commitment to cover the costs associated with operating,
maintaining, and upgrading LinkNYC’s Wi-Fi network, its interface software, and its
internal hardware—all of which was estimated at more than $200 million for just the first
year of operations (Gustin, 2016). Also included in the deal were speed guarantees:
LinkNYC promises to deliver speeds up to 1 gigabit per second (almost twice as fast as

6

Greta Byrum, personal communication, March 9, 2017. The LinkNYC deal also came in the
wake of a failed contract between the City of New York and Verizon. In March 2017, New York
City filed a lawsuit claiming that Verizon broke its 2008 contract to provide fiber optic broadband
internet coverage throughout the city (Shu, 2017). Greta Byrum, who runs the Resilient
Communities Initiative for the Open Technology Institute at New American Foundation, believes
that DoITT’s negotiations with LinkNYC were shaped, at least in part, by the Verizon deal’s
having gone south.
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Figure 2.7 Iconic promotional image for LinkNYC. Source: Pereira, 2016

the national average for residential internet speeds)7—although this number could
decrease dramatically depending on the number of users accessing internet from a single
Link (ibid.). Most dramatically, CityBridge promised the City at least $500 million
dollars in advertising revenue over its first 12 years (Pinto, 2016)—an estimate that
doubles what payphones were bringing in from ad sales in the 1999 agreement.8
Not everyone was convinced that the franchise agreement was a good deal
though. In December 2014, less than a month after the de Blasio administration
announced that CityBridge had been awarded the bid, the Franchise and Concession
Review Committee (FCRC) received two letters of opposition, one from lawyers
representing Cemusa, New York’s street furniture franchisee, and the other from lawyers

7

Gigabit speed Wi-Fi is approximately 125 MB/s in download speed. The average download
speed for commercial ISPs in 2016 was 54.97 MB/s (Coldewey, 2016).
8
Ad sales for payphones in the 1999 agreement were estimated to bring in $50 million per year.
Even if the City were receiving 50% instead of the previous agreement’s 36%, that would still
only amount to about $250 million over ten years.
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representing Telebeam, one of the other payphone operators under the 1999 agreement
(Marvilli, 2014). The Telebeam letter made a number of allegations to discredit the
CityBridge agreement. Lawyers from Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, which represented
Telebeam, argued that DoITT was guilty of favoritism, with personnel crossovers
between Control Group, DoITT, and the New York City government’s Technology
Development Corporation during the same period of time in which the City would have
been making its decision about the contract.9 These allegations were underscored by
Titan’s poor standing with the City: the advertising firm had apparently failed to pay the
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) $20 million in ad revenues, as per a separate
franchise agreement (Gibson Dunn, 2014). Most significantly, Telebeam’s lawyers
argued, awarding CityBridge an exclusive contract violated federal law, and specifically
the Telecommunications Act, since Telebeam and other franchise holders would be
forced “to exit the market in favor of CityBridge as a monopoly service provider" (ibid.,
p. 4).
City Council members also took issue with the agreement, not because of
monopoly or favoritism, but because of LinkNYC’s inequitable distribution of resources
across New York’s five boroughs. As per requests laid out in the RFP, CityBridge had
developed two design options for LinkNYC: one for high traffic areas with large, digital
advertising signage, and one for residential and historic-designated areas with little to no
advertising space. The question was whether Links without advertising would receive the

9

Specifically, the Telebeam letter alleges that “Robert Richardson, a former senior executive at
the Control Group, left the Control Group at the end of July 2014 to take a senior technology
policymaking post to ‘help direct technology strategy from City Hall’ at the same time that
DoITT was deliberating on the responses to the RFP” (Gibson Dunn, 2014, p. 2, original
emphasis).
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same amount of network bandwidth. In July 2015, Council members from the Bronx,
Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Staten Island filed Resolution 838-2015, “condemning the
inequitable contract between the City of New York and LinkNYC” (Cabrera et al., 2015).
The Council members claimed that LinkNYC provided “better Wi-Fi access to areas
throughout the City where advertising is deemed more profitable” and resolved to require
CityBridge to reinvest its revenues “in efforts to increase Wi-Fi access in the Bronx,
Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island” (ibid.). From this perspective, de Blasio’s
commitments to bridging digital divides would be entirely contradictory if the residential
areas in the outer boroughs—those most in need of broadband access—received the least
benefit in terms of connection speeds.
Despite these formal protestations—as well as a lawsuit eventually brought by
Telebeam (McGeehan, 2016)—the scale and scope of LinkNYC attracted attention from
major investors. In June 2015, Google co-founder Larry Page and Dan Doctoroff, a
former executive at Bloomberg News and Deputy Mayor for Economic Development
under the Bloomberg administration, announced the founding of a new company called
Sidewalk Labs. Now owned by Alphabet, Google’s parent company, Sidewalk Labs
describes itself as a “company that imagines, designs, tests, and builds urban innovations
to help cities meet their biggest challenges… to develop products and tools that can
address existing problems and drive toward the city of the future” (Sidewalk Labs, 2017).
In its first order of business, announced just two weeks the company was itself made
public, Sidewalk purchased a controlling share of Titan and Control group, merging the
two into a single entity called Intersection. The CityBridge consortium would remain
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intact, with formal partnerships between Intersection, Qualcomm, and Civiq. Intersection
would handle the installation and maintenance of the entire LinkNYC system.
In February 2016, Mayor de Blasio marked the official launch of LinkNYC,
making a free phone call on a Link to the City’s 311 information hotline service. The
system was then online, with new Links popping up along 3rd and 8th Avenues in
Manhattan weekly, eventually fanning out throughout the island and into the outer
boroughs. According to the franchise agreement, by 2020, the whole system of nearly
10,000 Links would be up and running, creating the world’s largest urban digital ad
network (ScreenMediaDaily, n.d.). As promised, LinkNYC’s Wi-Fi tested at “blazing
fast” speeds (Gustin, 2016).

Prototyping at Scale
But almost as soon LinkNYC’s network was online, it also started to raise new flags.
Many observers remained wary of the fact that LinkNYC was being managed by a
private entity. Unlike a city government, Intersection and its CityBridge partners would
not be beholden to citizens’ wellbeing. As Nick Pinto (2016) wrote for The Village Voice,
“[t]hat LinkNYC is, ultimately, underwritten by Google [through Sidewalk Labs] should
tell you a lot about why New York got so very lucky as to receive an unprecedentedly
fast network of citywide public Wi-Fi—for ‘free.’” Pinto argues that LinkNYC presented
New Yorkers with a set of issues about rights that were fundamentally distinct from the
privacy trade-offs that consumers of “freemium” online platforms face (cf. Barnes,
2006). It raised questions about “the right of the City of New York to surrender our data
for us; the right of our elected officials—over the objections of some of the city's own
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watchdogs and in exchange for what is, viewed in the light of the city's $78 billion annual
budget, chump change—to sell citizens' privacy off the back of a truck to a for-profit
company” (Pinto, 2016). This was not a problem of individual choice, then, but a
decision that was being made for New Yorkers by their City government, one which had
the potential to impact differently-positioned segments of the population disparately;
those with the least access to resources already would be hit most disproportionately by
privacy harms.
This point is underscored by the fact that LinkNYC remains poised to collect vast
amounts of data in ways not directly connected with the Wi-Fi service—for instance,
through embedded sensors, cameras, and technologies like Bluetooth beacons (cf. Harris,
2016; Mattern, 2017; Pinto, 2016)—and to put those massive troves to use to generate
revenue. As Pinto (2016) points out in his reporting, each Link is capable not only of
capturing data about users of its Wi-Fi services (which might be expected), but also about
any Wi-Fi enabled device within its range. These come in the form of unique numeric
identifiers (such as MAC addresses) rather than personally identifiable email addresses.
Nonetheless, given the penetration of smartphones in New York City, this means that
Intersection, as well as their advertising partners, will have access to real-time counts of
people by location. How this information will be used has yet to be officially disclosed,
but one likely scenario is that it will allow the company to create dynamic pricing models
for advertising sales, much in the same way that Google’s online business model works
(Auletta, 2009; Fuchs, 2014; Turow, 2013; 2017). Using historic patterns of peoplecounts, connected up with location and temporal data, the company could charge
advertisers more for displays in certain areas or at certain times—ostensibly creating a
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monopoly-like hold over data on New Yorkers’ mobility and profiting off of this without
citizens’ consent.
Comments by executives at both Sidewalk Labs and Intersection make clear that
this scenario is a real possibility. As Dan Doctoroff, CEO of Sidewalk Labs, explains it,
the informational feedback from the Links about where the densest pockets of mobile
urban populations are at any given moment would “replicat[e] the digital experience in
physical space” (quoted in Pinto, 2016)—and perhaps even move beyond it. When users
are on the network, Intersection will be able to integrate physicality into the extensive
data profiles that marketing firms and data brokers are already building for internet users
(e.g., Cheney-Lippold, 2011; 2017; Turow, 2013). “By having access to the browsing
activity of people using the Wi-Fi—all anonymized and aggregated—we can actually
then target ads to people in proximity and then, obviously, over time, track them through
lots of different things, like beacons and location services, as well as their browsing
activity” (Doctoroff, quoted in Pinto, 2016).
Digitally-enabled, targeted, out-of-home advertising has been promoted as the
future of marketing (e.g., Ember, 2016; Turow, 2017). A recent report by
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that the out-of-home advertising market will grow to
$42.7 billion by 2020 (Provenzano, 2017). Dave Etherington, Chief Strategy Officer at
Intersection, suggests that LinkNYC is at the forefront of the field. During a podcast
interview (Behind the Numbers, 2016), Etherington explained that Intersection hoped to
use LinkNYC to create an advertising platform “more analogous to advertising online or
on mobile than that which exists in physical spaces.” As with the online trend toward
individuation and hyper-targeted advertising—with each click and page view added to
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the profiles that marketing firms keep on each user (Cheney-Lippold, 2017; Turow,
2013)—LinkNYC would allow advertisers and media brokers to integrate users’
patterned movements in physical space with their devices, their online personae, and realtime information about environmental conditions:

We understand each Link's exact location, and we understand time, and so when
you add those two things together you get events. So we can, not just serve
advertising near specific places like restaurants or stadiums; we can tell you… not
just that that restaurant’s there, but that there’s an available table for four there at
a particular time. We can start to do that type of thing. We can then take
interesting third party data, like weather data, and overlay that onto it as well. And
so, you know, there’s a host of online advertising that's really predicated by these
types of inputs—the weather gets to a certain level where we see rain, and this
becomes a great opportunity to order an Uber or something like that…We’re
building the type of advertising network that belongs in a responsive city, that
responds to the world around it. (Behind the Numbers, 2016)
Jeremy Packer (2013) argues that this kind of thinking reflects a much larger
“computational turn” in the advertising industry, which is, in turn, motivated in large part
by the wild profitability of data-driven online advertising like those pioneered by Google.
In this model, the concern of marketers is less on the content of a given advertisement—
its ability to make people “buy things they didn’t need, shouldn’t want, or couldn’t
afford” (ibid., p. 297)—than on the direct measurement of results. “Google’s
computations are not content-oriented in the manner that advertising agencies or critical
scholars are… The only thing that matters are effects—did someone initiate financial data
flows, spend time, consume, click, or conform?” (ibid., p. 298). It is the capacity to
capture and measure audiences’ attention that counts in computational advertising
(Lanham, 2006; Webster, 2014; Wu, 2016)—albeit, often merely to prop up mythologies
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around the efficacy and effectiveness of advertising and the sway that it holds over
audiences.
LinkNYC attempts to translate these computational logics into physical spaces—a
move that some experts have claimed will become key to Alphabet Inc.’s continued
profitability in the future (e.g., Provenzano, 2017). In particular, this expansion of
Google’s advertising into public spaces may be a response to signs that online ad sales—
measured in “cost per click”—are declining, despite increases in the overall number of ad
sales. This decline may owe to increased competition (for instance, with Facebook), or to
more sophisticated ad-blocking software, or to the fact that an increasing share of
Google’s ad sales now take place on YouTube, where ad space is cheaper than search
results since it is not yet customizable to users’ browsing histories. These trends suggest
to some smart city industry commentators that revenue from out-of-home advertising will
be the next frontier for the tech giant.

Location-based data will allow advertisers to reach their audiences better than
ever, which means the value of each ad will increase. That means Alphabet will
be able to say goodbye to declining costs per click—and hello to a future in which
brilliant innovation is funded by smart advertising that gives people what they
want, when and where they want it. (Provenzano, 2017)
Sidewalk Labs was not alone in this emphasis on discovering new ways to
measure the effectiveness—and increase the value of—out-of-home advertising. In
October 2014, just a month prior to the announcement that CityBridge had been awarded
the franchise for LinkNYC, BuzzFeed reported that Titan had installed Bluetooth beacon
devices on hundreds of its payphone booths without public notification or consent
(Bernstein, Singer-Vine & Ryley, 2014). Beacons emit a low-energy radio signal to
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Bluetooth-enabled smartphones, pushing content to users’ apps if they have opted in to
such notifications and are within a close radius to the beacon. As Ad Age reported in
2015, with beacons, “marketers are merging digital and physical worlds to create
seamless, predictive, personalized, and delightful environments that increase sales and
brand metrics” (Fulford, 2015). The beacons that Titan used were manufactured by a
company called Gimbal, which was incubated at Qualcomm (Graves, 2014)—the latter
having already partnered with Titan in the CityBridge consortium during the same period.
Gimbal markets its beacons for specialty use at conventions, concerts, and large sports
events, where they can be used to push notifications to attendees. But as Nick Pinto
(2016) argues in his coverage of LinkNYC, beacons’ “real application to advertisers is in
‘location-based mobile advertising,’ pushing ads to people's devices as they move around
the city.”
Installed in each of the 7,500-10,000 Links to be installed throughout New York,
beacons would become the communicative appendage of Intersection’s marketing
schema, reaching into the phones of anyone with a third-party app that has partnered with
LinkNYC. But the beacons are also only one sensor amongst many installed in the Links,
and Sidewalk Labs has ambitions for the data collection beyond simply targeted
marketing. As Mark Harris (2016) of Recode reported, LinkNYC’s kiosks are adorned
with “eyes, ears and a host of environmental, air and digital sensors to give the tech giant
[Sidewalk Labs] an unprecedented snapshot of urban life.” Documents from Sidewalk
Labs’ bid to participate in the US Department of Transportation’s 2015 Smart City
Challenge show that LinkNYC plays a central role in Sidewalk’s smart city vision, the
cornerstone of Alphabet’s entry into the smart city market:
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When you think about LinkNYC and the 7,500 or so fairly evenly distributed
nodes across the five boroughs, then that does represent a really interesting
opportunity to learn about the city—the behaviors of the city—that could lead
directly to health benefits, more efficient use of traffic. Being able to sense—are
trucks idling near these things illegally? Is there congestion? Is there a traffic
jam? Is there noise pollution, air pollution? All of these things, by micro-location,
could really empower some really interesting insights about the city that will
make it a kind of more enjoyable place to live. (Behind the Numbers, 2016)
To civil liberties and privacy advocates, however, the “micro-located” data that
Intersection and Sidewalk plan to generate through the Links’ sensor platforms does not
promise to make New York a more enjoyable place to live. As a letter from the New
York Civil Liberties Union argues, the sheer volume of data that LinkNYC gathers “will
create a massive database of information that will present attractive opportunities for
hackers and for law enforcement surveillance, and will carry an undue risk of abuse,
misuse and unauthorized access” (NYCLU, 2016). Similarly, members of Rethink
LinkNYC—an activist group dedicated to replacing LinkNYC with a less intrusive and
more publicly-oriented Wi-Fi network—describe the network as “an opportunity for
surveillance, data collection and corporate profit boxed and marketed as free WiFi”
(Rethink LinkNYC, 2017). These critiques highlight the ambiguity of a complex
“communications structure” like LinkNYC, which blends telecommunications functions
like the telephone with internet and location histories—each of which triggering a
different set of requirements for law enforcement access. Police are required to get
warrants in order to access telephone records (Swaby, 2011) but have been able to access
location data without permission from a judge (ACLU, 2017). These conflicts beg the
question of whether a Link kiosk is more like a payphone, an internet service provider, or
a security camera (given that each Link contains up to three cameras).
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Beyond these most immediate and troubling uses for the data collected on the
Links, the kiosks also serve as a prototype for Sidewalk Labs’ broader smart city
initiatives. For instance, Flow, Sidewalk’s platform for “improv[ing] mobility with data
and technology,” employs kiosks identical to LinkNYC’s for data collection. As
Intersection’s Chief Innovation Officer Colin O’Donnell put it recently, “Phase One was
about making sure we’re offering robust services to people. Now we’re figuring out how
we can leverage all the different data sets we have access to and make [this technology]
as dynamic and responsive as it can be” (Woyke, 2017). In typical smart city fashion,
Flow promises to use data culled from its Link-like kiosks to train machine learning
algorithms to optimize traffic or waste disposal management (see Bulu, 2014), or to help
facilitate a rollout of autonomous vehicles in client cities (Woyke, 2017). As promotional
materials advertise, “The Kiosk sensor platform will help address complex issues where
real-time ground truth is needed: Understanding and measuring traffic congestion,
identifying dangerous situations like gas leaks, monitoring air quality, and identifying
quality of life issues like idling trucks” (quoted in Harris, 2016).
In 2016, Sidewalk Labs partnered with the US Department of Transportation
(DoT) to launch a “Smart Cities Challenge,” to identify where the company might begin
testing its Flow platform. Columbus, Ohio won the competition and Sidewalk has been
working with the city government and the DoT to integrate various transportation
systems within Flow. Documents from the public-private partnership reveal Sidewalk’s
plans to construct a kiosk network similar to LinkNYC to support Flow (Harris, 2016).
As with LinkNYC, Flow’s kiosks promise omnibus data collection capable of addressing
any number of known—and as-yet unknown—urban problems. But that does not
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necessarily divorce the kiosk from LinkNYC’s advertising-driven business model. Unlike
the deal that New York City was able to strike with CityBridge, municipalities that
subscribe to Flow would have to purchase kiosks out-of-pocket and fund their
installation: for 100 kiosks, the costs to a city government would be about $4.5 million in
the first year—that is, if they do not include the advertising panel. If the city allows
advertising on the kiosks, then Sidewalk will subsidize their installation, dramatically
reducing first-year costs and even generating revenue for the city after two years.
According to the logic of entrepreneurial urbanism and the private management of
public infrastructures that it promotes, Sidewalk Labs’ broad strategy to capitalize on
urban data collection should be immaterial—granted that it serves its promised public
benefit. But with LinkNYC, the public benefit part of the picture changed in September
2016, as a slew of complaints from neighborhood residents, business owners, and local
politicians started pouring into City Hall about “people who linger for hours, sometimes
drinking and doing drugs and, at times, boldly watching pornography on the sidewalks”
(McGeehan, 2016). In consultation with DoITT, Intersection agreed to shut down the
Google Chrome internet browser on each Link, directly contradicting de Blasio’s rhetoric
for LinkNYC as bridging digital divides. At the ribbon-cutting, for example, Council
Speaker Mark-Viverito noted that “LinkNYC is an innovative program that will provide
free internet access to New Yorkers in thousands of places across the city” (NYC.gov,
2016a). Brooklyn Borough President Eric Adams similarly proclaimed that, “By
expanding access to the Internet from thousands of sites in our city, LinkNYC will keep
New Yorkers connected” (ibid.). Mayor de Blasio even suggested that LinkNYC was a
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means toward “leveling the playing field and providing every New Yorker with access to
the most important tool of the 21st century” (ibid.).
But after September, 2016, users were no longer able to use LinkNYC to access
the internet—that is, if they did not already have an internet-enabled device. Intersection,
in consultation with DoITT and the Mayor’s office, discontinued browsing capabilities on
the Links, despite this access having been at the center of promotional campaigns in the
lead up to and first year of Link’s rollout. Of course, Wi-Fi was still available, and users
could still charge their mobile phones—functions that Manhattan Borough President Gale
Brewer argued “were the true benefit of the kiosks” (McGeehan, 2016). Brewer even
went so far as to liken users’ loitering and pornography viewing to payphones’ usage in
the 1980s and ‘90s, during the height of the crack cocaine epidemic. Shutting down
browsing on the Links, she argued, would be like blocking incoming calls on the
payphones, a tactic that police had used to remove drug dealers from Amsterdam Avenue
(ibid.). For his part, Mayor DeBlasio described the problem as “a pattern of abuse” that
was “disappointing,” but could only be solved by “cut[ting] off the ability to browse and
get [LinkNYC] back to some of its other core functions” (NYC.gov, 2016b).
The problem with this analysis, of course, is that such non-normative uses of the
Links could easily have been anticipated and dealt with had DoITT and/or Intersection
partnered with institutions or agencies that have experience in dealing with the problems
deriving from public information infrastructures. As Shannon Mattern (2016b) observed
after browsing was cut off on the Links, the “information commons is messy; that’s life
in a robust democracy. What works in a public library can work on the street.” Beyond
the bourgeois sensibilities and heteronormativity that this crusade reflects, the rush to roll
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out the Link network without consulting the traditional stewards of public information
systems—namely, librarians—betrays contradictions at the heart of public-private
partnerships. When public benefits and “commons” are pegged to profit-generation
through data collection (Thatcher, O’Sullivan & Mahmoudi, 2016), it is easy to cast aside
the needs of groups who do not contribute to that value. Aside from not having any
purchasing power of their own, the Link users who “loitered” while browsing the internet
frustrated stakeholders like business association leaders and borough presidents—
stakeholders whose constituents demand the type of “quality of life” assurances that
drove New York’s patent “order-maintenance policing” of the 1990s (see Harcourt,
1998). If Sidewalk and Intersection hoped to scale their data-generating kiosk business up
and sell the Links to new cities, they would have to ensure that its prototypic roll-out in
New York City appeased these types of stakeholders.
But also at stake are the connotative representations of connectivity and mobility
that animate smart city imaginaries. Images of apparent LinkNYC “abusers” (Condliffe,
2016; see Figure 2.8; 2.9) present a sharp contrast with Intersection’s promotional images
(Figures 2.7; 2.10). In promotional materials for LinkNYC, cars and pedestrians pass by
the Links blurred in a visual trope to depict motion and mobility. The racially- and
ethnically-ambiguous humans presented here do not engage the street furniture. They
simply pass by, shopping bag swinging as they go. In this imagery, LinkNYC has already
faded into the background of the passersby—an accepted and expected sidewalk feature,
like a lamp or bus shelter. In the press coverage of LinkNYC “abuse,” however, users—
typically depicted as black—are stationary as the world moves around them. They sit on
the ground, on milk crates, on discolored office chairs rolled out onto the sidewalk, or on
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overturned newspaper bins, obscuring the way for the blurred figures of the promotional
materials.

Figure 2.8, 2.9 LinkNYC “abusers” and “loiterers.”
Source (top): http://www.payphone-project.com/2016/linknyc-new-homeless-office.html
Source (below): http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/sept-17-linknyc-homeless-red-hook-article1.2795538
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Figure 2..10 Iconic promotional image for LinkNYC. Source: www.link.nyc

Such contrasts reflect what Tim Creswell (2010, p. 21) describes as a politics of
mobility—the ways in which physical movement, representations of mobility, and its
itinerant practices are “both productive of social relations and produced by them.” The
contrasting mobilities of LinkNYC’s stratified user-base connects the politics of mobility
with politics of the interface. Different types of connectivities parallel social distinctions
along lines of race and class: wireless, ubiquitous connection to the interface coheres with
privileged usage, whereas the “hardline” connections between abusers’ phones and the
kiosks, or their fingers and the touchscreen, suggest mal-usage—what Mayor de Blasio
described as the “unintended consequences” of distributing internet-enabled devices
throughout public spaces (Mattern, 2016). Given that LinkNYC’s advertising-driven
business model hinges on data collection from anonymized and aggregated Wi-Fi
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connected devices, the failure to anticipate the usage patterns of immobile “hardliners” is
unsurprising. Nonetheless, the distinction between “use” and “abuse” reflects the ways in
which these racial- and class-based hierarchies map onto how different subsets of
citizenries and publics are privileged in urban interface design.
At time of writing, LinkNYC is still being installed, with new kiosks going up in
Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island weekly. As I show in the next section,
this system’s Faustian bargain—between public benefit and omnibus data-driven profitseeking—was not inevitable. Looking back to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge and
paying closer attention to entries that were either ignored entirely or overlooked as
finalists, offers a better sense of the diversity of smart city imaginaries at play.

REVISITING REINVENTION
LinkNYC offers a vision for the smart city that is common across corporate promotional
materials. It is driven by a desire for real-time, omnibus environmental and social data
collection, often with neither an express purpose nor a stated hypothesis ahead of time—
an epistemological commitment to the objectivity and immediacy of big data and the
ability of machine learning techniques to reveal otherwise unobservable correlations in
pursuit of profit or further data production (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014; Boellstorff, 2013;
boyd & Crawford, 2012; Kitchin, 2014a; 2014b; e.g., Anderson, 2008; MayerSchönberger & Kukier, 2013). Sidewalk and Intersection, specifically, will require
immense quantities of user data if they are going to be able to extend Google’s profitable
online advertising model into the physical realm of public spaces. What Google learned
online—that “with enough data, the control of human behavior can be worked upon piece
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by piece,” through a constant refining of the techniques for collecting, storing, and
processing that data (Packer, 2013, p. 298)—has undoubtedly shaped the design of
LinkNYC’s interface and how this maps onto norms of usage and urban social
distinctions and stratifications.
How we envision urban interfaces opens a window unto our broader vision for
what the smart city can and should be. The LinkNYC model was not inevitable; other
smart city imaginaries were there and remain possible. The remainder of this chapter
looks to alternative designs for the smart city interface in order to enrich our collective
ability to imagine a future city that does not trade off public benefit in pursuit of data or
profit. Specifically, I highlight four entries to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge that
were either not publicly recognized (since they did not make it to the finalist level) or
received recognition but did not go on to actually influence the final design features that
DoITT called for in its RFP and procurement process. Although the designs presented
here come with their own sets of constraints and limitations (in terms of what kinds of
infrastructural futures they seek to enact), they nonetheless contrast sharply with
LinkNYC and its actualization of a particular vision for the smart city. These ideas are
worth considering both as pragmatic alternatives to LinkNYC and as expressions of
everyday smart city infrastructural imaginaries (Parks, 2014).
It should be noted, however, that this theoretical tack contrasts with work being
done in media studies of human-computer interaction (HCI), and specifically on
speculative design and the politics of anticipation. Dourish and Bell’s (2011, p. 5) work
on ubiquitous computing, for example, does not seek to show “‘how things could have
been different,’ but rather how they already are different among the different groups,
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places, contexts, and circuits that characterize contemporary ubicomp.” This strategy
makes sense when the object of inquiry is assumed to be a unified field, oriented to the
same sets of problems, but which sociological study betrays as a much messier and
complicated terrain. In the case of LinkNYC and its development, the situation is
somewhat different from that of ubiquitous computing. The Reinvent Payphones
Challenge explicitly sought to gather together a diverse range of smart city visions in
order to garner legitimacy, but then moved to consolidate communities of anticipation
around particular design features. In this context, then, showing “how things could have
been different” takes on a critical edge. The ideas, designs, prototypes, and differently
configured relationships between humans, interfaces, and information, were there, in
front of the city employees crafting the RFP, and yet ultimately excluded.
What would it mean to understand the alternative designs presented here as a
form of critique? In the 1990s, UK-based design researchers developed a program of
“critical design” that employed speculative narrative and imagery in order to challenge
viewers’ assumptions about the relationship between humans, objects, machines, and
environments (Dunne, 2005; Dunne & Raby, 2001; cf. Galloway, 2013, p. 57). Critical
design questions “the uncritical drive behind technological progress, when technology is
always assumed to be good and capable of solving any problem” (Dunne & Raby, 2013,
p. 34). It “rejects how things are now as being the only possibility, [and] provides a
critique of the prevailing situation through designs that embody alternative social,
cultural, technical or economic values” (Dunne & Raby, 2001, p. 58). Of course, the
designs that I presented here were crafted prior to LinkNYC’s implementation and rollout, and so cannot operate as critical designs in exactly the same way. Nonetheless,
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through their juxtaposition with LinkNYC, they can still provide a starting point for
critique as “testimonials to what could be” and “alternatives that highlight weaknesses
within existing normality” (Dunne & Raby, 2013, p. 35).

NYC Via
Consider first a design titled “NYC Via.” NYC Via would replace New York City’s
payphones with a series of high-visibility, networked hubs, each equipped with a
transportation aggregation software to provide users with information about the
transportation options they have available to them.
NYC Via is the result of a collaboration between Meredith Popolo and Alex
Levin. The two came together with complementary skillsets. Meredith had a background
in technology and, in late November 2012, when the Reinvent Payphones Challenge was
launched, was working as an editor at PC magazine where she received a press release
for the Reinvent Payphones Challenge. She was immediately interested in entering and
contacted her “go-to creative friend,” Alex, who had recently opened his own design
agency, which specialized in software and interface design. They felt that their respective
areas of expertise—Meredith on the tech side and Alex on the design side—were a good
balance, and quickly started kicking ideas around.
With the state of emergency into which Hurricane Sandy threw New York City
just months prior to the design competition, Meredith and Alex were thinking a lot about
telecommunications and transportation infrastructure in times of crisis and disaster when
they designed NYC Via. During Sandy, the City’s public payphones were the only option
available for thousands of New Yorkers trying to connect with family and friends, to let
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Figure 2.11 NYC Via.
Alex Levin and Meredith Popolo.

them know that they were alright, or to make sure family and friends were alright
(Gilbert, 2012). Most of the city’s cellular networks and internet connections, as well as
some residential and commercial landlines, had gone down as a result of numerous power
outages across the city (Wortham, 2012). The loss of electricity and connectivity—and,
for many, heating—was compounded by the closing of New York’s vast subway system,
which physically isolated the countless New Yorkers who depend on the Metropolitan
Transit Authority to get around (CNN Library, 2016).
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This influenced Meredith and Alex’s design in a couple ways. For one, they saw
no reason to get rid of the payphones landline connections; these had been invaluable to
thousands during period immediately following the storm.

Alex: I remember there was a huge issue with Sandy, just with connectivity, and
we saw a big opportunity there—in the fact that there were all these landlines
already in place and just keeping them around rather than making them totally
connected and on somewhat of, like, the internet’s beck and call or relying on
electricity.10
Rather than fetishize wireless connectivity, as they had anticipated from all the other
entries in the Reinvent Payphones Challenge, Meredith and Alex sought to take
advantage of the extant infrastructure, especially since it had so recently proven its worth
during a disaster.

Meredith: I think we kind of figured that most people would make it like a Wi-Fi
hotspot and to me that’s less exciting because, with Google right there in Chelsea,
I kind of predicted they would have free Wi-Fi over the whole city in a matter of
years. So it’s like, who really needs another Wi-Fi hotspot?11
Alex: We never had the idea of it being just the internet. It was always going to be
a way to access local places, like to see… what stuff is going on nearby, and to
provide just a dedicated space—ideally a few, say, one [parking] spot in front of
the actual phone booth, where a cab would actually be picking you up.12
Another influence from Sandy was the loss of transportation options, since the
city’s subway system was closed for days. This of course created traffic mayhem,
especially for evacuated residents returning to the city (Donovan & Work, 2017).
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Alex Levin and Meredith Popolo, personal communication, Dec. 29, 2016.
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Meredith and Alex had heard about two platforms that meshed telecommunications and
transport together: Hailo, a British platform for matching taxi drivers with passengers
through mobile devices, and Uber, the ride-hailing service in which drivers use their own
cars as taxicabs.13 In addition to alleviating the transportation vacuum during Sandy, the
designers thought, these services could also be valuable in alleviating traffic and reducing
the number of cars on the streets in New York—a perpetual problem for the city.14
NYC Via was the result of this brainstorming—a design that combined the
physical features of a bus shelter with the indestructibility of payphones and the
networked affordances of ride-hailing services. As Meredith and Alex described it on a
blog, Via’s structures would house a touchscreen kiosk loaded with software to provide
users with a system for transportation aggregation—“[t]he Kayak.com of urban
transportation,” a one-stop interface for accessing a number of public transport options
(Levin & Popolo, 2013). The structures themselves would be hardwired and networked
by landline, designed for both reliability and locatability, while its software would be
designed for accessibility—for instance, by making it available in numerous languages
and by not requiring a smartphone.
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In recent years Uber has become synonymous with the “sharing” or “on-demand” economy
(see Chapter 3) and has been both criticized and publicly chastised for its exploitation of drivers,
its sexist corporate culture, its combative engagements with municipal governments, and its
legally-questionable strategies to evade regulators (see Isaac, 2017a; 2017b; Isaac & Seshagiri,
2017; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Scheiber, 2017). At the time when Alex and Meredith were
creating their design, however, Uber was still relatively unknown. Nonetheless, it still managed to
catch major criticism for its handling of increased demand during Sandy. Since demand far
outstripped the available drivers, its surge charging system kicked in, earning it accusations of
price-gouge during a disaster (Carlson, 2012).
14
A 2017 study showed that, in cities that are already transit-friendly, ride-hailing services Uber
and Lyft increase rather than decrease traffic. See Schaller, 2017.
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Even though Via takes inspiration from bus shelters and ride-hailing smartphone
apps, it also departs from them. Unlike bus shelters, Meredith and Alex wanted Via to
have an elegant and minimal structure, to take up as little space as possible on the
already-crowded sidewalks—but also to be as iconic and distinctive as New York City’s
yellow taxis. As a physical site, the Via kiosks would provide a place for people to stop
and catch their breath. In contrast with LinkNYC, which discourages immobility, Via
would be a place to pause before being on the move again. But in order to work, it needed
to be easy to identify. As Meredith put it, the idea was for someone “to look down the
street and be like, that’s a place where I can get a ride.” They explained too that the
iconic design would be attractive for local advertising. For instance, their submission
included a mock-up of a Via site covered by a design by the home goods designer
Marimekko—whom they saw as a brand that was “a little bit more iconic in terms of
pattern.” But unlike LinkNYC and many of the Reinvent Payphones finalists, advertising
would take backseat to the functionality of the design, not drive it.
NYC Via also draws on ride-hailing apps, but does so in a way that captures their
ingenuity while avoiding their pitfalls. As I show in the next chapter, apps like Uber and
Lyft profit by avoiding employment regulations and outsourcing overhead costs to their
workers. NYC Via’s transportation aggregator, on the other hand, would merely connect
users to existing transportation options—not create its own. Since the system is
embedded in specific and known places, a user would enter her destination to see
different modes of nearby public transportation (bus, subway, rail, etc.). They would also
be given access to GPS-linked taxi cabs and airport shuttles. NYC Via’s native software,
FareShare, was especially designed to encourage opt-in cab-sharing. FareShare would
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work by linking passengers at different points along a broad trajectory; after a user
identifies his or her endpoint, FareShare pings a semi-occupied cab nearby heading in the
same direction. The taxi is cheaper for both users, but the drivers earn more money since
their meters run longer.
Rather than focusing exclusively on communications, as many of the other entries
to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge did, NYC Via presented an opportunity to network
together New York City’s complex transportation options into a single, ubiquitous
system. In this sense, it was not unlike Flow, Sidewalk Labs’ transportation platform.
One major difference between the two, however, is that Flow and the data it collects are
privately held and managed, whereas NYC Via would be publicly-owned. One can
imagine this opening up public transport options to new users—for instance, subway
riders unfamiliar with the bus system, or tourists overwhelmed by the number of subway
lines. In this way, NYC Via presented a vision of the smart city that was about improving
upon infrastructures already in place—a way to open up access to existing services.

Windchimes
Like NYC Via, “Windchimes” sought to repurpose the infrastructural affordances of
payphone landlines. But unlike other entries to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge,
Windchimes did not propose to replace them with a new structure. Rather it would
augment them with a suite of low-cost sensors for environmental monitoring. This
uniqueness was recognized in the design competition. Whereas every other finalist entry
featured the smooth, touchscreen surfaces typical of smart city promotional materials,
Windchimes offered a series of small attachments that would be applied to the existing
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payphones. It was also the only finalist to produce a working prototype rather than a
digital mockup, and the only entry that made it to the final round submitted by students
and not professional architects or designers. It tied with Titan and Control Group’s entry
NYC I/O for the community impact category.

Figure 2.12 Windchimes.
Nick Wong, Ann Chen, Rena Lee, Eric Leong, Louis Lim, and Paul Miller.

Windchimes was the result of a collaboration between Nick Wong and Ann Chen,
both students in New York City at the time of the Reinvent Payphones design
competition. Ann was pursuing a Masters in the Interactive Telecommunications
Program (ITP) at New York University’s Tisch School for the Arts, where she researched
environmental sensing and building—and specifically rooftop farms. Nick was working
on his Masters in mechanical engineering at Cooper Union, where he had become
interested in the repurposing of analog infrastructures in the digital age. The two first
encountered each other at a Meetup at ITP, organized to identify potential collaborators
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for the Reinvent Payphones competition. They were joined on the project by a host of
other design, technology, and art students—three at Cooper Union with Nick, two at ITP
with Ann, and one at Parsons. But the idea for Windchimes was really the product of a
symbiosis between Nick and Ann’s individual specialties—Nick, with his interest in
developing new uses for old technologies, and Ann with her knowledge of environmental
sensing.
The team assumed that most other entrants to the competition would go digital,
and they wanted to be different. Around the time of the Meetup, Nick had read an article
in the New York Times about telecommunications companies’ efforts to shift residential
phone services away from landlines and onto VoIP (voice over internet protocol)
(Brodkin, 2014). The article outlined some key facts about the merits of landlines relative
to internet-based alternatives (not least of which is that the Federal Communications
Commission’s “common carrier” obligations on telephones keep the cost of landlines
down, whereas VoIP occupied a regulatory gray zone between telephone and internet).
Coming off the experience of Hurricane Sandy, Nick was particularly interested in
landlines’ robustness, their ability to draw electricity through their copper wiring and stay
powered through outages. He was intrigued by the problem of how to take the phone
lines and do something different with them.

Nick: What kind of interested me about the competition was the idea to reuse the
payphones—not to replace them but to think about new ways to adapt what you
already have with a landline. Thinking beyond digital media and connectivity—
we just figured no one else would be.15

15

Nick Wong and Ann Chen, personal communication, Dec. 13, 2016.
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The idea that the team landed on was to use the payphones’ twelve dial tones (0-9, #, *)
to transmit data through audio. That meant no overhaul—units could simply be plugged
in to any existing phone line.
But it was Ann’s interest in environmental sensing that gave a focus to Nick’s
analog data transmission system. As the project website put it (Chen, n.d.), “We imagined
New York City’s existing 11,000 payphones as a distributed sensor network providing
real-time and hyper-local records of the city’s rain levels, pollution and other
environmental conditions”—a reflection of Ann’s graduate work:

Ann: There was a lot of thought put into the data that would be collected and
what kind of sensors we wanted to put on the phone, and then, like, broadcast that
data on panels on the side. That could tell each neighborhood what the noise
pollution levels were…but also a whole host of other data and potentially even—
this is broader thinking but—potentially, it could even be used to broadcast like
events or things so it becomes a community hub, or at least that was an idea.
Because these payphones were already so spread out throughout the city in a
democratic kind of way.16
As Nick explained, when the team was still working through different concepts and ideas,
he would ask himself, “What would this allow me to do that a smartphone would not
allow me to do?” As he pondered this, he turned away from designs that hinged on
internet connectivity or even digital displays and instead became interested in the
geographic distribution of payphones throughout the city (Chen, n.d.).
There were plenty of other entries in the Reinvent Payphones competition that
emphasized environmental issues (including fellow finalist, “Smart Sidewalks,”
described below). But Windchimes stood out among the crowd. One reason why was that
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Windchimes was the only finalist to submit a working prototype. There were other
submissions that included physical mock-ups. But because most entries involved
speculative surfaces or software, even physical entries were for display only.
Windchimes actually worked. At the time of the demo day, Windchimes was ready to be
connected to a phone line and start recording data. It was more rudimentary than even a
dial-up modem. This simplicity emphasized functionality over form and style, an ethic of
making and doing that contrasted sharply against other entries’ visually rich but entirely
speculative submissions. Nick and Ann estimated that each unit would cost between $100
and $200, depending on the number of sensors you decided to install in it. In large part,
this low cost is due to dramatic decreases in the size and cost of digital sensors and
computing equipment—for instance, Arduino components, microprocessors and
controller boards can be purchased for under $20. But it was also due to Windchimes’
modular, “plug and play” assembly, and the team’s eschewal of any digital signage, that
set it apart from the competition in the Reinvent Payphones Challenge. It was a vision for
the smart city that privileged practicality over novelty.
In conjunction with Windchimes’ do-it-yourself ethic for environmental data
collection, its designers also proposed open portals where any one could gain access to
the troves of environmental data being collected. LinkNYC, on the other hand, has only
disincentives to share their data. Its advertising-driven business model hinges on the data
remaining proprietary. Prior to the RFP, when Control Group and Titan were promoting
their entry to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge (NYC I/O), engineer Chas Mastin
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promoted a similar idea. On a blogpost for Control Group, Mastin (2013)17 described his
vision of an open access platform—an “API for the city itself,” “not just a marketplace
for apps to access this ubiquitous computing platform, but the ability for anyone to mine
the data for patterns, to see what the police are seeing, to see how companies are making
use of the data.” Ultimately, the model implemented by LinkNYC abandoned these
commitments to “open sourcing” the city. However, the Windchimes prototype, up and
running at the time of the competition, had already achieved this vision.

Smart Sidewalks
“Smart Sidewalks” was a finalist for the functionality category in the Reinvent Payphones
Challenge. Like the other finalists (other than Windchimes), its main feature was a
digital, touchscreen kiosk offering access to Wi-Fi, wayfinding functions, and devicecharging services. But Smart Sidewalks was also somewhat unique among competitors.
While its angular six-inch-wide kiosk panel extended up from the edge of the sidewalk, at
its base a strip of LED display lays flush with the ground and extends across the five-foot
sidewalk grid. It also proposed to incorporate a subterranean storm water management
system into the sidewalk during the construction phase.
Smart Sidewalks was developed by a group of designers led by Claire Napawan
and Brett Snyder, a landscape architect and architectural designer by training,
respectively. Like Nick Wong and Ann Chen on Windchimes, Claire and Brett presented
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while Brett had worked professionally in graphic design. The two had worked together
often when the two were both living and working in New York City. In 2009, however,
Claire left her job at an architecture firm to pursue a career in academia. She moved to

Reinvent Payphones Winner: Smar
Sidewalks - Best Functionality

University of California, Davis and began teaching in the Department of Human Ecology,
which is housed in the College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences. Brett

followed suit. In 2011, he landed a job at UC Davis in the Department of Design in the
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nycdigital:
Arts
School.

Figure 2.13 Smart Sidewalks.
Brett Snyder, Ben Busse, Rama Chorpash, Grant Foster, Jesse Ganes, Sinead MacNamara, and
Claire Napawan.

Both Claire and Brett had continued to work on New York-based projects even
after their move to California, and Claire, in particular, remained keyed in to projects
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involving streetscape design. The Reinvent Payphones Challenge quickly caught her
attention and she contacted Brett, with whom she had partnered numerous times in New
York. They also brought on other designers, including Rama Chorpash, whom Brett had
worked with at Swatch watch company and who was teaching at Parsons, as well as Ben
Russe Jesse Ganes, Grant Foster, and Sinead MacNamara—each of whom represented a
different facet of the project as it developed: structural engineering, product interface
design, etc.
During an interview, Claire explained that what caught her attention about the
Reinvent Payphones Challenge was that it was essentially streetscape design. She found
this area especially interesting as the last bastion of true public space. In New York City,
all of the most exciting spaces—the High Line, for example—are able to attract the
highest quality designers because there is real money involved. But that money comes at
a price to publicness. Spaces like the High Line are managed privately even though they
serve a public function. “You can’t protest in the High Line. It’s a really beautiful, highdesign public park, but it’s not really public.”18 The streetscape is exciting because it had
managed to avoid this arrangement.19 But being truly public also presents certain
limitations. “When you get to the streetscape itself, it becomes the lowest common
denominator… There are a lot of constraints—not just financial, but also sort of physical
engineered constraints too,”20 because the sidewalk is public and because it is a
throughway. But, as Claire explained, these limitations also present creative
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opportunities. This helps to explain Smart Sidewalks’ minimalist design—a way to
provide digital functionality to the streetscape without occupying much space.
Like many of the other finalists, Claire, Brett, and their team were willing to
incorporate an advertising function onto the kiosk. They were trying to be realistic about
the space. They knew it would be attractive to advertisers and that advertising would
provide much needed revenue to the city. But like NYC Via, they did not let advertising
drive the design. This became apparent when Claire and I discussed the RFP and
procurement processes that took place in 2014. As a finalist, their team was invited to
participate in the RFP. Claire and Brett expanded the team, reaching out to individuals
specializing in communications technologies in order to meet the RFP’s demands. But
Claire was dismayed at how little the RFP had to do with the design competition and the
ideas that it sourced.

Claire: There wasn’t a lot of room for designers, for architects, for the folks that
really engaged in the design competition, to play a role. And that’s because the
request was specifically geared towards communication, internet technology, that
sort of stuff—it was the classic clear vision of, just, do the ad in the subways and
what not.21
During the design phase, the team had thought instrumentally about advertising—
as a way to source some revenue to do the more expensive construction they had
envisioned, but not as the core feature of the structures. And what they had in mind was
the opportunity to update and expand on the city’s storm water management
infrastructure, which fails regularly. Claire explained that, on an average day, New

21

Ibid.

100
York’s sewerage system can handle the population’s waste, but when there is significant
precipitation the system gets overwhelmed rather easily, causing sewerage to overflow
into the rivers and bays surrounding New York. Smart Sidewalks’ vision was to intervene
in this failure through environmental engineering. Given the fact that any replacement to
the payphone would require going underground to access the telecommunications
infrastructure, the Smart Sidewalks team imagined installing a filtration and storage
system for storm water runoff. She described it as a “subterranean bioswale”—a way to
slow and filter storm water to mitigate excess and systemic overload. In theory, sensors
could also be installed in order to alert city agencies to overflow.
But these concerns fell by the wayside during the RFP process. As Claire’s team
partnered up with communications, marketing, and advertising specialists in drafting a
response to the RFP, she learned that this vision of the smart city—as an opportunity to
upgrade failing physical infrastructures—was not the same as DoITT’s vision.

I think that’s my problem with where the [Reinvent Payphones] project went after
it left the competition phase. It moved to thinking solely about economic gains,
the application of technology for that purpose. Some of the social role and the
social good that we saw that this project could provide—and which we saw the
really good other projects addressing, not just ours but others—they really didn’t
follow through on any of it.22

Digital Democracy
“Digital Democracy” did not make it as a finalist in any of the categories of the Reinvent
Payphones competition. Perhaps the reason why is that its concept was so simple. Digital
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Democracy proposed to replace payphones with large LED displays—or digital
“canvases”—available for anyone with a complementary smartphone app to upload
content. There would be no censorship on what images went up. It would simply
be whatever the user wanted—flyers, posters, original artwork, local business
advertisements, etc. This presented a relatively freewheeling idea, but it also came with
some constraints. Users would have to be in physical proximity to the sign in order to
upload content, and user-generated content would stay up on the digital billboards only
until the next user came along to replace it. A piece of content could be written over, but
also reloaded or put up at a different site. These rules were meant to ensure that no single
user could plaster the entire system, but left room for playful competition. Any
inappropriate or illicit content would be policed by neighbors, who could report and
replace offensive material. Digital Democracy was like a digital version of the kinds of
community billboards up on college campuses and in coffee shops.
The concept was developed by William Arnold and Andrei Juradowitch, who at
the time of the Reinvent Payphones competition were working together at a design studio
in New York. Sitting next to each other at the office, the two had been spit-balling ideas
for some time, looking for something to work on outside of work, before they heard
about Reinvent Payphones. Originally Will and Andrei pushed their company to submit
to the competition, but decided, due to a lack of interest, to instead do it for fun, just the
two of them, as a side project. As with NYC Via and Windchimes, Will and Andrei liked
the idea of incorporating existing infrastructure into the design of a new system—
“whether it’d be, like, the actual phone booth itself or the fact that there’s electricity
being pumped into this component… I think we had probably even talked about
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Figure 2.14 Digital Democracy.
William Arnold and Andrei Juradowitch.

[replacing the payphones] before this competition came up.”23 They were drawn to digital
media’s interactive capacities and were interested in applying that to some sort of
community engagement component.

Andrei: I guess when it started, we wanted to create something where we gave
people control rather than passivity. So we want to create something where people
could add to it rather than just observe it. When you look at wayfinders and maps
and stuff, it was all very like sort of observation and you didn’t really engage with
it. You just read information from it.
Will: So yeah, our concept was an exploration and repurposing of these phone
booths. But it was also kind of an exploration of a certain way of looking at free
speech in the 21st century. Our idea was that, using an app, anybody could
basically “slide in”—if you will—a piece of static content onto the screens…
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At the time, we were starting to see some of these phone booths get
advertisements on them. Our idea just felt like a really cool way to give a small
corner of the city or, like, some little piece of real estate back to the people. To
advertise whatever was on their mind, as opposed to this really expensive
corporate advertisement on the side of a phone booth. It was kind of giving a slice
of the city back to the people: to put meaningful images all over the city.24
The idea itself was inspired by graffiti, Will and Andrei explained in their
submission. “For decades, residents of New York have been relying on public space and
private property as outlets for personal expression and artistic exploration. As a result,
every corner of the city contains some sort of graffiti, sticker art, flyers, or wheat-pasted
posters” (Arnold & Juradowitch, 2013). Digital Democracy would create space for the
time-honored tradition of street media (Drucker, 2010), albeit as a software-based
platform. As Will put it, the idea was to enhance the publicness of public spaces, to add
to the media and forums available to activists, artists, and community organizers, without
having to rely on corporate sponsors.

Will: We felt like New York was maybe one of the only cities where this could
actually work. It’d be a utility for a city. It seems really simple and totally
achievable, but in reality really hard to imagine this screen existing. If it did, the
question would become, what will people use them for? I think you’d start to get
really interesting answers.
Of course, it is doubtful that we will ever see those answers. Unlike many of the
other submissions to the Reinvent Payphones Challenge, Digital Democracy avoided
getting bogged down in the political economy of digital street furniture. They had no
funding schema. They simply presented a “blue sky” vision of how a payphone
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reinvented for the 21st century could mesh with ideals of free speech and expression.
Perhaps this was naïve, but it offers an example of how to think about what a smart city
could be by carving out space for citizens rather than corporate advertisers. Contrast this
with LinkNYC, which has been advertised as “For New Yorkers, By New Yorkers.”25
Advertising on LinkNYC costs a minimum of $5,000 for four weeks of run-time, but the
pricing jumps rather quickly in order to gain access to busy locations and peak display
times (Gaynor, 2016). This effectively excludes “mom and pop” businesses from
utilizing the ad space—let alone individual citizens seeking artistic expression in public
space. For now, New Yorkers may have to stick to wheat-paste and spray paint.

CONCLUSIONS: INTERFACE AND INFRASTRUCTURAL IMAGINARY
As the quotes at the beginning of this chapter indicated, interfaces both structure and are
structured by the broader technological and social configurations in which they are
situated. Throughout the chapter, I have argued that how interfaces are designed—both in
terms of their aesthetics and their structuring of information, mobility, and urban
spaces—can play an important role in how we imagine a city to be made “smart”; even as
speculative designs, interfaces can shape our “ways of thinking about what infrastructures
are, where they are located, who controls them, and what they do” (Parks, 2014, p. 355).
As the relational points of contact between system users and system managers, interfaces
structure what can be known about a data infrastructure—how data is gathered, by whom,
and toward what ends. They can thus serve as key components in shaping imaginaries.
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The Link interface design shrouds most of the system’s core functions from plain
view—its arrays of sensors, microphones, and cameras, hidden within and behind the
interface. As comments by executives at Sidewalk Labs and Intersection made clear,
these tools for data collection are neither tangential nor coincidental; they are central to
LinkNYC’s business model—to its expansion of online advertising’s interactive feedback
into the physical domains of public space, and to its prototyping of a model of smart city
partnerships to manage mobility, as in the Smarter Cities Challenge. By the time that
internet browsing was shut down and non-normative users and usages were designated as
“unintended consequences,” little remained of LinkNYC’s promise to bridge digital
divides—the discourse that motivated public buy-in for the project.
By looking to alternative interface designs, I showed that other infrastructural
imaginaries were also in play, but that these were ultimately sacrificed in favor of
LinkNYC’s advertising-oriented model. Of course, no design is perfect, and the Reinvent
Payphones submissions were no exception. But they nonetheless point to a diversity in
the ways that the smart city and its interfaces can be imagined—a diversity that becomes
critical when alternatives are foreclosed upon through communities of anticipation, as
was the case for the Links.
Discarding these alternative designs, DoITT and the New York City government
acquiesced to a vision of the city that does not revolve around public benefit or the
informational commons, but rather around the privatization of public infrastructure, the
monetization of communication, the capture of mobile data for commercial calculation
and anticipation, and a marginalization of other visions for infrastructure and citizenship.
Of course, public payphones were always a commercial endeavor, both in terms of coin-
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drop payments and as advertising space. But there was also a straightforwardness and
utilitarianism to the payphone that is lost in LinkNYC but which survived in the
alternative designs presented here. NYC Via promoted access to public transport.
Windchimes’ do-it-yourself aesthetic of environmental data capture and open data portals
stimulated a sense of ecological citizenship, as did Smart Sidewalks’ buffering against
environmental disaster. And Digital Democracy fostered a sense of communicative
equality, much like a digital community board. That these visions have failed to enter the
conversation around smart cities reflects a failure of our collective imagination.
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CHAPTER 3. AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN THE
ON-DEMAND ECONOMY
Today, another technological revolution is looming. Pervasive digital
networks are entering physical space, giving rise to the “Internet of
Everything”—the networked lifeblood of the “smart city.” And, once
again, a broad spectrum of implementation models is emerging in
different parts of the world. In the United States, the general idea of smart
urban space has been central to the current generation of successful startups. One of the latest examples is Uber, a smartphone app that lets anyone
call a cab or be a driver.
—Ratti and Claudel, 2014
#DeleteUber
—Twitter, 2017

The “Internet of Things” (IoT) and the “Internet of Everything” are catch-all phrases for
describing a combination of technological forces—pervasive computing, ubiquitous
connectivity, and surveillant environments—that have become synonymous with “smart”
urbanism (Gabrys, 2014; Hayles, 2009; Kitchin, 2014; Sadowski & Pasquale, 2015;
White, 2016). In the popular imaginary, IoT is conceived as a particular set of
technologies (often domestic appliances) which communicate with one another without
the aid of human intervention and for the purposes of enhancing human convenience
(Lingel, 2016). The spectacle of a vast array of interconnected devices and
infrastructures, “talking to each other” without human awareness (Neyland, 2014, pp. 1011), suggests that IoT is still the pipedream of speculative designs (Forlano & Mathew,
2014; Kinsley, 2011; 2012) or even the fantastical matter of science fiction (Dourish &
Bell, 2014). But it is also the pipedream of information and technology giants. John
Chambers, former CEO of Cisco, estimated in 2014 that the application of IoT concepts
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to the public sector—urban planning, emergency response, military intervention,
healthcare—will become a $4.6 trillion business (Bajarin, 2014). Of course, these bullish
projections are enhanced by the fuzziness of IoT concepts and applications, which can
run the gamut from the mundane and domestic like smart kitchen appliances (Lingel,
2016) to the hyper-surveillant cyber-security-industrial complex, with companies like
Palantir landing multimillion dollar deals with US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and other law enforcement agencies (Woodman, 2017).
As with the smart city, there is an “actually existing” Internet of Things, already
taking hold in business and government applications. The IoT of refrigerators keeping
their own stock may still be the provenance of the wealthy, largely unattainable by
middle and lower class households. But technologies like RFID (radio frequency
identification) tags, which can be used to track goods across supply chains or employees
across factory spaces (see Kanngieser, 2013; Rossiter & Zehle, 2014), are already
deployed widely to effect logistical forms of control. For example, the trade press for the
logistics industry often feature articles with titles like, “What is Your Fleet Trying to Tell
You?” (Powell, 2016) or “How Real-Time Information Can Transform Your Supply
Chain” (Collins, 2016)—each detailing how communication technologies can make the
movement of goods and people more transparent to managers. Or consider the Universal
Product Code (UPC), or barcode, which might be considered an unacknowledged IoT
prototype, linking the physical mobility of commodities with trails of data. Invented in
1974, UPC technologies did not become ubiquitous until large retailers like Walmart
began insisting on their compulsory adoption by suppliers. As LeCavalier (2016, p. 20)
writes, the barcode “serves to abstract the items moving through Walmart’s supply
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circuits: they are registered and tracked as numbers rather than things,” creating vast
amounts of data that are only matched by the US Department of Defense.
These “other Internet[s] of Things,” as Lingel (2016) calls them, suggest that we
should not be asking when or if the IoT’s patent products and environments will arrive.
They are already here, operating “in the wild” and transforming the institutions that they
touch, often with few checks and balances on them. Like the smart city, the actually
existing IoT is unevenly implemented, full of holes and road bumps, disconnections and
breakdowns, which can disrupt their proponents’ dreams of seamless, invisible
computing, available “anytime, anywhere” (Forlano, 2013).1 Rather than prognosticating
about the arrival of IoT, then, we should be asking “which technologies will be gathered
under that label and to whose benefit” (Lingel, 2016).2
As the above quote from Carlo Ratti and Matthew Claudel of MIT’s Senseable
City Lab suggests, Uber and other companies operating in the “on-demand economy”
have become the “poster child” for IoT applications to urban space—“for leveraging an
internet-connected device to solve a unique problem” (Zhuo, 2016).3 On-demand
companies’ describe themselves as technology firms and their products as platforms,

1

For example, in October 2016 hackers gained access to “hundreds of thousands of internetconnected devices like cameras, baby monitors and home routers” in order to initiate a distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on internet infrastructure, and effectively shutting down major
internet traffic for hours (Perlroth, 2016).
2
Lingel’s argument is that there are surveillant technologies of control that get excluded from IoT
discourse. My argument here will be somewhat different, which is that the inclusion of ondemand services under the IoT label minimizes the manual, non-automated work that must be
fulfilled by humans rather than machines.
3
For example, a policy brief from the Wharton School of Business at the University of
Pennsylvania describes the coming digital economy as the “Internet of the World.” This
comprises the Internet of Things, the “big data” sets that ubiquitous connectivity yields, and the
on-demand economy, which seeks to generate profit off of that connectivity and data (Werbach,
2017).
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whose patent innovation is to leverage the smartphone’s “easy utility of personal
connectivity to the mobile internet” (Wiig, 2016) to facilitate transactions between
individual suppliers of a good or service with demand. Uber and Lyft provide ride-hailing
services through a smartphone app, Luxe valet parking, InstaCart food shopping and
delivery, Postmates and Caviar courier services for food and other goods, and Airbnb
short-term home rentals. As Zhuo (2016) writes for Entrepreneur magazine (in an article
titled “The ‘Internet of Things’ is Steering the On-Demand Economy”), these companies
“couldn’t have existed before smartphones became a widespread phenomenon, of course.
But today we can all hail a car with a swipe and a tap, thanks to [the smartphone’s] dual
internet connectivity and mobile GPS.”
From comments like these, one could be forgiven for assuming that it was the
smartphone itself that delivered the car. But this is not the case. That such discourses are
framed around the idea of automation and luxury (Uber’s tagline is “everyone’s private
driver”) eschews the labor that goes into services like ride-hailing and delivery. They also
allow on-demand companies to define themselves as mere technological matchmakers or
“middlemen” (Steinmetz, 2015), a designation with consequences for how laborers are
treated and defined legally.
Serious concerns have been raised about the validity of the “middleman” business
model. Ongoing class action lawsuits (Alba, 2016a; 2016b; Kessler, 2015), labor
department reviews of on-demand company practices (National Employment Law
Project, 2017), and surveys of on-demand worker experiences (Alba, 2015; Aspen
Institute, 2016) indicate that the on-demand economy involves much more than
innovations in connective devices, as the automated luxury of the IoT framing might

111
suggest. They point to new entanglements between regulation (and deregulation),4
technological affordances, and shifting moral economies of obligation between
corporations, workers, and consumers.
Whether companies operating in the on-demand economy are merely
technological middlemen is a truly fateful question, both for the firms and their workers.
For if firms are simply matching supply and demand on technological platforms, then ondemand workers will continue to be designated as independent contractors rather than
employees. This designation has obvious benefits to on-demand companies. In the US, it
frees them from costly worker protections, including minimum wage, overtime, antidiscrimination laws, contributions to Social Security, Medicare, workers’ compensation,
and unemployment and health insurance. It also means that workers—legally considered
an enterprise, a business, or as self-employed—must provide their own equipment and
pay their own bills—auto insurance, smartphones and data plans, bicycle parts and
maintenance. Without these financial weights, on-demand companies face few overhead

4

The on-demand economy has prompted debates about how to regulate digital economies. For
example, writing for the Wharton School of Business’ public policy blog, Kevin Werbach (2017)
recommends reconfiguring regulations wholesale to accommodate digital “disruptions” in
traditional service economies. Specifically, he suggests avoiding direct oversight by:
enabl[ing] private governance activity under the umbrella of public regulatory oversight.
There are several variants of self-regulation, co-regulation, and delegated regulation that
would free private actors from the inefficiencies of direct government mandates (e.g.,
restrictive licensing and verification procedures) while still ensuring that public interest
obligations (e.g., rider or occupant safety and consumer protection) are met. In particular
cases, software code might be more or less desirable than legal code in regulating
behavior.
Jettisoning traditional regulation for software code, or through mechanisms like workers’
reputation rankings, translates technological solutionism into the realm of oversight while also
deputizing the companies to police themselves.
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expenses. This, in turn, allows them to maximize their profit margins while undercutting
their traditional service industry competitors like the taxi industry. Some critical
observers have even argued that on-demand companies would cease to be profitable were
it not for their workers’ designation as independent contractors; the costs of fulfilling
employee obligations would simply exceed companies’ financial capacity even with
projected growth rates (Rajaraman, 2017; Rust, 2016).
Legally, the independent contractor designation requires that companies afford
their workers a certain degree of autonomy, typically understood as freedom from
employer control. The United States Department of Labor (DOL) and Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), for instance, each outline sets of criteria for distinguishing between
employee and independent contractor-type relationships. The IRS asks, “Does the
company control or have the right to control the worker as well as how the worker does
his or her job? For example, if a company provides training for the worker, this signals an
expectation to follow company guidelines and therefore indicates that the worker is likely
an employee” (AFL-CIO, 2016). Similarly, the DOL examines “the nature and degree of
control” of the worker “by the principal” (US DOL, 2014). A letter from the Obama-era
Department of Labor sought to further clarify these distinctions with a more nuanced and
detailed “economic realities” test (Wald, 2017).
The trouble for on-demand companies is that adhering to legal criteria of worker
autonomy comes with its own set of costs. Economic modeling of on-demand business
models suggests that, relative to “industry standard” market wage competition,
companies allowing their workers to set their own schedule—a key indicator of
autonomy and freedom from employer control—can expect smaller profit margins as
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well as issues with coverage, leading to customer dissatisfaction (Cachon, Daniels &
Lobel, 2017; Gurvich, Lariviere & Moreno, 2016; Taylor, 2016). Worker autonomy can
present logistical challenges to companies who need to ensure adequate levels of
coverage across their market, both in terms of space (as in having workers available in
the right places, i.e., “coverage”) and time (as in having workers scheduled throughout
operating hours and, especially, during peak demand periods).
In response to these competing demands, on-demand companies develop
strategies for having it both ways: for satisfying legal definitions of worker autonomy
while also tacitly exercising several techniques of control over their workers. Such
arbitrage is integral to the on-demand business model. For without the independent
contractor designation, many on-demand firms would likely have to shutter, and without
control over their workers, the quality of service provision would detrimentally decline.
These strategies of arbitrage are the topic of this chapter. My research suggests
that much strategic work takes place in and through the smartphone apps that on-demand
companies require their workers to use. These worker-facing apps are distinct from their
customer-facing counterparts. 5 The worker-facing app is a key component to the ondemand business model, typically the only interface between worker and firm. As such,
worker-facing apps are meticulously designed to structure the flow of information to
workers in order to achieve desirable outcomes for the company. When workers accept
job orders through the app, it not only implies consent to the terms of service (such as

5

Customer-facing apps have their own set of strategies at play (see Chen, Mislove & Wilson,
2015; Rosenblat, 2015).
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location-tracking), it also submits workers to dense worker contracts or agreements to
which they tacitly agree every time they agree to take an order.
These technical opacities operate in tandem with discourses that celebrate the
autonomy and flexibility of work in the on-demand economy. On-demand workers
respond to these strategies of arbitrage. They develop an intuitive sense of the workerfacing apps’ algorithmic workforce management techniques. These intuitions evolve over
time, as the worker gains experiences interfacing with the app. They are honed as
companies make seemingly arbitrary updates that later have palpable effects on
paychecks. My concern in this chapter is how these intuitions inform workers’ on-the-job
experiences and decision-making such as when to schedule, which orders to accept or
reject, and their sense of how and why companies alter the worker-facing app and to what
ends. These intuitions—and the company strategies of arbitrage that they reflect—
provide a corrective to simplistic framings of the on-demand economy as an IoT success
story. Like LinkNYC’s interface’s ability to shroud the surveillant data generation for
purposes of commercial gain, the interfaces of the on-demand economy’s worker-facing
apps are likewise central to its operations, not tangential or coincidental. Throughout this
chapter, I ask: what forms of logistical control can be effected through the design of
workers’ apps—and how do these buttress opaque workforce management systems?

METHODS, ARGUMENT, AND CHAPTER STRUCTURE
The research for this chapter utilized a mixed methodological approach, combining three
primary qualitative data sets. The first involved the collection and analysis of online and
print materials related to the search terms “on-demand economy,” “gig economy,”
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“sharing economy,” and “1099 economy.” This included articles on popular news media
websites (e.g., Slate, Medium, Quartz, Huffington Post, etc.), print media outlets (e.g.,
New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Herald, Seattle Times, etc.), trade magazines
(e.g., Personnel Today, Geomarketing), as well as blog posts and worker forums authored
by on-demand economy workers (e.g., UberPeople, Quora).
The second data set is comprised of extended, semi-structured interviews that I
conducted with twenty individuals who have worked for one or more on-demand
company, either as a bicycle courier or driver (see Appendix B for a schedule of
interviews and list of interview questions). The companies represented in this data set
include two courier services, Caviar and Postmates, and two ride-hailing apps, Uber and
Lyft. Each of these companies has its own set of methods for coordinating deliveries or
rides—different combinations of automated and manual dispatching, pricing schemes for
deliveries, scheduling requirements, and incentive programs. Nonetheless, they share a
number of common characteristics. Each uses worker-facing apps distinct from customerfacing apps. Each claims to be in the business of technology rather than delivery or taxi
services. And each utilizes opaque pricing algorithms that determine how much workers
will be paid for a given job order.
This last shared characteristic—algorithmic payment systems—was the most
important distinction of my selection criteria. Algorithmic pricing stands in contrast to
other platforms that are also sometimes included under the “on-demand” banner, for
instance, the short-term home rental platform Airbnb, or TaskRabbit, a platform for
hiring people to do minor tasks. Both of these companies allow the service provider and
the customer to set the pricing. On Airbnb, home-renters set the per-night price (Kinnard,
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2017) and on TaskRabbit, task-doers decide what their hourly rate should be for a certain
type of work. By contrast, drivers for Uber and Lyft, and couriers for Caviar and
Postmates, can only choose to accept or reject an order that they receive at a set,
algorithmically-determined price.
The third data set involved observations that I made while working for over a year
as a bicycle courier for Caviar, an upscale food delivery service operating in over a dozen
urban markets in the United States. My observations included a systematic survey of
deliveries made during a three-week period in November and December, 2015, as well as
hundreds of fieldnotes (made on my smartphone while working) that document customer
promotions, worker-oriented incentive programs, app updates, and changes to the worker
terms of service. Research was also enriched by attending a business-oriented conference
hosted by the MIT Sloan School of Management, which featured prominent speakers,
including Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, Uber’s chief economist Jonathan Hall, and
Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute, where debates about exploitation and
value in the on-demand business model were made explicit. Taken together, these lines of
research inform my argument: that on-demand companies remain profitable by effecting
strategies of arbitrage between worker autonomy and control, and that much of this
arbitrage takes place through the smart phone apps that companies require their workers
to use.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I critique the economic
theory most commonly applied to explain the way that technology is changing the nature
of work in the on-demand economy. This explanation rehashes Ronald Coase’s (1937)
famous enquiry into the “nature of the firm” and serves to legitimate the designation of
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on-demand workers as independent contractors through claims that technology serves to
“disaggregate” the firm.
The following section then illustrates how worker-facing apps effect control in
ways that reflect the traditional firm structure. Given that the worker-facing app is the
primary mode of communication between worker and company, control is exercised
through multiple techniques that capitalize on the app as informational bottle neck:
certain forms of information are selectively included or excluded depending on the
desired effect (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Control is also mobilized through opaque
algorithmic and job order allocation systems—“herding” techniques (ibid., p. 7)—that
assist in administering and managing worker coverage in time (scheduling) and space
(area). These techniques operate through various combinations of incentives and
disincentives, updates to app interfaces, worker contracts and agreements, and
infographics that invite workers to police their own behavior. Taken together, these
techniques suggest that the quantity, quality, and timing of information displayed to
workers are integral components of on-demand strategies of arbitrage.

THE NATURE OF THE (ON-DEMAND) FIRM
At the start of 2016, linguist Geoffrey Nunberg of NPR’s Fresh Air penned an essay
about the nomination of the word “gig” for word of the year. Tracking its origins as
musician slang for a performance or job to its later adoption by Jack Kerouac and other
hipsters of the 1950s to refer to short-term work, Nunberg argues that “gig” now signifies
the kind of work that has become dissociated from a person’s character, “a hip term for
any temporary job or stint, with the implication you're not particularly invested in it”
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(Nunberg, 2016). But by 2016, “gig” had also risen to prominence within the lexicon of
Silicon Valley’s tech gurus and venture capitalists. Gigging is at the center of a new
mantra of work-life—that the “9-to-5” should not define you. In the “gig,” “sharing,” and
“on-demand” economies,6 what counts is no longer “where you work” but “what you’re
working on.”7 In Nunberg’s words, gig economy discourse suggests that “The lifetime
job is history… a victim of technology and the logic of the market. Instead, careers will
be a patchwork of temporary projects and assignments, with the help of apps and
platforms with perky names like FancyHands, Upwork and TaskRabbit” (ibid.).
Nunberg’s take is cautionary, perhaps even a bit melancholy about the fate of
work, noting that for those without the means to “hit the road when it gets joyless,” “gig”
will remain “just an old word for a job you need that you can’t count on having
tomorrow” (Nunberg, 2016). But for champions of this new model of work, caution and
melancholy can all too quickly become a form of “blinkered nostalgia” for the pitiless 9to-5 (Graboyes, 2016). Writing for Economics21, the Manhattan Institute’s economic
policy blog, Robert Graboyes argues that “anti-giggers” “romanticiz[e] and reinforc[e]
the most hated aspects of post-1800 employment—subordination of and control over
employees by employers” (ibid.). Here, the freedom and flexibility of gig work represents
a liberatory alternative to the same repressive working conditions that Marx and Engels
had witnessed on the factory floors of Manchester, now manifest in the cubicles of

6

“Gig” and “sharing” economies are slightly more expansive terms than “on-demand.” They can
also refer to the rise of freelancing or service bartering, whereas the “on-demand economy” has
the slightly more specific connotation of rapid service provision, ordered through smartphone
apps or online platforms (see Wu et al., 2016).
7
Here I am quoting US Senator Mark Warner, speaking at the On-Demand Economy conference
hosted by MIT’s Sloan School of Management, the Initiative on the Digital Economy, and the
Institute for Work and Employment Research, Mar. 15, 2016.
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Figure 3.1 Still from commercial for on-demand food delivery and courier service Caviar.
Source: https://vimeo.com/126538031

mundane office buildings and industrial parks. According to this logic, the security and
benefits that employees receive from their companies simply cost too much in terms of
control. In their place, the gig economy offers its workers “flexibility to continuously
upgrade skills in a rapidly changing economy or pursue dreams that are incompatible
with a 9-to-5 routine” (ibid.).
The benefits of flexibility and autonomy are attractive to workers for obvious
reasons. Being their own boss, workers no longer need to ask permission to take time off.
This in turn allows them to devote time to more meaningful and worthwhile activities—
as flexibility proponents suggest, “to attend classes, acquire new skills, compose music,
or invent the next killer app or cancer cure” (Graboyes, 2016). An advertisement for ondemand courier service Caviar makes these benefits part of its sales pitch to potential
workers (Figure 3.1):
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I love discovering new places to eat around the city. And sharing the best local
food with people who appreciate it. I also love being in control of my schedule.
As a Caviar courier, I work as much as I like, which helps a lot. I can easily
balance work and school and I can hit the books when I need to. Once I’m
available again, orders are dispatched to my smartphone. All I have to do is
accept.8

The flipside of flexibility is that gig workers can be hired on a “pay-as-you-go”
basis. Discrete tasks can be outsourced to individual workers rather than whole
organizations, such as temp agencies. Gig working platforms provide “humans-as-aservice” (Irani, 2015). As a CEO of one major crowd-working platform put it,

Before the Internet, it would be really difficult to find someone, sit them down for
ten minutes and get them to work for you, and then fire them after those ten
minutes. But with technology, you can actually find them, pay them the tiny
amount of money, and then get rid of them when you don’t need them anymore.
(quoted in Marvit, 2014)
This “just-in-time” working arrangement also implies that workers provide their own
equipment to complete the work. Micro-workers at companies like Amazon Mechanical
Turk log on with their own computers. Similarly, for on-demand firms operating in the
ride-hailing or delivery business, workers use their own cars, their own smartphones and
data plans; they cover their own car and health insurance. These expensive overhead
costs are outsourced to the workers themselves. According to this logic, workers can and
should be their own bosses and take advantage of the flexibility it affords, but they should
also supply their own work equipment.

8

https://vimeo.com/126538031
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It is already possible to see this logic creeping into new areas of social and
political life. In 2016, an article appeared on Politico proposing to remodel entitlement
and benefits programs to a more “gig economy”-like arrangement (Conda & Khanna,
2016). Former Silicon Valley lobbyist Cesar Conda and former White House staffer
Derek Khanna proposed what they called “Uber for Welfare.” They promised that their
program would add “flexibility to unemployment programs and decreas[e] dependence
on a welfare system getting out of control.” It would create a work requirement for
benefit recipients, arguing that a gig-like arrangement would be more tenable than
traditional employment. “[T]oday the gig economy offers the solution: It can easily and
quickly put millions of people back to work, allowing almost anyone to find a job with
hours that are flexible with virtual locations anywhere.” While the “Uber for Welfare”
example may be extreme, it is exemplary of the way that flexibility and informality of gig
work are praised, while the costs thrust onto workers is ignored.
If the benefits of flexibility and autonomy are clear enough for firms seeking to
avoid overhead costs or as a way to further privatize government programs, less obvious
is how and why this “gig model” of work first became possible. Explanations of the ondemand economy tend to gesture toward the disruptive power of new media
technologies—and especially the smartphone. In the popular press as well as policyoriented statements, most writing about the on-demand economy contains a fair amount
of technological determinism (Smith & Marx, 1994). For example, a human resources
trade journal explains,

Advances in technology and changes in consumer trends have seen a boom in the
so called ‘gig economy.’ This has changed the way in which the traditional
workforce model and employment relationship functions in certain sectors, with a
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move towards short-term assignments and self-employed independent contractor
status. (Grant & Israel, 2016)
These same tropes are employed by worker advocacy groups, like Portable Benefits,
which lobbies for the creation of benefits packages for freelance gig workers and
independent contractors:

New technologies and business models are fundamentally changing the economic
landscape across the country, adding value to consumers’ lives and bringing new
opportunities for workers. (Portable Benefits, 2015)
In much writing, the causal relationship between technology and social and economic
change is simply a given.
The notion of technology as mechanism of social and economic change is
reinforced by on-demand companies' terms of service. Propping up their image as
middlemen simply brokering transactions between suppliers and demand, on-demand
companies claim not to be the providers of any good or service, but rather technology
firms. For example, consider how on-demand courier service Postmates describes itself in
its user agreement:

Postmates provides a mobile app and web-based technology platform that
connects consumers, retail stores, and restaurants, with independent contractor
couriers to facilitate on-demand delivery services (the "Platform"). Through the
Platform consumers may request that merchandise or food be delivered to them
from particular retail locations or restaurants. Independent contractor couriers can
access the Platform and receive delivery opportunities. Postmates is not a retail
store, restaurant, food delivery service, merchandise delivery service, or food
preparation entity.9

9

Postmates Terms of Service, updated July, 2016: https://postmates.com/terms?utm_swu=6672
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Uber, the on-demand ride-hailing service that launched the flurry of investment in ondemand startups, also claims to be a technology company rather than a service provider.
As Uber data engineer Ron Tal explains on a Quora form titled “Is Uber really not a taxi
service?”:

A taxi company contracts drivers, deals with vehicles, pre book rides [sic], etc.
Uber deals with building data centers, running real time software services,
facilitating payment and conducting research into the economics of real time
transportation automation, among solving all sorts of other interesting
technological problems—all things that are not done by a taxi service. It's a totally
different operation from what a taxi company or a transportation service does…
Uber is not a taxi company, but a technology company that provides solutions for
people's transportation needs. (Quora, 2016)
Many economists who study the on-demand economy are sympathetic to these
company narratives. Their argument is that the new ubiquity of computing power through
consumer technologies like the smartphone and phenomena like the “Internet of Things”
have made possible a disaggregation of the traditional firm. While the firm’s hierarchical
and bureaucratic composition made sense for coordinating the complexity of
manufacturing and distribution at large scales (Chandler, 1977), the smartphone’s “easy
utility of personal connectivity” (Wiig, 2016) allows for a disaggregation of the firm and
a return to more purely market-based modes of coordination—and thus greater autonomy
and competition amongst economic actors. Economists support this argument by pointing
to “horizontal” coordination of global supply chain networks, which disperse the vertical
functions of the modern firm across multiple players in a global marketplace. As I argue
throughout the remainder of this section, however, this narrative is fundamentally flawed:
it misses the role that tacit forms of control continue to play in seemingly
“deverticalized” production contexts (Kanngieser, 2013; Rossiter, 2016). As with the
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developments in supply chain management that first heralded these shifts, on-demand
companies have found ways to maintain the coordinative and managerial functioning of
the firm despite its apparent fracturing and disaggregation.

The Vanishing Hand?
At a high profile conference at MIT’s Sloan School of Management about the future of
the on-demand economy, several economists—including Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew
McAfee, authors of the influential The Second Machine Age (Brynjolfsson & McAfee,
2014) and, more recently, Machine, Platform, Crowd (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2017)—
suggested that to understand the relationship between shifting norms of work and new
technologies requires a return to the work of Ronald Coase (1937) and his theorization of
the firm (see also The Economist, 2015; Glatz, 2015; Kilpi, 2015).10 Coase’s work on the
firm begins by asking why firms are necessary within free markets—as “islands of
conscious power” within an “ocean of unconscious cooperation” between independent
economic agents (Coase, 1937, p. 388). If markets required little to no planning in order
to run effectively (as they are dictated by the “price mechanism”), then there would be no
need for planning or control. But this contradicts the sociologically-observable affairs of
the firm. In firms, an immense amount of planning goes on in day-to-day operations.

In economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production between
different uses is determined by the price mechanism… [But] within a firm, the
description does not fit at all… If a workman moves from department Y to
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because
he is ordered to do so” (ibid.).

10

MIT Sloan School of Management, the Initiative on the Digital Economy, and the Institute for
Work and Employment Research, Mar. 15, 2016.
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Coase argues that firms emerge when the coordination of production through internal
planning is more efficient than the “transaction costs” of external, market-dictated
relations of production. That is, the firm makes sense when internal hierarchies and
bureaucratic coordination through communication technologies (Yates, 1993) become
cheaper than buying on the market. For complex production processes at scale, hidden
transaction costs (such as the costs of distribution or market information) drive up the
overall costs of the price mechanism (Coase, 1937, p. 390).
This theoretical treatment is lent empirical weight by business historian Alfred
Chandler’s (1977) The Visible Hand. Chandler demonstrates how the firm’s
“administrative planning” succeeds market coordination as the dominant mode of
capitalist production and distribution between the 1880s and 1920s in US markets. As the
new technological and infrastructural networks of the 19th century connected production
centers across the continental US, the volume and scale of economic activity made
market contracts more expensive than internal administrative coordination.
More recently, however, economist Richard Langlois (2002; 2012) has argued
that the “visible hand” of the firm is giving way to the “vanishing hand” of globally
distributed production. In the wake of economic deregulation and technological changes
beginning in the 1970s (see Cowen, 2014; Danyluk, 2017; van Doorn, 2017, pp. 900901), the question of whether firms should utilize administrative or market forms of
coordination has shifted decisively toward the latter. As Langlois (2002, p. 2) explains,

Rather than seeing the continued dominance of multi-unit firms in which
managerial control spans a large number of vertical stages, we are seeing a
dramatic increase in vertical specialization—a thoroughgoing “deverticalization”

126
that is affecting the traditional Chandlerian industries as much as the high-tech
firms of the late twentieth century.
This takes the form of fractured “horizontal” production processes and global supply
chains, which stretch across disparate labor markets and extra-national special economic
zones (Easterling, 2014; Ong, 2006). They are animated by “lean” and “agile”
manufacturing practices (Cowen, 2014; Danyluk, 2017), such as “just-in-time” and “total
quality control” managerial philosophies (Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992).
Economists’ understanding of the on-demand economy localizes Langlois’
vanishing hand principle. On this view, the on-demand economy represents a
disaggregation of the firm’s hierarchical structures within traditional urban service
industries, driven by the coordinative affordances of the smartphone such as locationbased services and notification delivery (Rossiter, 2014; Wilson, 2012). As writers at The
Economist (2015) explain it, “Now that most people carry computers in their pockets
[smartphones]… the transaction costs involved in finding people to do things can be
pushed a long way down.” Or consider Finnish technology consultant Esko Kilpi’s
(2015) essay on the relationship between the Coasian firm and technology:

The existence of high transaction costs outside firms led to the emergence of the
firm as we know it, and management as we know it… [But the] reverse side of
Coase’s argument is as important: If the (transaction) costs of exchanging value in
the society at large go down drastically as is happening today, the form and logic
of economic and organizational entities necessarily need to change…
Accordingly, a very different kind of management is needed when coordination
can be performed without intermediaries with the help of new technologies. Apps
can do now what managers used to do.
These explanations of the on-demand economy frame its “disruption” as a
localization of the vanishing hand. But this misses the larger contexts in which
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deverticalization took place. One major omission is what sociologists Bonacich and
Wilson (2008) have called the “logistics revolution,” which was both a response and
catalyst to the deverticalization of the firm. The logistics revolution marks a major shift
in the logics of capitalist production, beginning in earnest in the 1970s with major
changes in freight distribution norms and attacks on labor power (Bonacich & Wilson,
2008; Cowen, 2014; Danyluk, 2017). In the era of revolutionized logistics, profit is
pursued not only by creating new demand or opening new markets, but through the
discovery of new efficiencies in “planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient,
effective flow and storage of goods, services, and information from point of origin to
point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer requirements” (quoted
in Allen, 1997).
The new impetus to eke out profits through logistical efficiency required new
forms of control in order to ensure optimization in the management of goods, services,
and information. A much darker evolution in workforce administration thus paralleled the
deverticalization of the firm and the rise of logistical capitalism. It is now common for
companies operating in global supply chains to employ technologies that track and
monitor both workers and goods as they move across dispersed spaces of production and
distribution (Cowen, 2014; Kanngieser, 2013; Rossiter, 2016; e.g., Collins, 2016; Powell,
2016). As Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) illustrated in the early 1990s, the deverticalized
firm required new techniques and technologies of surveillance, often legitimized in the
name of efficiency. The “just-in-time” and “total quality control” managerial
philosophies that had come to dominate production processes across the globe “both
create[d] and demand[ed] systems of surveillance which improve on those of previous
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factory regimes by instilling discipline and thereby enhancing central control” (ibid., p.
271). More recent developments in this field, including GPS (global positioning systems)
and RFID (radio frequency identification) tags, have followed suit. These new systems
are already integrated into supply chains’ production and distribution networks, allowing
companies to monitor and intervene in the movements of workers and goods much more
closely than was previously possible (Kanngieser, 2013; Levy, 2015; Rossiter, 2016; van
Doorn, 2017; e.g. Collins, 2016; O’Reilly, 2016; Powell, 2016; Terry, 2015).11
These forces are as important to the on-demand economy as the technological
affordances of the smartphone. As I show in the next section, like the “just-in-time”
production processes of global supply chain production, the on-demand economy “both
creates and demands” new techniques of worker control (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016)—at
the same time that it extols the virtues of worker autonomy (Chun, 2006). These
contradictions suggest that, despite claims about the demise of the firm, on-demand
companies are much more firm-like in their control over workers than proponents
admit—thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of companies which designate themselves as
technological brokers and their workers as independent contractors.

THE VISIBLE HAND OF THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY
Control over workers is traditionally understood through the employer’s right to dictate
employees’ work scheduling. This is the type of control that Coase referred to—“of being

11

The adoption of tracking systems within supply chains is often at the behest of large, multinational companies like Walmart, which wield monopsonistic power over their suppliers
(LeCavalier, 2016), but these have now become standard in the industry, e.g., Collins, 2016;
O’Reilly, 2016; Powell, 2016; Terry, 2015.
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entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and when not to
work.” It is also the type of control that “gig economy” advocates denounce. Gigs allow
for scheduling flexibility, for working when you want, for how long you want. Ondemand proponents claim that it is only with the independent contractor designation that
workers can enjoy this freedom (cf. Greenhouse, 2015). For instance, after a class action
lawsuit was settled allowing drivers for ride-hailing company Uber to remain
independent contractors, the company’s then-CEO Travis Kalanick released the
following statement on the company’s website:

In the U.S. almost 90 percent [of drivers] say they choose Uber because they want
to be their own boss. Drivers value their independence—the freedom to push a
button rather than punch a clock, to [work for] Uber and Lyft [Uber’s primary
competitor] simultaneously, to drive most of the week or for just a few hours.
That’s why we are so pleased that this settlement recognizes that drivers should
remain as independent contractors, not employees. (Kalanick, 2016)
This same sentiment is echoed by Graboyes (2016) of the Manhattan Institute, who writes
that “The Gig Economy does for work what packet-switching did for communication. It
lets one atomize and reassemble time and resources in ways incompatible with
hierarchical, full-time jobs.” The discourse of flexibility serves as a way for gig economy
proponents and on-demand companies to legitimize and perhaps even expand their
practice of designating workers as independent contractors.
The problem is that this discourse confines conceptions of control and autonomy.
Research on the application of information technologies and electronic monitoring to
“spatially diffuse work contexts” (Levy, 2015, p. 160) suggests that control is manifest in
myriad ways, with varying effects—not only in terms of scheduling flexibility. For
example, Rosenblat and Stark’s (2016) study of the on-demand ride-hailing service Uber

130
reveals much more nuanced and “soft” forms of control at play (see also Deleuze, 1992;
Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007). These are accomplished through a mundane regime of
surveillance, performed through the “interaction design of their app,” which in turn
propagates information asymmetries between worker and company (Rosenblat & Stark,
2016, p. 4). These asymmetries become techniques of “modulation” for companies to
achieve profitable outcomes (Deleuze, 1992). 12
Another example is Levy’s (2015) research on electronic worker monitoring
systems in the US trucking industry. Recently introduced information and
communications technologies into commercial trucking vehicles now monitor and
communicate performance metrics back to company dispatching services in real-time.
These mundane surveillance systems subject drivers to new forms of behavioral
monitoring, which companies can exploit to exert control over work that had been
appreciated for the independence and autonomy that it afforded drivers. For example, the
data that companies can now collect on their drivers’ performances can be used to
incentivize competition between workers. These studies of “soft” control in spatially
diffuse workplaces inform the present research into on-demand company strategies.
There are two types of on-demand work that I include here: ride-hailing services
and courier services. Uber and Lyft are the most prominent on-demand ride-hailing
companies operating in the U.S. At the time of writing, Uber was running in
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For an example of the micro-economic theory explaining how company managers exploit
information constraints in contexts beyond the on-demand economy, see Schmidt and Buell,
2015. In the context of Uber, specifically, see Calo and Rosenblat, 2017; Rosenblat and Stark,
2016.
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approximately 450 urban centers across 66 countries, and Lyft had operations in 230
urban centers, mostly in the United States.13 Both companies remain private (Slee, 2016),
with Uber valued at $66 billion (although this is disputed; see Damodaran, 2014; Spiegel,
2016) and Lyft at $5.5 billion (Newcomer, 2016). Both Uber and Lyft work by allowing
users to request rides from their current location. When the app is open, the customer sees
a map showing where nearby available cars are in relation to the customer. Both
companies utilize dynamic pricing mechanisms—Uber’s “surge pricing” and Lyft’s
“primetime”—which purport to reflect areas experiencing periods of heightened demand.
On worker-facing apps, drivers see maps detailing where price surges are in place (see
Figure 3.1). Both companies also use rating systems, in which customers evaluate their
drivers. Low rating averages are grounds for terminating drivers, and many drivers have
complained about rider abuse of this system (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).

13

For Uber, see https://www.uber.com/cities/; for Lyft, see https://www.lyft.com/cities.
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Figure 3.2 Lyft’s “Prime Time” surge pricing map.

Postmates and Caviar are two of the most visible on-demand courier services
currently in operation.14 Postmates is a privately-held company based in San Francisco
that operates in over 100 urban areas in the United States, and is currently valued at

14

Other courier and delivery companies, such as Grubhub and GoPuff, were excluded for
analysis. Grubhub was excluded because it uses a complicated, ad hoc mixture of delivery
personnel, with some couriers working directly for Grubhub and others either directly for
restaurants or other platform-based companies (such as Zoomer). GoPuff was excluded because,
although orders are placed and received through smartphone apps, the company functions less
like an on-demand company than a warehouse with delivery services. Postmates and Caviar use
much more straightforward, on-demand systems: couriers are hired as independent contractors
and receive orders directly through worker-facing apps.
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data. Source: Author.

Figure 3: “Up front” order information.
Figure 2: Rejection data. Source: Author.
Figure 3.3 Caviar order acceptance and rejection menus.
Source: Author.

around $500 million (Roof, 2016). Caviar is owned by Square, Inc., a publicly-traded
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higher-end restaurants located mostly within only a few central districts. Both companies
require workers to go through a stepwise procedure for completing work orders. Their
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worker-facing apps break down tasks into discrete components and require the courier to
enter information at each step. On Postmates’ worker-facing app, multiple couriers
receive information about an unassigned order, and the first courier to click the ‘accept’
button receives the order. The courier then travels to the pick-up location and may have
to place the order or retrieve the item themselves.15 Once the order is ready, the courier
pays, either on the company-issued debit card or in cash. Cash payments are reimbursed
electronically, and couriers who indicate they are willing to pay cash have a greater
probability of receiving orders. The courier then delivers the item to the customer, who
has the option to tip the courier. Customers are also prompted to rate the courier on his or
her performance. As with Uber and Lyft, Postmates couriers can be kicked off the
platform if their rating average drops below a certain threshold.
Unlike Postmates, Caviar orders are assigned to specific couriers, who are
presumably queued by dispatch as they wait for their next order. At the accept/reject
stage, couriers’ screens show a static image of a map with a direct line between the
pickup restaurant and the customer location, as well as the order’s size. If the courier
accepts the order, they are then directed to a restaurant where the courier checks in by
pushing a button on the app. This sends a notification to both Caviar’s dispatchers, who
are located in San Francisco, and to the customer. Couriers also check-in at the restaurant
by confirming a randomly-generated order number (e.g., Caviar order #3054) that
corresponds with the pickup. Dispatchers, who communicate with couriers by text
message, monitor the situation. If an order is taking a particularly long time to be
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For Postmates’ formal partners, the order goes through a separate system, sometimes involving
an automated dispatch call to the business.
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prepared, the dispatcher may request that the courier get a new estimate for when it
should be ready. When the order is ready, the app prompts the courier to indicate that all
order items are included on a checklist. After this is complete, the courier clicks an “out
for delivery” button, and receives the drop-off location.
The remainder of this section details four company strategies for arbitrating
between the maintenance of worker autonomy and exerting control over the worker fleet:
the changing interface, distance-based pricing models, workers’ right to reject, and
ensuring coverage.

The Changing Interface
Updates to the worker-facing app occur regularly. Often, there is no observable change in
the interface. However, when changes are made, they can dramatically transform the
presentation of information. Where information was once available, an update might
remove it or shift it around within the stepwise procedure without explanation.
At Caviar, a major update occurred in September, 2015, when the company
required its workers to upgrade to the Courier Prime app to be able to continue working.
There were several notable differences between the original app and Courier Prime, but
the most obvious to couriers was a change in the information available at the start of a
delivery. Whereas on the older version of the app, workers could see the addresses of
each stop along a delivery route when prompted to accept or reject an order, after the
update couriers could only see information about the pick-up location and the general
area that it is headed, not the final address.
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The couriers that I spoke with did not like this update for a number of reasons.
Many bicycle couriers prefer to mentally plot their routes while riding or while waiting
for an order to be prepared—especially if they have multiple, “stacked” orders in their
queue. Knowing the general area a drop-off is not the same as knowing its final address
(especially in a city like Philadelphia, in which many streets are one-way). Additionally,
not knowing the drop-off address, couriers have a harder time knowing what kind of
location the order is going to—an office buildings or an apartment building; a single
family home or a condominium with doormen. Worker preferences for delivering to
certain types of places could thus be negated, as their local knowledge of undesirable
addresses was rendered useless.
This issue recurred throughout my interviews with Caviar couriers. It resonated
both for those with little to no courier experience as well as for more seasoned cyclists.
For instance, Mike,16 a dreadlocked cyclist who had previously worked as a bicycle
messenger and legal courier in Philadelphia, not only disapproved of the new system for
delivering information. He also experienced problems with his phone due to the upgrade,
which required an operating system upgrade in order to handle the new app:

Mike: In order to download that new app I had to upgrade my iPhone. It wouldn't
be a normal problem for a normal person who's obsessed with their phone but
fuck, I use it for phone calls and GPS… Now, my battery doesn't last as long,
certain things move slower… It's difficult. It’s affected this entire thing because
of this stupid upgrade, so that sucks…
I also really liked it more before where you had all the information in front
of you at all times. You knew when you were picking up, where you were picking
up, the exact address. The exact address it was going to, not an overhead map
with a straight line. Basically… Every change was “Hey, where's that
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The names of the workers that I interviewed have been changed to protect their identity.
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information? Where's that information? Hey, I didn't verify my items yet so I
don't know the exact address”—that's a problem. If I'm waiting on something I
want to plot my route. I don't want to have to like wait until I’m on my way to
know where I’m going, you know what I mean?17
This sentiment was echoed by Gary, who had prior experience delivering food for
restaurants but not with another app-based delivery system:

Gary: When they switched around the app a couple months ago it became a lot
more opaque. They give the courier less information up front. We used to see the
customer’s address right away and now we can't see the customer’s address until
we’ve checked in at the restaurant and clicked the button saying that we have all
the food and that we’re out for delivery. After that it shows the address, which I
find very frustrating because I used to spend my time waiting for the restaurants
to prepare the food—I would plan my route. And I can't plan my route while I’m
waiting anymore.18
Mitchell, who works for Caviar in addition to InstaCart, another on-demand delivery
company specializing in groceries, felt similarly.

Mitchell: One of the bigger things for me is that [the new app] doesn't give you
the ending address anymore… I think they changed that, because it was a lot
easier to deny something based on that information… like, especially if you
already had an order in the works and now it's kind of like, can I even take this
new order? Not knowing where it’s going makes that just like more complicated. I
mean I guess I could take it, I can take anything, but sometimes it's not quite cost
effective for me—I guess like not knowing the time it’s going to take—if it’s
effective it makes more sense, but it’s harder to know.19
Because the worker-facing app is typically the only interface between worker and
company, small changes and updates can have larger consequences for the quality of
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Interview conducted Jan. 16, 2016.
Interview conducted March 7, 2016.
19
Interview conducted March 2, 2016.
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work but also for payment outcomes. Postmates updated both its courier- and customerfacing apps in a way that altered the tipping interaction. Tips comprise a large portion of
income for Postmates couriers, so changes to the tipping system affected how much
workers were bringing home on the whole. Suzanne, who has worked for both Postmates
and Caviar, explained how important tipping is on Postmates:

Suzanne: Postmates, it’s a tip-based system. Payouts are extremely low. The
most you'll see for a Postmates payout might be $7, but it's almost never that. It's
usually $3 or $4, but because it's a tip-based system, all the responsibility is on
you because you have to do better to get a good tip and it can be for anything.20
When the company updated its app, however, the tipping procedure changed and couriers
began seeing less in tips.

Karl: When I started at Postmates, there was a system where the customer would
tip you like on the percentage, based on how much they paid. But they did away
with that for just like a vague, like, the customer can just tip whatever. When I
started, we’d have to pass the customer our phone and be like, “Could you sign
here and like make sure it’s all okay?” And they would do the tip then, like on
how much they were paying, like a percentage. But they changed that. Now they
do it on their phones, kind of like Uber. And they don’t get the same screen, it just
lets them tip whatever, not like, click here for 20% or here for 25% or anything.21
These experiences exemplify how changes to the interface can change the nature of
mediated interactions. If “apps can do now what managers used to do” (Kilpi, 2015), then
changes to the app mean changes in management, often without explanation. For workers
who depend on digitally-mediated interactions to earn money, these changes can
accumulate, alter working conditions, and in some cases result in less earnings.

20
21

Interview conducted Dec. 14, 2015.
Interview conducted Feb. 16, 2016.
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The Limits of Distance-Based Pricing Models
In addition to interface updates, on-demand companies also change their payment
algorithm without warning.22 These systems are tightly-guarded trade secrets, since the
robustness of companies’ algorithms relates to their valuation by investors (Solomon,
2016). The longer couriers work for a company, the more attuned they are to changes in
the payment systems. This is because hourly earnings on distance-based systems are
constrained by pragmatic limitations—such as the time it takes a restaurant to prepare an
order, and how long it takes the courier to make the delivery. Workers become especially
sensitive to factors that delay the delivery process but which appear not to be
incorporated into payment models. Orders priced according to the distance between
restaurant and customer do not take into account how long it takes a courier to get to the
customer after they have arrived at the ground address.
This issue came up repeatedly for high-rise buildings. As a courier, delivering to a
high-rise entails a time-expending, ritualized sequence that even the speediest bikers
begrudge: locking the bike outside, checking in with a security guard who may or may
not require looking up the customer in a directory and calling, waiting for and then taking
an elevator to a top-level floor. These small tasks accumulate rapidly throughout the work
shift as time spent unpaid. Gary explains, with apartment buildings,

Gary: it may take a long time to get up an elevator if there’s either a lot of people
or just a small elevator trying to get up to the customer’s apartment. And then
different buildings have different policies for couriers. Sometimes you have to
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This is not unlike social media platforms, many of which will change their terms of service,
sorting algorithms, or moderation policies without warning. See Van Dijck, 2013.
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wait for the customer to get down to the lobby of the building. And it might take
the customer a while to get down to pick up their order.
Delivering food on a piece-rate payment system, couriers quickly become attuned to the
fact that the amount they can earn is intimately tied to the number of orders that they can
complete in a day. Office buildings with stringent and sometimes-arbitrary delivery
policies, requiring couriers to use alternative delivery entrances, to wear a temporary ID
card that needs to be printed, or to wait in the lobby for the customer to come down,
create frustrations because they are roadblocks before the next order.
Suzanne has given the high-rise issue some thought, and even raised it as a
concern with the courier manager:

Suzanne: I have brought up [the high-rise] issue many times with [the
Philadelphia courier manager]… I'm just like, “Yeah, okay, lunch time, yes, all of
these orders are in very close proximity [within Philadelphia’s central business
district] and that is why the payouts are low.” But the thing is, it will actually take
me more time to deliver from [a popular, vegetarian fast food take-out restaurant]
to a high-rise [in the same area] than it will for me to ride all the way to South
Philly and drop it off at someone's doorstep… Like—first, I have to go to
reception, then I have to wait for them to call, then I have to go all the way up,
then I have to come all the way down. I have to lock my bike and unlock my bike.
Whereas, if I'm dropping off at a house in South Philly or West Philly [residential
neighborhoods], you don't have to lock your bike. You just go to the door. But
they [Caviar] can't really reasonably figure that out. You can complain and see if
they'll give you a bonus, but they probably won't. It's just one of the struggles you
just have to deal with because there are long orders that I get… that take me less
time. And I much prefer spending that time riding than going up an elevator.
While excess time spent waiting at restaurants can be acknowledged with small “wait
bonuses,” the time spent getting up and down busy high-rise office buildings is not
compensated. The point that couriers stressed was not that they should not have to deliver
to apartment buildings or high-rise offices, but rather that there is no accounting for this

141
time. Further, due to the change in the interface discussed above, couriers end up
accepting high-rise orders that they might have rejected had they known in advance.
Couriers develop tactics for saving time in these situations. Here, Kevin, a parttime Caviar courier who works just a couple hours a week for extra cash, explains his
tactics for saving time in these situations.

Kevin: As often as I can, I try to just… walk behind the doorman. Just like walk
with purpose and like, I don't know, confidence, and maybe—I'd say pretty
often—I'll just walk right by them. And it saves me time. I often find that they are
like unhelpful generally … The one suggestion I have is to avoid the whole
doorman thing if you can. It actually would be really helpful if Caviar would ask
the customer to touch base with the doorman, just saying they're expecting
somebody. It's not really information that they would provide for me, I guess I’d
just not dislike going to apartment buildings or office buildings if the customer
called down ahead of you coming… I mean, ultimately, if it were up to me, I
wouldn't go to apartment buildings because they take time and time is running,
but you end up getting those orders.23
In addition to the high-rise issue, couriers also note a problematic pattern with
deliveries to residential areas farther away from the central business district. In general,
couriers appreciate these orders, since it allows them to spend more time on their bikes
and less time waiting. The problem is that, because there are far fewer restaurants in these
areas, couriers can generally expect not to receive another order until they have returned
to the denser concentration of restaurants. This means that they can expect to either wait
much longer for their next order or to ride back to the city center without being paid.
Couriers sometimes take this into account when accepting an order. Because Suzanne
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Interview conducted Jan. 14, 2016.
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lives in a residential area a couple miles away from the city center, she thinks about this
at the start of her shift:

Suzanne: Since I live [in West Philadelphia], a lot of times, I'll just sign on at my
house and I'll wait. But I have gotten text messages saying, "Hey, can you head
towards Center City?" I'll be like “come on!” Because a lot of times, I've gotten
orders from my house for [Center City restaurants] and it's like, “I know you can
send me an order for Center City while I'm out here.” It's just, you're going to
make me ride into the city so you can give me a lower paying order. I mean, when
they changed the payout system to be based on location and distance—I think
there are a bunch of other factors—I could see how couriers could really try to
abuse that system, in the beginning. But I don't think they can anymore really.
The downside is that [orders] are now like only going to go to couriers who are in
the area. It’s cheaper for [Caviar] to do that, so they will.
Mike uses the term “one-way jobs” to describe these long runs to areas where couriers
are unlikely to receive a follow-up order:

Mike: One of the worst nights I had at Caviar—I never hated the job, even now,
this was just a very bad night. I kept getting called up to North Philly, going
between Callowhill St. and the Fairmount area, where we have a few restaurants,
and they had me going up to Temple University [about 2 miles north and uphill of
Center City]… And I’m good with that area. I lived up there… But those are—
basically you get paid for a one-way job… There’s not a damn client between
Temple University and like the Fairmount area. It's like you're doing all those
trips and then coming back and not getting paid and then getting sent back out to
do the same thing again.
Even if an order pays more because it is farther away, the “one-way” jobs generated by a
distance-based system can cut away at hourly payout rates, since they require time spent
in areas where couriers are unlikely to receive an order, and time spent getting back to the
city center.
Postmates’ pricing model poses an interesting contrast to these issues with Caviar.
Postmates originally used a distance-based model. But in January, 2016, they switched
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their pricing system to be based on time as well as distance. In theory, because Postmates
couriers can be assigned to any type of pickup location and thus face longer wait-times
than Caviar orders, a time-based model makes sense as a way to compensate couriers.
But most couriers writing on Postmates Reddit forums, as well as those that I interviewed
here, agreed that they were making less money under the time-based system. Here is how
one Postmates courier described the new system on Reddit:

dbbldz123: I have no idea how delivery fees were calculated before but I assume
at least that it has not and will continue to not be calculated on the actual distance
you have to travel (for example taking a faster but longer route to avoid traffic)
but the shortest possible distance you could potentially go regardless of real world
circumstances…
I have been caught waiting at a restaurant for up to an hour before here in
L.A. at certain restaurants… and while the [newly introduced] compensation for
the wait time is a nice gesture it doesn't even come close to making up for the
smarter option of just re-assigning that order so you can pick up two others in the
same amount of time. Anyone can see the advantages of forgoing ~$6 for waiting
about an hour vs maybe grabbing two $8-12 orders in the same amount of time…
My guess is that this new system was initiated solely to offer an incentive
to less savvy Postmates couriers to pick up orders that are a major pain in the butt
like slow asf [sic.] restaurants and super market grabs and to limit the amount of
reassigns overall which is undoubtedly increasing the load on their Job Support
team. I for one will continue to avoid super markets, pharmacies, and notoriously
slow restaurants like the plague.24
Marcus, a courier who stopped working for Postmates after they implemented the new
time-based pay model, explained it this way during an interview:

Marcus: The model Postmates had—it was per distance, so the shortest you
would get was like four blocks and like four bucks, and then the longer, farther
you went, it could go up to like $14. And then with Blitz [Postmates’ surge
pricing system], it could go up to like $16. That was good while it lasted and then
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https://www.reddit.com/r/postmates/comments/3zxcj0/new_pay_model/
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they changed something in the pay model that is like they want to do it off of
waiting time—how much you waited at the vendor to pick up before drop off. I
mean obviously they’re not telling us it’s less money and they just said its better
for you because now you get paid while you wait… After that I stopped riding for
Postmates…
Interviewer: So I would have thought that something that’s based on how long
you’re waiting would be better for you.
Marcus: … If you’re doing like a grocery list, shopping for someone, that’s
definitely the move. But at the same time, it just pays so little for waiting, you’d
rather be doing another order anyway. Also, for the most part you don’t get that
many orders for that. InstaCart [an on-demand delivery service for groceries] does
that now. [This new model] kind of just phases that out. So a lot, if not most, of
the orders are just, like, burritos. Like, super simple, one-meal things like a
smoothie, whatever. That’s like thirty seconds, you’re in and out. Because the
deliveries I was doing for the most part were like that, the waiting model didn’t
make sense. They were like in and out and like, it was on distance for me, but
they cut that because of the time. 25
A comparison can also be made with drivers for ride-hailing services. Neither
Uber nor Lyft compensate their drivers for time spent getting to the customer’s location
or for waiting on the customer once there. Both companies recently introduced a feature
in which customers can request a shared ride (UberPool and Lyft Line). From a customer
perspective, these services cost a significant amount less than a single ride. But drivers
only get paid for a single trip. Harry, an Uber driver that I interviewed, explained that
“You spend so much time waiting for each stop [during an UberPool pick up] that you
don’t really make up for how much time it takes… It’s just yet another cut back in rates
for riders that, like everything else, that they represented as a way that drivers can make
even more money, but at the end of the day, the pay is less.”26
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Interview conducted Feb. 17, 2016.
Interview conducted Feb. 22, 2016.
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The Right to Reject
Individually, changes to the worker-facing app interface might seem trivial. But
cumulatively they can constrain workers’ ability to make fully informed decisions. This
is especially true at the first stage of a work order—the point at which workers decide
whether to accept or reject. The right to reject is a key part of the autonomy that ondemand companies promise their workers. But shrouded information about orders makes
it difficult to gauge how worthwhile a delivery or ride might be. Some couriers reject
orders outright if they are in certain places of the city at certain times of the day or week.
At other times, couriers reject orders because the payouts simply “don’t make sense.”
This was a phrase that came up repeatedly in the interviews, signaling that drivers and
couriers develop an intuitive sense of how payout and order allocation algorithms should
be working.
Charlotte and Matt, both seasoned Caviar couriers, have expressed that some
orders just don’t make sense relative to others. Charlotte began working with Caviar
when they first started operating in Philadelphia. Matt worked for years as a bicycle
messenger in both Philadelphia and New York in the 1990s.

Interviewer: Do you feel like you have a sense of how the algorithm works for
assigning orders, like what the factors are?
Charlotte: They go over it with you somewhat, but I feel like it’s still one of
those things where you're not getting this breakdown every time you take a
delivery. You're not really seeing the algorithm for each delivery that you're
taking. Some of them are pretty far, but the money that you're getting is pretty
low. So it doesn't make sense, because for other ones, you're not going as far but
you're making more money and it's kind of like, what? I feel like they need to
make—like, if you're taking a small order but going a longer distance, you still
should get a good amount of money, whereas if you're taking a bigger order, even
if it's a shorter distance, sometimes you get paid more and that doesn’t make any
sense… The other thing is like the risk. The farther you go, the more risk you’re
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putting yourself in. If you're in a blizzard and you're going from Center City to
West Philly, you should be making good money on that because that's dangerous
and busy and far.27
Interviewer: What about the payments? Do you feel like the algorithm is
consistent across the time? Do you feel like you’re always getting paid the same
amount for the same type of delivery?
Matt: Yeah. Sometimes it will be, give-or-take, a few dollars different. And I’ll
look at the ride and be like, “Huh, that doesn’t make sense, I usually go that far
for a little more.” Usually, it’s pretty on point, but if it’s a weird-looking rate, like,
why is that only so and so for these orders and not for these other ones, I might
not do it. Or if it’s a place that’s known for making you wait and it’s a low rate,
no, I’m not going to—you know, if [the restaurant] is a little more on point, I
know [the order’s] going to be up quick and I’m out. So, yeah, sometimes it’s
weird in those rates.28
Suzanne also commented on her sense of how the algorithm ought to be working for
pricing payouts:

Interviewer: Do you turn down orders ever?
Suzanne: I do occasionally, if they don’t make sense. Sometimes I’ll get really
ridiculously low-paying orders that are actually really far, or it’s a restaurant that I
know takes forever and that [the price] doesn't make any sense. Usually, I’ll text
dispatch and be like that payout doesn't make sense.
Because of the opacity of algorithmic and app-based work management, couriers
also have second thoughts about rejecting orders, since they are unsure of the
consequences. Some couriers believe that rejecting too many orders may automatically
trigger something within the system to set them back within a delivery queue, having to
wait longer periods between work orders and lowering their hourly earnings. As Irani
(2015) argues of online crowd- and gig work, transactions mediated by apps or platforms

27
28

Interview conducted Feb. 13, 2016.
Interview conducted Feb. 13, 2016.
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shroud the human activities and labor behind the employers’ interface. The flipside is true
in the on-demand economy, where it is often unclear whether an order came your way
because of a manual operator intervening in dispatch or through an automated allocation.

Interviewer: Do you feel like rejecting—do you think they’re making strikes
against you that mitigate—
Charlotte: Yeah. I think that rejecting orders is a big thing. I think that if they’re
sending you good orders and you’re only taking the good orders and then you’re
rejecting the bad orders, I think the dispatchers tend to not give you good orders
for a while. Like if you're taking a bunch of great orders all day and then they
send you three or four bad orders and you reject them because you’re like, “Hell
no, I’m not doing this,” we all notice that your number of great orders slows
down. But I’m not sure if that’s, like, part of the system or not.
Mike: I'm almost sure that there is a rule, if someone denies more than one job in
an hour... There's definitely a queue at all messenger services and you go to the
bottom. Same at Caviar, I’m sure.

Others, however, have more faith that rejecting orders can “communicate” with the
Caviar algorithm, in a way.

Interviewer: Are you worried that if you reject too much, that they keep track of
that?
Janet: Yeah. I don't know. I haven't really seen any direct consequences. I don’t
know. I'm hoping that it goes the other direction. If enough people reject the
really bad orders...
Interviewer: Then they'll stop doing them?
Janet: Yeah.
Ride-hailing services are actually more transparent in this regard, since Lyft and Uber are
both relatively straightforward about requiring their drivers to maintain acceptance rates.
This is how Matthew, a driver for Lyft, explained his company’s acceptance rate policy:
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Matthew: It is transparent when you reject things, your acceptance rate goes
down and –
Interviewer:—And it shows you that back to you?
Matthew: Yes, they show you your acceptance rate. And they’ll put a little
comment like, “Doing great,” or they’ll be like, “Need better." And it’s a generic
thing, not like personalized or anything.
Interviewer: And that doesn’t affect your pay?
Matthew: It doesn’t affect my pay. But if your acceptance rate is too low you get
kicked off. You get fired essentially.29
There are trade-offs in this regard, between Uber and Lyft’s straightforward acceptance
rate requirements and the entirely opaque rejection policies of Caviar and Postmates. The
uncertainty that couriers experience can be useful for companies in leveraging worker
control. Without knowing if and how rejected orders communicate anything to a
company, rejection becomes less the prerogative of the worker than a potential constraint.

Ensuring Coverage
The most celebrated aspect of the flexibility that the on-demand economy promises is
workers’ ability to set their own schedules. What gets ignored in this formulation are the
pragmatic constraints that govern workers’ scheduling. That only certain times or days
are profitable becomes evident to workers rather quickly (e.g., weekend evenings are
busy; weekday mornings are slow). Less clear is how companies go about ensuring that
the busiest periods are well-staffed while slow time slots are not overcrowded (Gurvich,
Lariviere & Moreno, 2016).
In addition to natural variability in demand, workers’ scheduling autonomy is
mitigated by strategies that companies employ to ensure coverage across shifts and across
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Interview conducted Feb. 14, 2016.
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different areas of coverage. One of the most prominent is dynamic pricing. Uber’s
“Surge,” Lyft’s “Prime Time,” and Postmates’ “Blitz” each used targeted incentives to
get drivers or couriers to position themselves efficiently relative to demand (Rosenblat &
Stark, 2016; Scheiber, 2017). Workers on these platforms see maps with differentiated
zones of demand, indicated by certain rate multipliers (as illustrated in Figure 3.1).
Rosenblat and Stark (2016) have detailed how Uber’s Surge pricing system can mislead
drivers. “Through an appeal to the concept of algorithms, Uber can generate and coordinate clusters of labor in response to dynamic market conditions… without explaining
the reliability of its cluster incentives or guaranteeing the validity, accuracy, or error rates
of its labor deployments” (p. 8). Because “pricing is based on what a passenger sees on
screen in their location, not a driver’s position,” when drivers go to surge zones “they can
and do receive ride requests from passengers in other, adjacent areas” (ibid.). This means
that when choosing to accept or reject a ride, drivers do not necessarily know in advance
whether surge pricing will be applied.
Rosenblat and Stark also found that non-surge payouts were so minimal that many
Uber drivers viewed surge prices as a necessary condition for signing on. In other words,
baseline prices were suppressed to the point that many drivers only worked if they
anticipated a surge—even if they were skeptical of the veracity of the system’s ability to
reflect actual spikes in demand. This is reflected in the interviews that I conducted as
well. Charlie, who began driving for Lyft after years working as a software engineer, was
especially skeptical of the hotspot mapping scheme, suggesting instead that drivers let
their order assignments determine where they position themselves.
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Charlie: You never go to a hotspot… I avoid the hotspots because I know how
the hotspot system works. I myself—I'm a software engineer. I figured out how
the hotspots work by looking at it. By taking pictures and ruling out factors. I
basically tried to reverse engineer it to see how they work… because they would
never tell you how it worked. My assumption is that the way they create a surge is
like—a 25% surge, that means that if there’s… two guys requesting [rides] and
there’s only one car, they [Lyft] will put in a 25% surge. And then there’s no
other drivers available in the area. Depends on how big they want to make it
though, could be smaller. But basically once you step in there, you kill it. You
physically kill that thing because you alter the ratio.
Interviewer: Oh, so if you don’t happen to be there already it’s not worth going
there?
Charlie: Exactly. Because once you get there—Philly has so many stop signs and
traffic lights. You know it’s—even though it’s only one mile, it’s probably gone
in a minute. And you’re not going to travel like five blocks within one minute.
And then the surge is like already gone by the time you get there. So there’s really
no point in going.30

Postmates’ “Blitz” pricing system works similarly. Couriers see a hotspot map
that incentivizes certain areas within the delivery range. But because orders on the
Postmates platform go out to multiple couriers, it can be extremely difficult for couriers
to seek out higher paying jobs on Blitz:

Marcus: If you didn’t hit accept fast enough, a really good order would just
disappear and someone had taken it cause they hired so many people. They just
hired anybody… It was literally a race to accept it, especially for the good orders.
Like if you were in the zone wherever that restaurant was and it was like $14 Blitz
pricing, obviously you want to take it. But it’ll be gone just, like, super quick.
According to scholars of workforce management, the incentives created through
dynamic pricing systems like those used by Lyft, Uber, and Postmates operate as a
“control lever” (Gurvich, Lariviere & Moreno, 2016). Their limited availability
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Interview conducted Feb. 28, 2016.
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throughout the day, and their position in specific locations, allow companies to “herd”
fleets of ostensibly independent workers. This is based on the assumption that drivers
respond to the input—signing on if they are logged off, or driving towards the surge
zones if they are logged on. But as Rosenblat and Stark (2016) argue, this management
through incentivization is the perverse outcome of low baseline earnings. Harry, a parttime Uber driver, explains how the combination of incentives in the form of Surge
pricing, combined with the quiet disincentive of low earnings during low-demand
periods, governs when he works.

Harry: I’ve been driving pretty frequently. I would say two full evenings,
afternoon and evenings. Like Friday and Saturday I usually try to do from midafternoon all the way to three in the morning. And then I’ll go out like another
three days a week but just for a few hours.
Interviewer: Those are the big rush times, right?
Harry: Yeah. It’s the only time that you can make really any decent money, I
found. It’s just not worth it to work during rush hour, even if there are surges,
because there’s just so many cars out there, it takes you forever to get anywhere.
It’s only really worth it if there are surges and no traffic, and that’s really only
when the bars let out.
Karl, a Postmates courier, likewise limited his scheduling to times when he knew it
would be worthwhile:

Karl: I definitely got picky about when I would take a shift. Like if I have four
hours off in a day, and there were two hours in the afternoon, 2:00 to 4:00, and
then two hours at night, like 8:00 to 10:00, I’m definitely taking the 8:00 to 10:00
ones cause you’d find like a lot more work there. If it’s all the same, then like
yeah, I’m going to go for the one with more work to come. Plus there’s Blitz
pricing, so you’ll probably make a little more on the orders.
For its part, Caviar uses scheduling incentives to attract workers for predicted
peak-demand periods. Regularly occurring rises in demand (such as “the dinner rush”)
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will include an extra ten to twenty percent per order. During major sporting events such
as the Super Bowl or the Olympics, or during shifts with especially poor weather, the
company might send out an email announcing that any courier who completes seven
orders during a two- or three-hour period will receive a $15 bonus. These game-like
incentives operate in conjunction with disincentives designed to thin out the fleet during
low-demand periods. This creates a dynamic of transparency and opacity that reflects
company’s use of incentives, since baseline pay calculations remain “blackboxed” while
the incentives are highlighted and promoted.

Mitchell: I feel like the only thing they have told us about is when its pay
increases, either on bonuses or at peak times. I know they added in peak times to
it, at least, supposedly, and it seems like they are in effect because I have done
afternoon deliveries and [the payouts] seem super fucking low compared to when
I'm doing dinner rush stuff. At dinner, [orders are] usually seven to fifteen bucks,
whereas during like an afternoon shift I only get half the orders and we are going
to get max six bucks, even if it’s far.
Caviar places caps on each scheduling shift in order to reach their desired number
of couriers. When too many workers are signed on relative to demand, workers
experience high wait times between orders, which can lead to frustration. Along with
dynamic pricing incentivization, worker capping is another “control lever” that
companies have at their disposal (Gurvich, Lariviere & Moreno, 2016). Caviar gives
priority to workers who schedule themselves in advance, presenting a conundrum in
terms of worker autonomy by self-scheduling. The home screen of the Courier app states,
“Go online at any time. Set schedule in advance to get priority.” Unscheduled workers
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who log on are placed at the bottom of the queue.31 Paul, who works for Caviar while
finishing up college, explains his frustrations around this:

Interviewer: Is there anything else that I should know about your experiences
that’s important, like to the experience of working for Caviar?
Paul: There probably is but I can’t think of anything right now. Oh, actually, I
guess, like priority working—like not getting priority if you just sign on. I
understand why that makes sense, but like –
Interviewer: You mean the scheduling?
Paul: I mean, I just know a lot of people who are in college working for Caviar
and it’s just not always possible for me to know a few days in advance if I’m
gonna be able to work, compared to—I just don’t know what my workload is
gonna be like week to week, because I got a lot of professors who change up their
schedules.32
Having worked as a courier since Caviar launched in Philadelphia, Gary has also seen the
culture and policies around scheduling become more stringent. He pointed to a recently
introduced infographic of scheduling reliability included in the weekly payout summaries
that Caviar sends out to its couriers by email. This show the workers an index of how
often they have signed onto the platform to work their pre-registered shifts when they say
they will. For Gary, this graphic created a sense of anxiety around scheduling where there
previously was none:

Gary: When I signed up for Caviar… I was told that we were not obligated to
accept orders, that it’s completely at our discretion when we want to work and
what orders we want to accept. That was a big selling point for them looking for
31

Caviar’s Terms and Conditions explains scheduling as follows: “You will have the opportunity
to pre-select the days and times you are available to perform Delivery Services for Caviar. When
offering a Delivery Order, Caviar will give preference to the couriers who have pre-selected
schedules, and who then sign on to the Courier App to perform Delivery Services within their
pre-selected schedules. Pre-selecting the days and times you are available to perform Delivery
Services does not impact your ability to sign on to perform Delivery Services or to accept or
reject Delivery Orders within this timeframe” (accessed February 2016).
32
Interview conducted Feb. 12, 2016.
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couriers. Take this, do this flexible thing, you can just do it on your spare time.
Now, they're doing this reliability system. I still haven’t looked at the new emails
to check it out yet but what it feels like is Caviar is trying to guilt trip us for not
showing up for our shifts—which are not obligatory—and whether or not we’re
being penalized for showing up for our shifts is kind of unclear. But it seems like
whether or not they're penalizing us, it feels like they're asking us to penalize
ourselves.
To Gary, infographics seem to invite workers to police their own behavior in ways that
undermine the flexibility they had been promised.
Information asymmetries around the supply of workers can also lead to
frustrations, especially among the more seasoned bike messengers that I talked to. Not
knowing how many other couriers are on the road at a given time, veteran couriers like
Matt felt that they were logging into a situation in which an oversupply of couriers on the
road would dilute demand. He said that he would find it useful if he could see where the
other couriers were on the app in order to avoid the busiest areas.

Matt: I always want to see a screen that, like, yeah, to see the dots [of where other
workers are on a map]. You know what I mean? I mean, I’m not gonna go out—
just to go to where that herd is. Like, “how many you got out there right now,
really?” Like, “Whoa, you got a lot out there.” I never know. You don’t know,
right? They say, “We need thirty couriers.” I’m like, “Do you really need thirty?”
I don’t know, it’s really that busy all over?… When it’s really busy, it doesn’t
matter; you’re just getting order after order. But in the summer [the period with
the lowest order volume], I was getting nervous… There were times where I was
looking and I’m like, “Should I even bother coming out if I saw that there were
twenty more dots in that area?” Sometimes you go out, you ride by Rittenhouse [a
park where couriers sometimes congregate in between orders], and you just see
how many people are out there, like I probably wouldn’t have left the house to
begin with if I knew that many were out there.33
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A different issue comes up when companies have too few workers on the road.
Even though Caviar tries to predict periods of high demand, surprise spikes in demand
(for instance, during a rainstorm) can catch the company off guard. Too few workers
means slow delivery times and customer dissatisfaction. During these moments, the
dispatchers (who are based in San Francisco) send out a message through the Courier
app, asking more couriers to log on. This is known as the “bat signal.” Mike, another
veteran courier, explains how the bat signal can ruin his shifts when the spike in demand
is not sustained relative to the increased workers that come out in response to the call.

Mike: If you send out a bat signal, that's fifty people that are gonna sign on, like,
within a few minutes, and then the work just gets scattered. That happened to me
just the other day. It was like 10:50am, a week or two ago, just putting my shoes
on, getting ready to walk out the door for an 11:00 am shift and I get a bat
signal… I barely made anything… and I was hustling, didn't deny a single order
all day. I texted the dispatcher, like “What's going on, where's the work at?” and
they send me like a $3.50 job. So, I was like, “It's $3.50. Come on! Let's do this,
make me sweat.”
Mike communicated his frustrations to the company through an automated email system
that Caviar uses to elicit feedback.

I put this in the little blurb and I was like, “I think when I started working here it
felt like a bubble that I knew was going to burst and it did. It did, the bubble
burst.” And the response was very vague, like, “Oh, I hope the bubble hasn't
burst. Sometimes it's just slow”… But how are you going to send the bat signal
out right before a major shift starts?... Like, if it’s slow, don’t get fifty more
couriers to sign on right before the big lunch shift starts!
… The reason I schedule myself at Caviar the way I do is so that I know—I make
pasta the night before and I’m making an omelet in the morning and I’m gonna be
riding all day. If I'm getting out of the shower and I get a bat signal, I'm not going
to throw my clothes on and go out to make $30. Fuck that, I don't do that. So the
bat signal for me is nothing more than “you're about to make 20% less money for
the next couple of hours because everyone and their mom is signing on.”
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The bat signal, for Mike, Gary, and others, is emblematic of the imbalance between
workers’ and companies’ interests. An oversupply of couriers remedies unanticipated
spikes in demand but at the same time it dilutes the availability of jobs for scheduled
workers. Conversely, when un-scheduled couriers sign on in response, they are likely to
receive an order right away but after that initial spike, they then go back to lowest priority
in the allocation queue.

THE RATIONAL FLEXIBLE WORKER
As the previous section illustrated, workers develop sophisticated intuitions about ondemand companies’ strategies of arbitrage. These strategies are designed to maintain the
veneer of flexibility and worker autonomy while simultaneously exerting pragmatic
forms of control—through incentives and disincentives, information asymmetries and
opacities, updated interfaces and algorithmically-determined pricing. Workers quickly
become wise to these strategic “control levers” (Gurvich, Moreno & Lariviere, 2016),
and their experiences demonstrate the extent to which discourses of autonomy and
flexibility cover over the human element in logistical infrastructures in the service sector.
Discursive framings of the on-demand economy within the IoT umbrella suggest that
companies create value and convenience without the aid of human labor or intervention.
On the contrary, the company strategies outlined here reveal a complex entanglement
between the worker, the interface of the worker-facing app, and the application of
algorithmic logics to workforce management—what Tarleton Gillespie (2014, p. 183)
describes as “a recursive loop between the calculations of algorithms and the
‘calculations’ of people.”
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Workers’ “calculations,” however, often run counter to those of companies,
pointing to misalignments between how on-demand firms model workers as rational
decision-makers and how decisions are actually made on the job. Workers have their own
rationalities that respond to company strategies, especially as they pick up on the extent
to which company rhetoric and actions might disagree. As workers become accustomed
to algorithmic workforce management, and register the shifts in obligations between
company and worker under these conditions, their decision-making changes as well.
When they become disillusioned with the promise of flexible employment, this is echoed
in mundane decisions—about which orders to accept or reject, when to sign onto the app
to start working, or when to call it quits on the whole prospect.
Recent work in science and technology studies and critical geography helps to
conceptualize the misalignments between workers’ calculations and companies’
modeling of worker decisions. Understanding this slippage highlights the subtle modes of
resistance that workers perform in response to company strategies of arbitrage. The
notion of “calculative rationality” is misleading in this context, however, since it suggests
that workers’ intuitions actually cohere with companies’ modeling of worker behaviors
under strategic information constraint and opacities. In other words, if workers adhered to
company models, their behaviors would be entirely predictable, which is not the case.
The notion of “qualculation” offers a productive alternative for understanding
workers’ on-the-job encounters with algorithmic workforce management systems (Callon
& Law, 2005; Thrift, 2007). Qualculation highlights the more-than-calculative nature of
worker intuitions; the on-the-job bodily and affective sense-making that on-demand
companies both demand and negate from workers (see Levy, 2015). There are two
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distinct but related conceptualizations of qualculative reasoning. The first, developed by
Michel Callon and John Law (2005), challenges distinctions between rational
calculability and irrationality. Callon and Law begin from the premise that calculability is
always informed by its Other—incalculable judgment—and that calculative rationalities
must be produced and are only possible under specific conditions, which, in turn, must be
qualified and maintained. For example, Marie-France Garcia-Parpet’s (2007) research on
the strawberry auction at Fontaines-et-Sologne in France shows how a marketplace was
constructed—architecturally, socially, and technologically—to mimic four core tenets to
the economic theory of an ideal market (atomicity, homogeneity, fluidity, and
transparency). Forms of judgment and reasoning that exceed these more narrow
conceptualizations of rationality assumed by micro-economic theory were effectively
excised from the space, matching the concrete instantiation with the ideal.
For Thrift (2007), the embedding of computational objects within the spaces of
everyday life overwhelms “calculative rationality” as it is traditionally understood,
suggesting new configurations of judgment, rationality, and calculation that he also calls
“qualculative.” New environmental technologies, and the epistemological shifts that they
effect, have begun to change how actors marshal evidence and data to make decisions.
The pervasiveness of calculative objects and environs—with “many millions of
calculations continually be[ing] made in the background of any encounter”—makes
calculation “so ubiquitous that it has entered a new phase” (Thrift, 2007, p. 90). In this
“new phase,” specificity and exactitude are conceded in favor of “making qualitative
judgements and working with ambiguity” (ibid.), both because new calculative
technologies deal in varying levels of uncertainty and probability, rather than certainty,
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and because of how societal asymmetries in access to information and calculative
technologies play out, as “only limited numerical facility is available in the bodies of the
population” (ibid., p. 98).
So while for Callon and Law, qualculation reveals the mutual constitution of
qualification and rationality, for Thrift, it points to an emergent, processual condition
stemming from the affective excess of computational milieus. The intuitions of ondemand workers reflect both conceptualizations. The types of evaluation that workers
make throughout the work day—the appropriateness of payments, the number of other
workers logged on, the rate at which orders are being allocated, the relationship between
the distance of an order and time necessary to complete it, etc.—are informed both by a
myriad of embodied and contextual cues that inflect judgment in decision-making (as in
Callon & Law) as well as by the technical affordances of the smartphone as a prosthetic
that locates, constrains, and enables workers within ambient informational environments
to which they have only limited access (as in Thrift).
In the long run, workers’ decision-making could stand to undermine company
strategies for workforce management. This is because company strategies assume that
workers do not reflect on their work conditions (which leads to more-than-calculative
judgments) and remain ignorant of the conditions of information constraint. In effect,
companies’ modeling assumes that workers will respond in predictable ways to
incentives and disincentives such as bonuses and surge pricing zones (Cachon, Daniels &
Lobel, 2016; Gurvich, Lariviere & Moreno, 2016; Sheldon, 2016; Taylor, 2016). These
assumptions form the basis for companies’ ability to exert control over fleets of workers.
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A closer examination of how economists approach the issue of self-scheduling in
the on-demand economy helps to illuminate this. For years, economists have assumed
that when workers are able to schedule themselves for work, they would do so in line
with the precepts of rationality in micro-economic theory—to maximize their overall
income, not to reach a specific “income target” for the day (cf. Camerer et al., 1997). For
instance, if demand increases during a rainstorm, a rational actor would work longer
hours and take advantage of the increased demand rather than hitting their income target
for the day and calling it quits earlier. Camerer et al. (1997) conducted a large-scale study
of taxi drivers to test these assumptions, finding that cab drivers’ decisions changed dayto-day but that, overall, income targeting was the norm.
With access to Uber’s vast databases of information gleaned from drivers’
interactions with the worker-facing app, Uber data scientist Michael Sheldon (2016)
repeated Camerer et al.’s study, looking at drivers’ scheduling patterns over time. His
results indicated that a large fraction of drivers began with the “irrational” goal income
targeting but over time “learned” to shift their scheduling to match spikes in demand, as
indicated by Uber’s surge pricing system (Scheiber, 2016).
If surge pricing and other incentives are indeed the “control levers” that
companies have at their disposal (as suggested by Gurvich, Lariviere & Moreno, 2016),
then the implication of Sheldon’s study is not only that workers become more “rational”
in their calculations over time (at least, according to economic theory), but that they also
learn to submit to the mechanisms of their own control. However, worker scheduling is
not so simple. Workers weigh a given day’s pay rates against a myriad of qualitative
factors—from weather conditions to estimates about how many other workers might be
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on the road at the same time—in order to determine how “worth it” it might be to log
onto the app and hit the road.
One core component to workers’ qualifications in these decisions is the sense of
moral economy that they develop after working for longer periods of time for on-demand
companies. By “moral economy,” I mean specifically the sense of obligation that is
understood to exist between worker and company (Götz, 2015; Murdock, 2011;
Thompson, 1971). Both proponents and critics of platform-based labor agree that it
heralds a shifting moral economy of work. This is most evident in discourses on
“gigging”—either as the freedom for workers to compose their work life from myriad
projects or to choose what benefits they want to consume, or as a new form of
exploitation that is masked by rhetorics of “sharing” and “flexibility” (cf. Schapiro, 2014;
Slee, 2016).
For workers, one way that this shift is registered is through the seemingly neverending expansion of labor pools—of drivers or couriers—as on-demand companies
continuously onboard new workers. Many couriers that I spoke with observed this
practice over time as a general dilution of the supply-demand ratio—a decreasing amount
of work orders relative to the number of workers on the road. This perception is not
unfounded. Companies prioritize customers’ instant gratification over workers’
complaints about working conditions, including decreasing hourly earnings and increased
wait periods between job orders. These preferences are reflected in the commonly-used
metaphor of liquidity in describing on-demand services. Former CEO of Uber, Travis
Kalanick, for example, described his company’s mission as “mak[ing] transportation as
reliable as running water” (e.g., Cutmore, 2016). Critics of on-demand work’s
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exploitative potentials employ similar analogies. According to Chris Roberts, senior
social and economic policy researcher for the Canadian congress, the on-demand
economy “turns labour into something that comes out of a tap. You turn it on when you
need it, you turn it off when you don’t” (Ball, 2016; see also De Stefano, 2015).
For companies, over-hiring creates an expansive and elastic labor supply, making
couriers part of a stream or “standing reserve” (Heidegger, 2013) of undifferentiated
labor. In his critique of technology and modernity, Heidegger uses the term “standing
reserve” to refer to the ways that tools are ordered to be at-hand and ready for use. From
the perspective of company strategies, workers are similarly ordered to be at-hand in a
way that favors firms but creates a “tragedy of the commons”-type scenario from the
workers’ perspective. Serge sees it this way:

Serge: There’s just so many people getting into the delivery racket right now… I
think that everybody that's doing this kind of knows—we're at this peak right now
where they need us to work for them so they [can] continue to grow and expand
their businesses and enter new markets… That means it's good now but it's not
going to be good. It’s not going to last… Eventually there's going to be so many
people willing to do it that they’ll also be willing to do it for less money.34
Marcus and Karl observe this happening with Postmates already.

Marcus: There was just this like huge decrease in demand customer-wise—or not
in demand from customers, but there was just a supply—there was like too much
Postmates on the road, too many people. So I was, at one point, just not getting
orders. I was like, why is this? I was like, obviously they just hire everybody.
Karl: It’s definitely good when it’s good but there are a lot of times where you
kind of feel left out. Like when they’re hiring just so, so many people that it’s
tough to get jobs at certain times of day or even certain times of year. It doesn’t

34

Interview conducted Feb. 13, 2016.
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hurt them [Postmates]. Now you’re just getting less in jobs, but they’re probably
getting more orders than before.
These comments suggest that on-demand workers register a sense of shifting
moral economy, a transformation in the obligations between companies, workers, and
consumers that deprioritizes workers. This too flies in the face of companies’ claims to be
mere technological brokers or middlemen, disavowing any role they might play as
service providers. The degradation in obligations between these priorities affects how
workers make decisions on the job. Workers’ intuitions and experiences qualify the
judgments and decisions that they make on-the-job and on the fly. Significantly, though,
companies still take for granted that workers’ rationales adhere to bald calculations of
earnings. In practice, workers’ decision-making is far more difficult for on-demand firms
to model—and to thus predict and control. Rather than learning the type of rationality
that will submit workers to company control mechanisms (as Sheldon (2016) argues), it
may instead be the case that veteran on-demand workers’ learn a “qualculative” logic that
leads them to become suspect of company motives and interests.
There are signs that workers are already growing disillusioned with companies’
opaque strategies of arbitrage, which has led many stop signing into their apps. As Alba
(2015) reported for Wired, a survey of on-demand workers conducted by a consortium of
venture capitalists and start-up networks found that many workers were disappointed in
the pay and the narrow scheduling possibilities.35 Workers “discovered they had to work
earlier or later than they expected, and longer hours in general, because the systems
weren’t as flexible as they assumed. The upshot: people are leaving on-demand work

35

Accessing the survey costs $999, so I have had to rely on Alba’s (2015) reporting.
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after finding out the promised advantages over traditional jobs don’t hold up” (ibid.).
Workers’ dissatisfaction may become a larger problem for Silicon Valley. Growing
turnover rates for workers are outpacing companies’ constant onboarding. Further,
several class action lawsuits have been filed to challenge workers’ designation as
independent contractors. To date, these suits have been settled out of court for large
sums, meaning that there has yet to be a ruling about the legality of the contractor
designation (Alba, 2016b). These trends are disrupting the presumed reign of the
“middleman” business model (e.g., Williams, 2016) and revealing the on-demand
economy for what it is in practice—labor without overhead.

CONCLUSIONS: CONTROL AND ON-DEMAND WORK
In the on-demand economy, workers’ smartphones become mobile coordination
machines, enrolling workers in a fleet—a logistical network for moving goods and
people. To managers and remote dispatchers at on-demand firms, the city itself may
appear as an empty container for this coordination. But the city comes to life in workers’
on-the-ground knowledge of local conditions, their ability to deftly navigate its spatial
and temporal contours. Companies rely on these intuitions, even as they seek to control
them through strategies of arbitrage.
Despite its framing as a “poster child” for the Internet of Things and the smart
city, the on-demand economy is less about information transfer and communication
between networked objects than it is about the coordination of workers, their intuitions,
and their movements. I showed that the on-demand business model does not hinge on
technological innovation per se but upon discourses, techniques, and strategies of
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arbitrage that negotiate between ensuring enough worker autonomy to maintain their
designation as independent contractors and exerting enough control that the complexity
caused by worker flexibility can be managed and mitigated. Companies find unique ways
to exert control over their workers through various techniques, from updates to the
worker-facing app interface to opaque pricing algorithms and payment policies. These
strategies undermine both the celebratory discourse of the on-demand economy as a
success story for the Internet of Things as well as the economic theory mobilized to
rationalize its business model.
This research provides insights into what the automation of work looks like at the
present historical juncture—as both fantasy and reality. Algorithms and apps may be
automating the functions of workforce managers, but humans are still needed to
accomplish the tasks. That the on-demand economy might be considered a poster child
for the Internet of Things reinforces a fantasy of workforce automation that is as old as
capitalism itself (e.g., Aloisi, 2016)—that humans, like machines, will follow “a
predetermined sequence of operations or respond to encoded instructions” (Nakamura,
2007, p. 11). And yet the reality is that, within a shifting moral economy of work, ondemand workers resist the types of rational, calculative decisions that companies project
onto them in their modeling. The predictability of worker responses to companies’
control levers hinges on their willingness to conform to those specific rationalities.
Workers reflect on the conditions of their work and make measured, qualculative
judgments in order to get what they want out of it. They develop a sense of company
strategies and tolerate them to the extent that they align with their own interests. There
are signs that this lack of allegiance may come back to haunt on-demand companies, as
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workers’ unwillingness to tolerate certain conditions, such as high variability in earnings,
leaves them disillusioned with the promise of on-demand work:

contractors who once gravitated to the flexibility and the extra money that comes
from working for a company like Uber have become disenchanted with the gig
economy because of declining or unstable wages… Employee losses were offset
by hefty hiring gains, but the steady shedding of workers, while not necessarily
cause for alarm, is added pressure for companies that very publicly struggle with
giving workers their fair share. (Williams, 2016)
Companies also face pressure from class action lawsuits and municipal regulations.
Seattle’s City Council, for example, unanimously passed a resolution allowing ondemand workers to organize (Mehta, 2016), but this has attracted the attention of big
business lobbies, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Large sums of money are
being spent to push back against local rulings, often with countersuits that un-ironically
invoke anti-trust laws—the argument being that as independent contractors, unionized
on-demand workers would superficially resemble corporate collusion (Kennedy, 2017;
Van Grove, 2016). The Department of Labor under Donald Trump retracted a letter from
the Obama administration that sought to clarify the difference between independent
contractors and employees (Wald, 2017). Powerful institutions’ interest in upholding the
on-demand business model—and especially the independent contractor designation—
demonstrates the extent to which seemingly-neutral technological changes can become
entangled in cultural-political struggles to define what, exactly, is a problem and what its
solution should be.
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CHAPTER 4. PERFORMANCE AND
PERFORMATIVITY IN PREDICTIVE POLICING
[P]olice maintain superiority not simply through a monopoly on the use of
violence, but by creating a monopoly on the use of logistical media as
well.
—Reeves and Packer, 2013, p. 378

In 2009, Charlie Beck—then Chief of Detectives for the Los Angeles Police Department
and now Chief of Police—penned an article for Police Chief magazine. In the article,
Beck posed a question to his fellow police leaders: what could law enforcement learn
about crime-fighting from retailers like Walmart and Amazon? His answer: the
application of predictive data analytics, developed in the worlds of logistics, supply chain
management, and finance, to discover new efficiencies in police patrol and resource
allocation. “E-commerce and marketing have learned to use advanced analytics in
support of business intelligence methods designed to anticipate, predict and effectively
leverage emerging trends, patterns and consumer behavior” (Beck & McCue, 2009). The
police could—and needed to—do the same. In the years following the Great Recession of
2008, police resources and personnel were severely constrained by diminished
department budgets (Goldsmith, 2014). Departments that were “data-smart,” however,
could use predictive analytic technologies as a “force multiplier” (PERF, 2012), to make
the resources and personnel that they did have more powerful. “[N]ew tools designed to
increase the effective use of police resources could make every agency more efficient,
regardless of the availability of resources” (Beck & McCue, 2009).
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Historically, new technologies have appeared as correlates, if not catalysts, to
organizational change within law enforcement agencies. From the ensemble of two-way
radio, telephone, and automobile in the first half of the twentieth century, to the mobile
data terminal (MDT), records management systems (RMS), and computer-aided dispatch
(CAD) in the latter half (Harris, 2007; Rosenbaum, 2007), the historical trajectory of
urban policing is punctuated by changing material, technical, and infrastructural
conditions (Manning, 2008; Reeves & Packer, 2013; Wilson, 2000). Most of these
technologies are now woven into the fabric of patrol policing, almost to the point that
they appear as natural extensions of the patrol officer (De Lint, 2000).
Beck’s call for a “predictive policing” connects this long lineage of “police
media” technologies (Reeves & Packer, 2013) to the smart city’s digital solutionism. If
Beck’s ideas seemed radical in 2009, today they are commonplace. The largest police
forces in the US, and many in the UK and Germany, are currently employing predictive
policing systems (see Robinson & Koepke, 2016; Shapiro, 2017a; 2017b). Some of these
systems are supplied by the biggest players in the smart city industry. Microsoft’s Digital
Patrol and IBM’s Intelligent Law Enforcement, for instance, can both be included as addons to broader smart city government-solutions packages.1
But these “innovations” are not happening in a vacuum. Smart city players’
ramped up efforts to push new law enforcement and digital surveillance technologies—
body-worn cameras, facial recognition software, big data analytics, etc. (Graham &

1

For IBM’s Intelligent Law Enforcement product, see http://www03.ibm.com/software/products/en/integrated-law-enforcement. For Microsoft’s Digital Patrol
Solutions, see https://enterprise.microsoft.com/en-us/solution/industries/government/publicsafety/digital-patrol-solution/
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Wood, 2003; Marx, 1996)—have coincided with highly publicized deaths of unarmed
black community members at the hands of police officers across the US (e.g., Stroud,
2016). This is prompting a new level of critical attention to police technologies and
raising questions as to whether they are complicit in discriminatory policing practices.
Predictive policing is emblematic of these developments, having garnered much
attention and much controversy in recent years. Predictive policing refers to the use of
algorithms, predictive analytics, and machine learning techniques to automate the
analysis of crime data towards the detection or deterrence of crime.2 At present,
predictive policing products fall into one of two categories: offender-based and
geospatial prediction models. Offender-based modeling uses demographic criteria to
create risk profiles for individuals, such as parolees’ risk for recidivism or the likelihood
that an individual becomes a perpetrator. In the case of Chicago’s Strategic Subject
List—or “heat list”—criteria include criminal records and job and education histories, as
well as data about a subject’s affiliations with other “risky” individuals (Davey, 2016).3
Because of the controversial nature and demonstrable bias of offender-based
prediction (Angwin et al., 2016; Harcourt, 2006), most police departments have been
more likely to adopt the second type of predictive policing: geospatial prediction

2

Reports about predictive policing have slightly different definitions. These include the “use of
data to forecast where crime will happen or who will be involved” (Robinson & Koepke, 2016, p.
1) and “the application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative techniques—to identify
likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical
predictions” (Perry et al., 2013, p. 1). The differences between various definitions of predictive
policing highlight the technological spectrum along which different forecasting systems operate:
some definitions emphasize algorithmic analyses and the automated generation of crime
intelligence, while others (like Perry et al.’s) focus on quantification and statistical prediction.
3
The premise of these social network analyses is that social connections are a predictive
determinate of one’s own risk of involvement as a perpetrator or victim in a shooting.
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(Brayne, Rosenblat & boyd, 2015; Robinson & Koepke, 2016). Geospatial predictive
policing systems create risk profiles for places and times. They divide jurisdictions into
grid cells of approximately 500 square feet and employ algorithms trained on crime data
to create risk profiles for places. That information is then used in the allocation of police
patrol resources. A growing number of geospatial prediction systems are currently
available, some backed by publicly-traded corporations (IBM and Microsoft, but also
Motorola and Hitachi) while others, like leading predictive policing company PredPol,
are venture capital-funded (CrunchBase, 2016).
Proponents of predictive policing maintain that by making appropriate use of
geospatial crime forecasts, police departments can become better equipped in their
decision-making. In the best case scenarios, this would lead to a reduction in crime, while
simultaneously freeing up valuable resources amid growing budgetary constraints. As
with smart city solutionism more broadly, predictive policing is designed to help
departments “do more with less” (Brayne, Rosenblat & boyd, 2016, p. 4).
Critics of predictive policing, on the other hand, contend that there is systematic,
geographic bias inherent in the crime data used to train predictive algorithms. They argue
that if not adequately addressed, this bias would inevitably lead to the reinforcement of
discriminatory patterns in policing, creating insidious feedback loops of criminalization
(Ensign et al., 2017). Low-income communities of color—already facing discrimination
and violence at the hands of police departments (Brayne, 2014; Eubanks, 2006;
Goffman, 2014)—would thus become subject to enhanced forms of police surveillance
and intervention under the guise of scientific objectivity and technological neutrality (cf.
Lum & Isaac, 2016).
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The disjuncture between the two sides of the predictive policing debate can seem
irreconcilable. For example, speaking on a panel at a recent Brennan Center Forum titled
“Policing and Accountability in the Digital Age,” one activist asked: “My question to
anybody working in the private sphere, producing technology for policing, is: are you
trying to [improve my community]? Are those the problems that your company is trying
to solve? Because if that is not why you are set up and that is not how you make your
profit, then we aren’t even working on the same problem” (NYU School of Law, 2016).
A review of recently published reports, white papers, and statements of concern
about predictive policing, however, suggests that the two sides of the debate have more in
common than is typically acknowledged. On the whole, social justice and civil rights
activists are not calling for the elimination of data in policing, but rather for more and
better data on how predictive analytics works when put into practice. For example, one
major problem that critics have identified is that evaluations of predictive policing
conducted to date are plagued by conflicts of interest, as in when researchers with a
vested interest in a predictive policing product are involved in its evaluation and the
publication of the results (e.g. Mohler et al., 2015). Predictive policing is also plagued by
a lack of statistical evidence to support its claims to meaningfully reduce crime (Hunt,
Saunders & Hollywood, 2014).4
Despite these well-known issues, police departments across the US and elsewhere
have continued to adopt predictive policing software (Robinson & Koepke, 2016). In

4

Other performance evaluations are in progress. Researchers at Temple University in
Philadelphia conducted a randomized control trial of predictive policing using HunchLab, but the
results are not yet published. See http://www.cla.temple.edu/cj/center-for-security-and-crimescience/the-philadelphia-predictive-policing-experiment/
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response, progressive think tanks, academics, and legal scholars have called for more
independent evaluations of predictive systems, for explicit recommendations for adoption
in order to minimize their potential for discriminatory bias, and for regulations to
constrict how jurisdictions implement predictive policing (ACLU, 2016; Brayne,
Rosenblat & boyd, 2015; Ferguson, 2017; Robinson & Koepke, 2016; Shapiro, 2017b).
Proponents similarly want more and better data, but for different reasons—to better
understand how predictions about crime risk can be translated into actionable strategies
for department command staff (e.g., Ratcliffe, 2014) or to improve upon the accuracy of
crime predictions across disparate types of crime, from petty theft to assault to homicide.
As Sherman (2013) writes, improving on predictive analytics might help police in
“targeting scarce resources on evidence of large, predictable, and harmful statistical
patterns rather than on isolated cases.”
The demand for more evaluative data on predictive policing is undisputed.
Nonetheless, such data can never be neutral. Opposing sides of the debate are interested
in different types of evaluation, with proponents seeking to improve systems’ accuracy
and critics concerned about harm to communities.
A productive way to conceptualize these different sets of concerns is through a
distinction that Adrian Mackenzie (2015) draws between the performance and
performativity of predictive algorithms. Performance and performativity are two sides of
the same data-analytic coin: performance is about the accuracy of a predictive model,
while performativity is about the effects that acting on predictions has on the contexts in
which decisions are made.
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Predictive policing’s performativity occupies a more complex register than its
performance measures. Data performativity describes the relationship between how we
categorize and measure things as data, and how those things are then affected as a result
of such categorization and measurement (Hacking, 1995; Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014; Law
& Urry, 2004; Thrift, 2007). In a context in which predictions are being made and then
acted on, it captures how “the deployment of prediction… changes what people do”
(Mackenzie, 2015, p. 442). The generalization of predictive analytics into an increasing
number of societal registers has prompted critical attention to issues of performativity
(e.g., Callon 2006; MacKenzie, 2006). For technology producers, this means finding
ways “to fold the performativity of models back into the modelling process”—to create
measures for representing the effect that predictions have on the conditions being
predicted (Mackenzie, 2015, p. 443).
In predictive policing, this might look like district commanders and field officers
altering their decisions about where and how to patrol communities based on the
predicted crime risk of different areas. These altered decisions would then be reflected in
the data, which in turn get fed into predictive algorithms to create performative feedback
loops, reinforcing potentially discriminatory patterns (Brayne, Rosenblat & boyd, 2015;
Ensign et al., 2017; Robinson & Koepke, 2016). Capturing these feedback loops is
further complicated by the fact that, if stated at all, the goal of predictive policing is the
deterrence or prevention of crime, not an increase in arrest rates (Benbouzid, 2015;
Bratton, 2014). Successfully prevented crimes are not easily represented within statistical
models (as in the truism that “you can’t prove a negative”). Proxy indicators must
therefore be enrolled into evaluations in order to estimate deterrent effects. This is the
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case with the randomized control trial (RCT) methodology typical of experiments
conducted to evaluate predictive policing (e.g., Hunt, Saunders & Hollywood, 2014;
Mohler et al., 2015). Statistics provide measures of certainty that observed decreases in
crime are indeed the result of experimental conditions. Nonetheless, myriad complexities
can undermine confidence in the cause of observed effects: did crime decrease during the
experimental period because police were using predictions to shape patrol decisions, or
was it due to some other, tangential event, such as a seasonal lull in a particular crime
type?
These complexities raise critical questions for predictive policing: How do the
producers of predictive analytic technologies account for the effects that predictions have
in the field? To whom should the burden of proof fall, in order to ensure that
performative effects are fair and nondiscriminatory?
It is in this problematization of measurement and statistical representation—of
dealing with the uncertainty and messiness that attend the apparent certitude of predictive
analytics—that the field of predictive policing has come to its current impasse. In this
chapter, I explore these problematics through ethnographic research with the product
team behind HunchLab, a predictive policing software suite produced by Philadelphiabased software company Azavea. The chapter focuses on how the problematization of
predictive performativity works as an organizing principle for producers of predictive
systems (Rabinow, 2003). It highlights the role that immeasurability and nonrepresentability—rather than predictive certitude—play in the production of law
enforcement technology (Mackenzie, 2015; Thrift, 2007). What new forms of uncertainty
attend crime prediction, and how do technology designers address them?
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Data performativity is a persistent problem for the HunchLab team since their
task, among other things, is to statistically represent the fluctuating social worlds of crime
and policing in the form of data that can be fed into predictive models. The chapter
focuses on how HunchLab grapples with these issues as both a technical and ethical
problem. Like previous chapters, in which the interface becomes intertwined with
algorithmic management, performative crime data in this chapter entails a complex
assemblage of humans and machines, mobility and information. And just as the
assemblages of LinkNYC and on-demand economy fleets involved information and
opacity, so too are police patrol resources controlled and coordinated in part by discursive
framings of predictive analytics’ viability, the potency and accuracy of locational crime
data, and police officers’ on-the-ground knowledges of space and place. How police
officers behave once predictive information has been given to them, in other words,
becomes a question of logistics, of ensuring that patrol resources are deployed in ways
that serve a coordination for the sake of efficiency.

METHODS, ARGUMENT, AND CHAPTER STRUCTURE
This chapter is based on ethnographic research conducted over the course of a year with
the HunchLab product team. My connection with HunchLab was somewhat
serendipitous. The company that makes HunchLab is based in Philadelphia. After reading
media coverage of predictive policing locally, I reached out by email and was put in
touch with Jeremy Heffner, HunchLab’s Senior Data Scientist and Product Manager.
Jeremy was extremely welcoming of my research interests and allowed me to follow the
product team in their day-to-day activities. Between October, 2015 and August, 2016, I
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attended dozens of hours of meetings, from planning out software development with
engineers to discussions about current and potential clients to conference calls with
representatives at other companies or at police departments. I also attended trainings for
new employees and provided feedback on instructional webinars that the team was
working on while I was there. In December, 2015, I accompanied two HunchLab team
members on a trip to St. Louis County, MO, where they were working with Sgt. Colby
Dolly of the St. Louis County Police Department to introduce the product to command
staff, to train officers on how the software works and should be used in the field, and to
conduct ride-alongs with officers using the HunchLab predictions for the first time.
In addition to this primary research with HunchLab, I also attended a number of
panels, symposiums, and seminars about algorithmic governance, including “Tyranny of
the Algorithm? Predictive Analytics & Human Rights” at the Bernstein Institute for
Human Rights at New York University’s School of Law and “Technology in Criminal
Justice Reform” at the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. I also followed reporting about predictive
policing in the popular press throughout the duration of the research period.
Much of the data that I quote at length in this chapter is taken from transcripts of
webinars that the HunchLab team produces for its clients and any other interested parties.
These webinars are published on YouTube as slideshows with accompanying audio.
Unlike other data sources, the webinars provide concise articulations of concerns and
issues that came up repeatedly for the product team during the fieldwork. This makes
them easier to quote than some of the lengthier discussions that I had with members of
the HunchLab team. Moreover, the webinars are public-facing—crafted and designed to
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communicate key features of the HunchLab product to specific audiences, typically
comprised of crime analysts working in police departments. For these reasons, I quote the
webinars at length, acknowledging that their presence may over-represent highlypolished accounts of the technology rather than the nitty gritty of daily debates and
discussions. Jeremy Heffner narrated many of these webinars, so his voice appears more
often than other ethnographic interlocutors.
Taken together, these data sources inform the argument that I present in this
chapter, which is that critical perspectives on law enforcement in smart cities should look
to how data performativity operates as an organizing problematic for technology
producers. Predictive policing’s performativity animates cultural-political struggles over
the meaning and viability of data technologies in policing. To date, research on predictive
policing has largely been restricted to evaluations of predictive accuracy and efficacy
through randomized control trial-type experiments (Hunt, Saunders & Hollywood, 2014;
Mohler et al., 2015). How producers of predictive policing products themselves
conceptualize the problematics of performativity, as both a pragmatic and ethical
consideration, and how they go about translating these concerns into the design of
algorithmic predictions, have received little attention in the literature. The chapter
illustrates how uncertainties and epistemological paradoxes can become engines of
thought and action, productive slippage points between the ideals of data-analytic
decision-making and the social world in which datafication takes place (Andrejevic,
Hearn & Kennedy, 2015; Van Dijck, 2014). Understanding these dynamics is especially
important as police departments in the U.S. and elsewhere continue to adopt predictive
policing systems at a growing rate (Robinson & Koepke, 2016).
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The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I summarize the mythic
narrative shared amongst law enforcement intellectuals about the relationship between
urban policing strategies and technology. Predictive policing appears here as the telos of
efforts to align policing with public concern and changing institutional norms around the
use of technology in shaping police practices. The remainder of the chapter challenges
this mythic narrative, showing that predictive policing is plagued by uncertainty and
immeasurability despite its promises to certainty and predictive accuracy as solutions to
myriad problems in police patrol.
The following section thus introduces the problematics of performativity that
animate both critiques of predictive policing as well as programs for its development. I
then move to discuss HunchLab. HunchLab’s history aligns with many points in the
institutional narrative, but also illustrates the specificity, contingency, and connections
that had to come together in order for the product to become what it is today. The
subsequent section details issues of data performativity by focusing on HunchLab’s
vision for a “prescriptive” analytics in policing. I present three strategies that are core to
this vision—randomization, diversity, and experimentalization. The chapter concludes by
returning to the broader question of putting predictive policing into perspective. In place
of the institutional narrative, I propose Reeves and Packer’s (2013) notion of “police
media” as a way to reconceptualize the work that predictive policing does for police
command staffs.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL NARRATIVE OF POLICE AND TECHNOLOGY
The development of predictive policing can be situated within an institutional narrative of
police technology and innovation,5 in which crime prediction and risk forecasting serve
as the apex of a long progressive march towards data-driven decision-making in law
enforcement.6 In this narrative, technology serves as a synecdoche for changes in police
culture, while changes in police culture are seen as responses to changing public
demands, institutional norms, and political climates.
One of the most influential articulations of this institutional narrative is Kelling
and Moore’s (1988) canonical “The Evolving Strategy of Policing.” The article first
appeared in Perspectives on Policing, a prestigious joint publication of the U.S.
Department of Justice, the National Institute of Justice, the Police Foundation, and the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.7 Kelling and Moore
suggest that policing history can be broken down into three dominant phases. During the
political era (from roughly the 1840s through the 1930s), policing was a largely corrupt
institution overseen by local political bosses. The second period, the reform era (the
1930s to the 1970s), involved the centralization of municipal police departments, calls for
increased “professionalism” across agencies (Sklansky, 2013), and the adoption of
scientific ideals of objectivity in investigating and responding to crime. And the third era,

5

By “institutional narrative,” I mean both a narrative of institutional change and an
institutionally-accepted narrative. It should be understood as a cultural story that police and
criminologists tell themselves about themselves and about technology (Geertz, 1973; Wilson,
2000).
6
For example, Reeves and Packer (2013, p. 361) note that “digital police media… serve as a telos
to the narrative of technological development.”
7
The article’s influence can be gleaned not only from the frequency with which the paper is cited,
but also by the fact that recent texts theorizing police history constantly reproduce and summarize
the narrative’s argument (e.g., Rosenbaum, 2007; Treverton et al., 2011).
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the community problem-solving era (the contemporary era for Kelling & Moore,
beginning in the 1970s), reflected a return to localized visions of order and control as
enacted through informal social and cultural channels at the local level (Rosenbaum,
2007).
The transition between each of these eras in Kelling and Moore’s account
corresponds with the promise and then perceived failure of technological overture. The
reform era responded to issues of corruption in the political era by establishing new
professional standards, ideals of scientific objectivity in forensic investigations, and
information and communication infrastructures, such as national crime report databases
(e.g., the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report and a national fingerprint registry) and centralized
dispatching stations that were capable of communicating with increasingly mobile
officers in the field (e.g., telephone-operated emergency response services and two-way
radio dispatch) (Battles, 2010; Byrne & Rebovich, 2007; Wilson, 2000).
Despite its active attempts to minimize police corruption through new
technologies, the reform era’s emphasis on rapid response and displays of police
authority—for instance, as emblematized by the police cruiser (cf. Packer, 2008)—
eventually betrayed a growing sense of distance between the police and the public. The
community problem-solving era responded to this sense of distance by emphasizing that
patrols should be strategically directed to areas with patterns of crime (a method known
as “hot spot policing”). Police patrols would also work in conjunction with communities’
informal and organic social control mechanisms. By the 1970s, there was the sense that
the ideals and principles of policing (as outlined by Sir Robert Peel at the launch of the
first municipal police department in London in 1829) had become vague and unattainable
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(e.g., Bratton, 2014). Peel’s (1829) principle that “[t]he police at all times should
maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the
police are the public and the public are the police” made little sense as police departments
were becoming more like militaries and stamping out the popular urban unrest of the
1960s (Kraska, 2001; Graham, 2011).
Changes in mainstream criminological theory and research also attended the shift
toward “community problem-solving.” Criminology departed from its bread-and-butter
research—the study of the criminal-deviant—and began to focus instead on the contexts
in which crime occurred (Garland, 2001; Foucault, 2007; Lianos & Douglas, 2000; Miller
& Rose, 2008). The most prominent example of this is the hot spot policing technique,
which would track how crimes related to specific environments. Theories of
criminogenesis in the community problem-solving era “normalized” crime, in the sense
that crime was no longer seen as based in criminals’ abnormalcy, but rather in the
opportunities presented by situational conditions (cf., Foucault, 2007, pp. 239-266). Subdisciplines like crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) emerged in
response to this new orientation (see Garland, 2001; Shapiro, 2016).
Criminology’s new focus on the contextual determinants of crime also included a
renewed interest in how police patrols interacted with their communities. A burst of
experimental criminological research beginning in the mid-1970s focused on this
relationship, re-evaluating tried-and-true police strategies and tactics. Kelling et al.’s
(1974) foundational “Kansas City preventive patrol experiment,” for instance, found that
“increasing or decreasing the intensity of preventive patrol did not affect either crime,
service delivery to citizens, or citizens’ feelings of security” (Weisburd & Braga, 2006, p.
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227). Likewise, Spelman and Brown’s (1984) research found that reductions in police
response times to calls-for-service had no impact on arrest rates (Weisburd & Braga,
2006).
This focus would continue throughout the 1990s, past the publication of Kelling
and Moore's article. More recent accounts of the relationship between police and
technology extend Kelling and Moore’s narrative into a new era, one shaped by datadriven empiricism in criminology and policing practice. Rosenbaum (2007) names this
period the “Information Technology era,” while a RAND Corporation study (Treverton et
al., 2011) calls it the “intelligence-led policing era.”8 In these updated narratives, the
incorporation of computational technologies into policing promises to improve policing
practices “through analysis of empirical evidence, facilitated by better and faster
technologies” (ibid., p. 33).
One major influence on police departments’ adoption of technology was a
managerial program called CompStat. CompStat was first pioneered at the NYPD in the
1990s under then-Commissioner William Bratton. CompStat (short for “computerized
statistics”) incorporates crime mapping and statistical analyses into weekly meetings
between department executives and district commanders. The program was rapidly
adopted by most large police departments within the U.S., and now worldwide (Willis,
Mastrofski & Weisburd, 2007). Its primary function is to create new mechanisms of
accountability between district commanders and their superiors. Geographical
information systems (GIS) and visualizations of high crime areas—hot spots—allowed

8

The notion of “intelligence-led” is iteslf derived from a model of policing under budgetary
constraint developed in the U.K. in the 1980s (see Ratcliffe, 2008).
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department commanders to call attention to failing strategies, and to hold the district
commanders accountable for crime spikes within their jurisidictions (Moore & Braga,
2003; Silverman, 2006; Manning, 2008).
Within institutional narratives of police technology, CompStat is noted for its
import but also seen as an unrefined tool—a first step towards intelligence-led policing,
but not its final realization. For instance, since mid-level district commanders were held
accountable to crime statistics, CompStat created perverse incentives that led to the
falsification of data (Eterno & Silverman, 2012). Its retrospective analytics were based on
the hot spot hypothesis of crimes clustering in certain areas (Rosenbaum, 2006), but had
little nuance in dealing with problematic spaces aside from brute interventions. Further, at
an operational level, hot spot maps were geographically vague; whole zip codes could be
considered high crime areas. This made patrol resource allocation decisions somewhat
arbitrary within hot spots.
Predictive policing is seen to respond to the shortcomings of CompStat’s
rudimentary crime data analytics. In the imaginary of institutional actors, it simply
represents the logical next step in policing technology—a refinement and automation of
CompStat’s data-driven ethos. At the outset, predictive policing was a somewhat vague
concept, referring to a panoply of crime mapping and analytic techniques attempting to
hone the predictions implicit in hot spot policing (cf. Ratcliffe, 2014; Treverton et al.,
2013; see also NIJ, 2014). Like CompStat, it was imagined to create new channels of
accountability: where CompStat increased accountability between department executives
and district commanders, predictive policing would extend this down to the rank-and-file
line officers in their day-to-day patrols.
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Also like CompStat, William Bratton played a central role in the development of
predictive policing. Bratton left the NYPD in the late 1990s and was hired by the Los
Angeles Police Department to serve as Chief. During his tenure with the LAPD, Bratton
was charged with directing a series of symposiums on predictive policing for the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ, 2014). To Bratton, predictive policing represented “the next
phase that we’re moving into… the ability to truly identify where there may be the next
crime occurring and get in there ahead of time to prevent it” (Bratton, 2014).
As with the community problem-solving era identified by Kelling and Moore,
predictive policing also reflects a desire to return to the earliest tenets of police patrol,
including a preventive—and not just responsive—function. “We certainly always want to
improve our ability to respond to [crime],” Bratton (2014) explained, “but we don’t want
the response to overwhelm the basic mission of crime prevention.” Predictive policing
thus serves as the culmination of this mythic teleology. It heralds a return to the
fundamentals of patrol through the adoption of advanced statistical techniques and
predictive data analytics. Its technology promises a new level of granularity and ubiquity
to fill in the large gaps that remained with CompStat—and to uncover new efficiencies to
maximize resources. As I show throughout the remainder of the chapter, however, the
actual use and development of predictive policing involves a complex entanglement of
data measurement with immeasurability, exactitude with uncertainty, and predictions
with imprecision.
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CRIME DATA’S PERFORMATIVITY
Observations about messiness of crime data and the institutional reforms that it provokes
are not new (e.g., Haggerty, 2001). But in debates about predictive policing, these
observations seem somehow to have been entirely eschewed. Understanding predictive
policing today requires looking not just to the predictive accuracy of algorithms—which
already assumes a tidiness in the data and data management practices—but also to how
data-driven predictive analytics affect and sometimes transform the conditions, dynamics,
and processes they purport to represent. This is predictive policing’s performativity.
Orienting to performativity rather than mere performance reflects Matzner’s
(2016) distinction between “representationalist view” and “citationalist” approaches to
studying surveillance. The representationalist view questions the performance, accuracy,
and veracity of surveillant assemblages (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000)—how precise or
valid a representation might be relative to its itinerant reality. This is largely what police
departments and criminologists have been interested in for predictive policing. The
citationalist approach, on the other hand, examines how statistical representations of
populations can work to performatively produce subjects in particular ways through
objectifying repetition. On this latter view, predictive algorithms are always acting
performatively; they represent and intervene in the same instant (Hacking, 1983; Miller
& Rose, 2008). Even if we do not have immediate access to our statistical
representations, their deployment “in the wild” structures our interactions with
sociotechnical systems (cf. Cheney-Lippold, 2017).
The trouble is that the performative effects of surveillance are difficult to discern.
It does not help that they are “increasingly masked by an ideology that continues to frame

186
data as an objective and value-free way of assessing the world as it actually is” (Shelton,
2017, p. 4), rather than as an intervention unto it. Despite this masking ideology, there is
good evidence to suggest that the producers of surveillant systems are well aware of these
performative effects. Think for instance of the prominent placement of surveillance
cameras in plain sight, designed to interpellate would-be criminals (McGrath, 2004). Or
the effects that certain environmental designs can have on inhabitants’ behavior, as in the
tenets of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) (Shapiro, 2016).
Although it should be said that the algorithmic apparatus of predictive policing is not
evident to actors in the same way, these examples help to illustrate why a purely
“representationalist” (or performance-centric) approach to surveillance is inadequate. It is
in the performative, citational, or “non-representational” (Thrift, 2007; Clough et al.,
2015) dynamics of predictive policing that its core problematics come to the fore.
Predictive policing’s performative effects are understood differently by opposing
sides of the debate about predictive policing. As the institutional narrative of police and
technology suggests, predictive policing is imagined as a rationalizing force. But to
critics, this “rationality” seems more likely to performatively entrench the police’s
harmful biases against minority communities than to achieve any sort of meaningful
change. For example, consider the following exchange between Jeremy Heffner,
HunchLab’s Senior Data Scientist and Product Manager, and Aliya Rahman, community
activist and technology director at Wellstone, a progressive public policy nonprofit. The
exchange took place during a panel titled “Policing and Accountability in the Digital
Age” at the Brennan Center for Justice.
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Aliya: Is there anybody here [in the audience] who believes that communities that
are marked as more high risk by these algorithms — is there anyone who believes
that black people and people of color are, by nature, riskier, more dangerous
people? [Silent pause.] Cool, so if an algorithm is saying that this is where we
should go, then it’s broken, correct? Or, it is 100% performing the wrong
predictive task. It is not actually telling us how to be more safe, it is only telling
us how close today can be to yesterday, which is the mathematical definition of
maintaining status quo…
Jeremy: My question is, do you not think that minority communities are
disproportionately affected by violent crime?
Aliya: … I believe that minority communities, at this moment, are watched
enough and do things that get marked as criminal enough, that they will be overincarcerated by what we call criminal. Way too much shit is actually criminal
right now, right? Things that do not actually need anyone to go into jail. So
currently, minority communities match up exactly right with how laws have been
created, and how much policing is there, to make it look like they’re more
affected by [violent crime]… I do not believe that minority communities are more
violent or do things to make this world worse than anyone else. So if that is
manifesting in the crime stats… [then] that is the wrong thing to guide us. All it
does is ensure that we replicate yesterday’s legislative situation and what
happened in the streets. It doesn’t say anything about safety. (NYU School of
Law, 2016)

This kind of exchange is emblematic of the sort of conceptual gridlock
characteristic of the debate over predictive analytics—not just in policing, but across a
wide range of social and legal registers (e.g., O’Neill, 2016). Critics maintain that
because algorithms are trained on data that is never “raw” (Gitelman, 2013; Boellstorff,
2013), they will inevitably reproduce patterns of bias and discrimination already
inscribed in the “ground truth” training data, which is used to tweak and adjust
algorithms so that predictions adhere to historical patterns. The performativity of the
predictions, then, is in their maintenance of oppressive conditions.
Another way to understand this contention is that patterns detected in the ground
truth data may actually adhere more closely to the institutional categories from which
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data are constructed than to the natural distribution of phenomena they purport to
represent or predict. For instance, there is a well-known racial bias in incarcerations
resulting from illegal substance infractions. Despite evidence that rates of drug
consumption are comparable across racial lines, people of color are more likely to be
convicted and incarcerated for substance violations than whites (Drug Policy Alliance,
2016). Statisticians Lum and Isaac (2016) show that if an algorithm trained on conviction
data were to predict the location of drug use and direct patrol resources accordingly, the
police would be much more likely to monitor the minority communities where
convictions had already taken place than white communities with roughly the same rates
of usage—thus failing to capture the “natural” distribution of drug use in a demonstrably
biased way.
These concerns are echoed across several statements of concern, policy reports,
and white papers expressing criticism about predictive policing systems come to similar
conclusions (e.g, ACLU, 2016; Robinson & Koepke, 2016). Brayne, Rosenblat and
boyd’s (2015) primer on predictive policing, addressed to social justice advocates and
policymakers, argues that more data is needed in order to understand predictive
algorithms’ propensity to create “self-fulfilling statistical prophecies.”

Algorithmic decision procedures can “reproduce existing patterns of
discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the
widespread biases that persist in society. It can even have the perverse result of
exacerbating existing inequalities by suggesting that historically disadvantaged
groups actually deserve less favorable treatment.”… Simply stated, we need to
ask whether predictive policing reduces police discretion (and to what extent we
want to reduce it in the first place), and whether it serves to exacerbate or remedy
existing inequalities in police practices. (Brayne, Rosenblat & boyd, 2015, p. 10,
emphasis added)
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This statement suggests that predictive policing algorithms have the capacity to
performatively amplify existing sources of bias at both the level of the individual officer
(“police discretion”) and the systemic level (“existing inequalities in police practices”).9
Individual officers’ discretion can lead to bias when the choices that they make affect the
data. Although steps are already in place to mitigate this potential—for instance, as
officers are rotated out of their beats to mitigate the likelihood that they abuse their
position of power locally10—there is still evidence to suggest bias in officer discretion
remains a hugely overlooked problem (Nowacki, 2015; Smith, 2015; Spencer,
Charbonneau & Glaser, 2016)—and especially when considering highly discretionary
patrol practices like “stop and frisk” in high crime areas (Ferguson, 2017a; 2017b;
Jefferson 2017; Harcourt, 2006).
Bias at the systemic level, on the other hand, can be caused by many factors,
including the under-reporting of crimes; the over-policing of certain areas relative to
others; or by laws that categorize the behaviors of marginalized groups as criminal. It is
less clear what steps police departments are currently taking to mitigate these systemic
level issues. As Robinson and Koepke (2016) argue in a widely circulated report on the
state of predictive policing, a lack of transparency in predictive policing policies may
undermine whatever ongoing efforts social justice advocates might be advocating to
disrupt patterned discrimination in law enforcement at the systemic level.

9

Although the term “performativity” is not used in the documents I’m referring to (Brayne,
Rosenblat & boyd, 2015; Robinson & Koepke, 2016), their shared emphasis on predictive
algorithms’ propensity to affect the social, legal, and material contexts in which crimes become
inscribed as data and enrolled into algorithmic architectures, reflects key tenets of the concept of
performativity as it has been applied to data infrastructures and computational technologies.
10
David Robinson, personal communication, Oct. 26, 2016.

190
The performativity of predictive policing, in other words, does not occur in a
vacuum. The application of data analytics to police patrol connects and intersects with
broader institutional practices in law enforcement. These institutional practices have
always been animated by performative relationships, constituted by various
hybridizations of humans, institutions, legal codings, and technologies, which, in turn, are
animated by myriad overlapping performativities—of internal policies and management
programs (such as CompStat); of criminal law and the codifications of certain behaviors
as criminal; of professional norms and conventions; of intertwined technological
constraints and affordances (such as the squad car, telephone dispatch, and two-way
radio); etc. To be “found guilty” by a jury is pronounced through a performative
utterance in a trial; to become labeled as a “convicted felon” (rather than “formerly
incarcerated person”) has performative effects on the person’s life (Hacking, 1995). As
Introna (2013, p. 7) writes, “[a]lgorithms are performative—but only as incorporated into
sociomaterial assemblages.” Here those “sociomaterial assemblages” are the alreadyflawed “best practices” in policing and law enforcement. Coupling predictive algorithms
with the downward spiral of “criminal justice contact and institutional attachment”
(Brayne, 2014)—in which the accumulation of institutional registrations such as bench
warrants for traffic incidents leads to mundane forms of entrapment within the criminal
justice system (see also Goffman, 2014)—would accordingly result in dramatically
reduced life chances for large swaths of urban populations (Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 2003).
To anyone paying attention to predictive policing, these critical concerns about
performative effects are well documented—even if not much is being done about them.
But surprisingly, very few studies have collected data about the extent to which these
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effects are materializing (Brayne, Rosenblat & boyd, 2015; Robinson & Koepke, 2016).
Still even less attention has been paid to how the producers of predictive policing
technologies think about the performativity of their predictions. My research on the
product team behind the predictive policing software suite HunchLab suggests that the
design of predictive systems indeed revolves around a problematization of data’s
performativity, but not always in ways that mirror critics’ concerns.

HUNCHLAB
HunchLab is produced by Azavea, a Philadelphia-based software company that focuses
on web-based geographic data applications. Within the broader field of policing
technology, Azavea seems an unlikely candidate to be a predictive policing vendor. Most
competing platforms are brought to market by large corporate players, including IBM,
Microsoft, Motorola, Hitachi, and LexisNexis, or by smaller companies backed by
venture capital, such as PredPol (Robinson & Koepke, 2016). Azavea, by contrast, is not
beholden to shareholders or investors. Instead, it adheres to a strict set of guidelines for
corporate social responsibility, environmental sustainability, and transparency, all of
which have earned the company a B-Corporation certification. “B-Corps” are for-profit
companies that have been certified by nonprofit B Lab to have met criteria to demonstrate
their commitment to promoting social good. At Azavea, this entails philanthropic giving,
with 2% of company profits being donated to nonprofit organizations that are selected
collaboratively by all employees; the allocation of 10% of employees’ time to
independent or personal research projects; a commitment to open source software
development and open data (meaning that the company posts its code to GitHub); and
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Figure 4.1 Jeremy Heffner, product manager and senior data scientist for HunchLab (left), with
Chip Koziara, former product specialist at HunchLab.
Source: https://mycitypaper.com/news/philly-crime-mapping-tool-spreads-across-the-country

supporting a summer fellowship for creating geospatial data analysis tools for nonprofit
organizations at no cost.
The office atmosphere at Azavea is typical of tech company culture. Situated on
the entire fifth floor of a factory-turned-office-building, located in a warehouse district
north of Philadelphia’s Chinatown, Azavea’s offices comprise a large, open floor plan
with an open kitchen, a bike storage room, exercise equipment, and a ping pong table. In
the main workspaces, programmers wear wireless studio headphones while working
silently and intently at computers, often multi-tasking between different projects or
communicating with their colleagues on the workforce messaging app Slack. Glasswindowed meeting rooms line the interior of the floor plan, with each room named for a
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global city; meetings are scheduled to be held in “Paris” or “Tokyo” or “Lagos.” Each
morning, different teams of engineers, product managers and specialists, coders and
programmers, meet in groups to go over what they have accomplished the previous day
and what they will be working on presently. Cork boards on wheels are covered with
multi-colored Post-It notes, indicating different assignments in various stages of
completion.
The HunchLab product team is comprised of Jeremy Heffner, Product Manager
and Senior Data Scientist, and, at the time of writing, four product specialists—Adele
Zhang, Tyler Gilcrest, Vanessa Paige, and Claire Walker, each of whom is a fellow with
Venture for America, a program that places recent college graduates at start-up or earlystage for-profit companies in order to foster entrepreneurship. This group works
exclusively on HunchLab, but the software is developed by a larger team of
programmers, coders, and designers who also work on other projects.
Azavea fosters a collaborative organizational structure. The HunchLab product
team works with developers from the “geospatial insights” team to delineate individual
tasks, such as bug fixes or interface designs. But the HunchLab team also has to take into
account a budget of programmers’ time, allocated between HunchLab and other Azavea
projects. After the HunchLab team has created a set of tasks for the current “sprint” (a
biweekly work cycle), the programmers and coders use a point-based system to
approximate how long and how difficult a given task would be. Each project is allocated
a certain number of points that can be “spent” on programmers’ work; points are
distributed based on a combination of available resources and how much funding a given
project is bringing in.
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In addition to this work allocation system, difficult decisions are made
collaboratively. For instance, the HunchLab team was approached by a company that
repossesses automobiles. The whole team, including the programmers and coders, made a
joint decision to decline working with that client, as repossession was seen to serve
predatory interests. In another example, a company that sells automated license plate
readers (LPRs) to police departments approached HunchLab about a partnership and
again the team jointly decided to decline their offer due to concerns about conflicts with
the company’s commitments as a B-Corp.11
HunchLab is one of four in-house products that Azavea maintains. The other three
include Cicero, a tool for mapping and databasing information about legislative districts;
OpenTreeMap, an open source mapping system for urban forestry and ecosystems
analysis; and GeoTrellis, an open source software for “fast geospatial data processing by
distributing tasks across computer clusters.”12 Unlike client-driven projects, which have a
specific goal and end date, Azavea provides updates and maintenance for these in-house
products. Among these, HunchLab is somewhat of an outlier, as it is not immediately
identifiable as contributing to social good in the same way that Cicero and OpenTreeMap
might be.

HunchLab’s Origins
For Azavea's president and founder Robert Cheetham, HunchLab is also unique in that,
unlike other Azavea projects, it grew out of work that he had begun prior to founding

11
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Fieldnotes, meeting with Selex-ES sales representative, Nov. 11, 2015.
https://www.azavea.com/work/
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Azavea. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Cheetham was working in the Philadelphia Police
Department’s first full-time data analysis division, then comprised of just two people.
During the Clinton Administration, cities and police departments received funding
through Community Development Block Grants, with certain percentages dedicated to
developing community policing programs and crime analysis divisions. Cheetham was
hired with funding from one of these grants around the same time that police data—
incident reports, calls for service, and dispatch data—were first being digitized. It was
also around this time that John Timoney, formerly First Deputy Commissioner for the
NYPD under William Bratton, became Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police
Department (1998-2002), bringing with him Bratton’s new CompStat managerial system
(Taylor, 2016).
Crime maps are the core of CompStat. Real-time, up-to-date crime maps are the
media-objects through which CompStat’s crime-fighting strategies are articulated.
Cheetham and his fellow crime analyst were charged with building software for mapping
the various data sources that would be used in the new CompStat meetings. Being that it
was only the two of them, Cheetham sought out new ways to automate the map-making
process; otherwise, it would be nearly impossible to keep up with the department's
breakneck schedule of weekly CompStat meetings.
Cheetham was also tasked with producing info-visualizations to boost officer
morale. Animations that showed how crime was reduced over time illustrated to officers
that their work was actually accomplishing something. For example, during Operation
Sunrise, a large-scale, inter-agency effort to disrupt networks of drug dealers and
traffickers in North Philadelphia (Fine, 1998), Cheetham was tasked with visualizing the
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changing crime rates in the operation’s target areas. To do this, he animated changes in
the geographic density of crimes across 180-day periods. This gave officers the morale
boost that the department had hoped for, but it also gave Cheetham an idea.
It was in the process of making these visualizations that Cheetham first started
thinking seriously about automated crime data analysis. He described his line of thinking
to me during an extended interview at the Azavea offices in October, 2016:

What if we took a thirty-day window and scrolled forward one day at a time, and
we only looked at one crime type at a time, and took a statistical test on each grid
cell to see if something significant was changing? It would be kind of an early
warning system. Because, often times, by the time you get to a CompStat meeting
it may almost be too late to have a discussion about [an emerging pattern]… Or if
it’s an emerging pattern, you may not notice it because of the arbitrary temporal
boundary created by [the schedule of] the CompStat meetings. So there could be a
cluster of crimes that, because of where you sliced the days, you wouldn’t even
see it as a cluster. But what if you were doing this continuously, like every
night?13
This “early warning system” became the basis for the first version of HunchLab, although
a prototype would not be built for several years. Cheetham left the Police Department for
a job as a programmer with the City of Philadelphia, and eventually left that job to found
Azavea. It was only once his company was started that he returned to working on
HunchLab. In partnership with his former boss in the crime analysis division, Cheetham
won a Small Business Innovation Research Grant from the National Science Foundation
to further develop the product.
By the late 2000s, Cheetham and his team had begun to hear about “predictive
policing” within police technology circles. In British criminology, where much of the
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Cheetham, personal communication, Oct. 26, 2016
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theory behind predictive policing had originated (Benbouzid, 2015), the term of art had
been “forecasting.” Though the idea of forecasting had been around for several years in
both the US and UK (e.g., Bowers, Johnson & Pease, 2004; Gorr & Olligschlaeger,
2002), its slow adoption within operational policing suggested that criminologists were
failing to convince police practitioners of its value (Caplan, Kennedy & Miller, 2011, p.
361). This would change in late 2009 and early 2010—as Charlie Beck wrote his article
in Police Chief magazine and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) held two symposiums
on “predictive policing.” “Forecasting” is the term that Cheetham still prefers. “We don’t
call a weather forecast a weather prediction because you can’t predict the weather; you
call it forecast for a reason: there’s a good chance we’re wrong. It’s a guide.”14 The term
“predictive policing,” however, had a marketing effect within law enforcement circles. Its
naming gave shape and common currency to a host of techniques that were then still in
development. The idea of a predictive policing seemed valuable for the same reasons that
Cheetham preferred the concept of forecasting—it connotes certainty and exactitude
rather than the vagueness of merely forecasting. The irony of these connotations is
highlighted when one considers the indeterminacy of the term at the outset. For example,
during the NIJ symposiums on predictive policing, participants—criminologists and law
enforcement leaders—identified a range of goals and “values” for predictive policing,
which included anything from “predicting acts of terror” to “predicting riots,” “traffic
management and crowd control” and the “travel of serial offenders” (NIJ, 2014).
As excitement around “predictive policing” was growing, Cheetham had begun
working with Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe—a criminologist who, though based at Temple
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University in Philadelphia, was trained in the British quantitative criminology tradition
out of which crime forecasting originated. Ratcliffe introduced Cheetham to a forecasting
mechanism known as “near repeat” victimization. Near repeat had become popular
among criminologists beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The concept was
originally used to describe a density pattern in the spatial and temporal distribution of
residential burglaries. A group of British criminologists discovered that when homes are
burgled, “the risk of further victimization is not only higher for the targeted home, but
also for homes nearby” (Ratcliffe, 2010, p. 16).15 Although the near repeat effect is
strongest for residential burglaries (Benbouzid, 2015)—the original context in which it
was observed—the concept has nonetheless been applied to a myriad of other contexts or
crime types, for instance, to predict the locations of shootings in Philadelphia (Ratcliffe
& Rengert, 2008) or the distribution of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on
coalition forces in Baghdad during the Iraq War (Townsley, Johnson & Ratcliffe, 2008).
In parallel work, Joel Caplan and his colleagues at the Rutgers School of Criminal
Justice were developing what they called a “risk terrain modeling” system (RTM).16
RTM predicts crime by measuring the geographic proximity between crime locations and
key urban features, which can be rendered as layers within GIS. Like near repeat
modeling, RTM is based on an implicit theory of contextual determinacy to crime. But
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Near repeat pattern analysis is an a posteriori concept: it identifies a pattern of risk that
emerges from the data, and then theorizes retrospectively. It focuses on the communicability of
risk for crime according to specific spatial and temporal horizons that are likewise determined by
the data (Townsley, Homel & Chaseling, 2003).
16
Although the theory behind RTM has been incorporated into HunchLab’s modeling, it is also
the name of a distinct predictive policing product. RTM is available for free online, and the
Rutgers academics who developed it charge to train crime analysts on how to use it (see Robinson
& Koepke, 2016).
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where near repeat looks to the contagion-like repetition and spreading of crimes, RTM
focuses on how crime revolves around key fixtures on the urban landscape. Accordingly,
the proximity of a crime event to a school, a church, a bus stop, or a bar could tell you
something about how risk for the next crime event is distributed.
Following the Predictive Policing symposiums, the NIJ started to release grants
for the development and evaluation of predictive policing tools. Cheetham applied for
and won one of these grants, this time in partnership with Jerry Ratcliffe and Ralph
Taylor, another Temple University criminologist. The Temple team would develop the
methodology while Azavea would build the tool (see Taylor, Ratcliffe & Perenzin,
2015).17 To manage this, Cheetham hired Jeremy Heffner, a mathematician and
statistician, and now the product manager and chief data scientist for HunchLab.
Together, Cheetham and Jeremy worked on combining these distinct approaches to
forecasting—near repeat pattern, the temporal approach that Cheetham had started
developing while at the Philadelphia PD (such as day-of-week, time-of-day, day-ofmonth, etc.), and RTM—into a single product.
Jeremy brought with him advanced techniques from machine learning, neural
networks, and artificial intelligence. Applying some of these techniques to crime
prediction, the team created hundreds (if not thousands) of variables and indices to
represent the different forecasting approaches that they were incorporating into their
modeling. This would allow the computer to automatically parse through variables to
determine their predictive efficacy for different crime data sets. The team quickly found

17

This was a more experiment-oriented iteration of HunchLab, consisting of a “combination of a
long-term crime potential map surface with a short-term crime spike surface,” designed to test
criminological theories about neighborhood-level collective efficacy as a predictor of crime.
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that with this open-ended modeling, their predictive accuracy was far greater than any
single forecasting approach applied on its own. The machine learning and artificial
intelligence techniques—what is described below as the “gradient boosted model
approach, using decision trees to compare things”—enabled the combination of these
different criminological approaches:

We thought near repeat was really effective in some cases, but it wasn’t effective
as a general tool; it was only good where the near repeat phenomenon was
present. And that was limited to some crime types. But we also had this timebased thing, and we knew that there was some veracity to that, so we could
measure how close we were to a forecast. And then RTM as a concept seemed to
work, but we felt it needed more rigor to it. And [our idea was that] you should be
able to compare and combine these things together.
So Jeremy really worked out the details of this. This is when he came up
with this gradient boosted model approach, using decision trees to compare
things, and then the idea of using machine learning tools to try a bunch of
different approaches for any given crime type: test them all and take the best one
for any particular crime type.18
This motto—“test them all and take the best one for any particular crime type”—
reflects how HunchLab works today. By applying machine learning techniques –gradient
boosting and decision trees—the system can remain agnostic toward any specific theory
of criminogenesis. Each approach is rendered in terms of variables that the machine
learning algorithms can then parse for predictive value. In other words, the HunchLab
team did not have to determine, in advance, whether a crime was more affected by
temporal variables or geographic variables, but could let the computer parse each
combination and determine which one worked best to predict a crime that actually took
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Cheetham, personal communication, Oct. 26, 2016
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place in the ground truth data. By comparing different crime outcomes in the ground truth
data with the model’s predictions—over thousands and thousands of repetitions—the
algorithmically-generated predictive models could be honed to the utmost granularity.

Robust Modeling
The current version of HunchLab is a subscription service, costing departments about
$45,000 for the first year and $35,000 for subsequent years.19 It is comprised of several
different features that work in tandem. The most basic feature is the crime prediction
algorithm, which is called Predictive Missions (see Figure 4.2). Predictive Missions
works by overlaying a map of the client’s jurisdiction with a grid of 500 sq. ft. cells.
Based on the historic crime data used to train the system, Predictive Missions then
outputs a risk profile for each cell at regular intervals. Clients who subscribe to
HunchLab submit up to five years’ worth of geo- and temporal-coded crime data.
HunchLab uses that data to train the algorithm and build an “instance” of the model that
adheres to a jurisdiction’s local data and crime patterns.
Open, non-crime-related data sets, such as weather patterns, maps of the
proximity and density of geographic features, school schedules or schedules of sporting
events, etc., are also loaded into the HunchLab system alongside the crime data. These
are represented as a series of variables that the machine learning algorithm parses for
correlations with crime outcomes.20 Some variables are gleaned directly from the crime
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HunchLab’s pricing system is based on the population size of the jurisdiction. Larger
jurisdictions cost more.
20
Even if HunchLab has not partnered with a particular jurisdiction, if there is an open crime data
set, an instance can be created. HunchLab often does this to demonstrate to potential partners how
accurate their model is.
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Figure 4.2 HunchLab interface.
The different colors on the grid cells correspond to different predictions by crime type. Officers also
receive a tactical recommendation, in this case foot patrol. See “Experimentalization” below.

data—crime type, location, and time/date are the three core variables that HunchLab
requires. Other variables are computed. Computed variables represent relationships
between data and between other variables. For instance, on the temporal axis, computed
variables would include things like day-of-week, day-of-month, seasonality, time since
last crime event in the area, etc.—each of which preempts a temporal correlation between
a given crime event and other crime events, approximating a near repeat approach to
forecasting. Spatial variables, such proximity to geographic features or the proximity to
another crime event within a given temporal horizon, work similarly and represent RTM.
Still other variables are imputed from public data sources such as the US census or
weather histories. Census data, for instance, is used to calculate indices for “collective
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Figure 4.3 HunchLab crime prediction models for Philadelphia broken down by the influence of
different variable types (historic levels of crime, time since last event, temporal cycles,
geographic variables, and location in the grid).

efficacy,” an aggregate of socioeconomic indicators like income levels or employment,
and the “heterogeneity” of a community (Azavea, 2015, p. 12).
To train the algorithm, crime data is mapped onto the grid and a long series of
thousands of decision trees are used to evaluate outcomes in each grid cell. These
decision trees allow the model to parse whether a crime occurred in a given cell; when
crimes did occur, it works regressively to determine which variables influenced the
occasion of that crime type. HunchLab’s internal analyses and accuracy tests show that
very rarely is a single variable or set of variables wholly responsible for predicting a
given crime outcome. The “composition” of a prediction usually entails multiple
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predictive factors, even if they are not equivalent across the board. For example, Figure
4.3 illustrates the way in which each crime type within Philadelphia PD’s instancespecific model is composed of different combinations of predictive variables. Comparing
the top and bottom entries in the Figure, one can see that about 70% of retail theft is
determined by historic crime levels in the location, whereas for homicide a similar
amount derives from geographic variables.
Using the gradient boosting and decision tree machine learning techniques allows
for this type of comparison across crime types and variables. It also results in high rates
of predictive accuracy when run through internal accuracy tests. This was the case on a
brisk morning in early December, 2015, as I joined members of the HunchLab team on
their visit to the St. Louis County Police Department. St. Louis County PD had recently
become a HunchLab client, but at the time they had yet to implement the system. Jeremy
had prepared the accuracy numbers that morning at his hotel and would deliver them
during a presentation to the department’s command staff at their weekly CompStat
meeting. That day yielded a particularly promising test: the models were showing
between 92% and 97% accuracy—exceptionally high by any measure, but not unheard of
for HunchLab. Their robust modeling—combining different criminological theories and
using machine learning to determine the optimal combination of predictive variables for
each crime type—pays off in its predictive performance.

TOWARDS A “PRESCRIPTIVE” POLICING
Accuracy tests like the one performed for St. Louis County Police Department serve as a
shorthand—to demonstrate the precision of HunchLab’s predictive algorithms. They

205
compare crime predictions within a specific jurisdiction—in this case, St. Louis
County—against data on crimes that actually took place during the prediction period.
This is how you calculate the accuracy rate. The trouble is that once a predictive system
is deployed in practice, with officers’ patrols organized according to the predictions,
accuracy measurements are no longer possible. By dint of officers having gone into the
predicted locations, the conditions being predicted are affected. This data is then fed into
the system to generate new predictions, but the ground truth data itself has been changed
by the deployment of predictions. Any data that might be used to compare—and
potentially falsify—predictive accuracy is lost after deployment.
These performative effects connect technical issues with ethical questions.
Crucially, there has been no consensus about how to measure the effects that officers
have on areas predicted to be at high risk for crimes. Should predictions lead to an
increase in arrests, demonstrating that patrols are more efficacious in catching criminals?
Or should predictions result in reduced crime rates? This latter criterion—though the
more desirable from the perspective of HunchLab and police command staffs—would be
especially tricky, since reduced crime rates could mean either that crime has gone down
or that police are missing crimes taking place elsewhere. These questions intersect with
the ethical concerns of predictive policing’s critics, since there is no evidence to suggest
that predictive policing does anything to mitigate the already-harmful performative
effects of over-policing poor and minority communities.
HunchLab’s rhetoric suggests that the team would like to be able to address both
technical and ethical concerns in tandem. As Jeremy Heffner explained while on a panel
at the Brennan Center for Justice, “Our stance on working in this space”—in the field of
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predictive policing—“is one of engagement over pulling out. But this requires an
engagement with the activist community that’s more than just anti-algorithm; it’s got to
be more ‘how can we transform algorithms to hold the values that we want?’” (NYU
School of Law, 2016)—or, in other words, how to mesh the ethical with the technical?
My research with HunchLab suggests that this is not an idle question. The team
actively thinks about flaws in police patrol practices, and tries to design algorithms that
can address those flaws, rather than ignoring or dismissing them. While there is a
growing literature about how algorithms and big data stand to performatively reproduce
social values and discriminatory institutionalized categories (e.g., Amoore, 2009;
Andrejevic & Gates, 2014; Andrejevic, Hearn & Kennedy, 2015; Barocas, Hood &
Ziewitz, 2013; Gillespie, 2014a; 2014b; Kitchin, 2016; McQuillan, 2015; Thatcher,
2013), little attention has been paid to how technology producers themselves
conceptualize such concerns, both as technical and ethical considerations, and then
attempt to address them within the design of algorithmic prediction systems. With
HunchLab, these considerations are most cogently articulated in their vision for what a
“prescriptive” rather than “predictive” policing analytics could look like.
Before outlining this vision, however, it is first necessary to explore how the
HunchLab team operationalizes performativity and performative effects as a concrete set
of problems.

Performativity as a Dance with Tensions
Where critics have focused on predictive policing’s potential to induce “self-fulfilling
statistical prophecies”—feedback loops that amplify biased systems of targeting (Brayne,
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Rosenblat & boyd, 2015, p. 9)—HunchLab team members think about performative
effects as malleable and amenable to tweaking in order to mitigate, rather than reproduce,
biases inherent in police patrol. This means thinking about how predictions influence
officer behavior in the field and capturing ways to represent that influence in the data.
Two tensions animate this thinking. The first deals with patrol officers’ user
experience and the steps that can be taken to ensure that officers are invested in the
accuracy of predictions. Predictions are useless if field officers fail to act on them.
Consulting with crime analysts and command staff in departments that have used
HunchLab or other predictive policing systems, the HunchLab team has become attuned
to the risk of losing “officer buy-in.” Without officer buy-in, there may be little incentive
for patrol officers to go to mission areas for an appropriate amount of time; or,
conversely, if they do go to a mission area, they may not perform the recommended
tactics. Feedback solicited from clients suggested that simply demonstrating predictive
accuracy to officers through presentations or trainings is not enough to convince them of
the software’s value. Officers would need to arrive at this conclusion themselves—for
instance, by making an arrest in a predicted grid cell—and for stories of this affirmation
to then circulate among the rank-and-file. Adele, a HunchLab product specialist,
described the importance of officer anecdotes for buy-in: “If an officer has some sort of
good experience, feels that they did something, and it’s because of HunchLab, they’re
going to be like, ‘Oh, yeah, I did this’—and it worked. And it only needs to be anecdotes.
It doesn’t need to be real from an overall perspective, it just needs to be an
anecdote.”21 In other words, there is a strategic acknowledgement among the HunchLab
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Fieldnotes, HunchLab offices, Dec. 18, 2015.
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team members that regardless of the “realness” of predictions—their accuracy, their
viability, their usefulness—what is most important for gaining officers’ trust is anecdotal
evidence that the system works in its anticipation of events.
In terms of operationalizing this problematic of officer buy-in, HunchLab
imagines a tension between sending officers to areas already known to be at high risk for
specific crime types (i.e., theft from vehicles in parking lots, or larceny at malls) and
areas that might seem less obvious to officers. HunchLab strives for a balance—between
getting officers to believe that HunchLab’s predictive algorithm “knows what it is doing”
and that it is adding value by “doing something” differently.22 At the CompStat meeting
in St. Louis County, Jeremy Heffner explained this to the command staff:

Your officers may say [of HunchLab’s predictions], “Well, those areas are all
areas that we know about.” So, let's say that we didn't give them any areas that
they believed to be true, they then wouldn’t believe the system, right? And so,
conversely, if we only identified areas that they believed to be the highest risk
areas, then we wouldn't be adding value. So what we try to do is a mixture of the
two.23
The tension between sending officers to known and new places motivates the
design of HunchLab’s mission allocation and interface. Input from clients has led
HunchLab team members to believe that this is important in setting them apart from their
competitors. Lee Hunt, director of Information Services for the Greensboro, North
Carolina police department, hosted a webinar for HunchLab, relaying his department’s
experiences with the software.24 He described the effects that the granularity and rapid
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Fieldnotes, interview with Jeremy Heffner, Mar. 15, 2015.
Fieldnotes, Dec. 2, 2015.
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“HunchLab Predictive Missions at Greensboro PD: ‘Tell me what I don't know!’” Webinar.
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-QdYqZzQhY
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updates of HunchLab’s predictive mission cells have on officer psychology, again in
terms of buy-in and itinerant behavior:

For years, crime analysts would generate density maps and put them out—“Here's
thirty days of density for the last month; here's 30 days for the month before
that”—and it never moves. And the officers become desensitized—in my
opinion—to seeing these hot spot maps. But at least seeing the [HunchLab
Predictive Mission] grid cells, it gives them a different perspective for the same
area they're normally patrolling, particularly when you give them a four hour time
frame and ask them to go in there… By getting them into those areas, the officers
themselves—at least the psychology of thinking that the grid cells are somehow
special, getting off those main thoroughfares and doing things slightly
differently—they've had, and it appears to have had, a deterrent effect in crime
occurring in those areas.
Officer psychology and belief in the value of the predictive algorithm are key
components to HunchLab’s ability to realize desirable effects—not in terms of accuracy
or performance measurements of the predictions, but in getting predictions to have some
meaningfully deterrent effect on crime. During an interview that I conducted with him,
criminologist Jerry Ratcliffe also argued for the import of officer buy-in—and especially
in large “more loosely coupled” departments like Philadelphia’s, where the command
staff has little control over officers’ day-to-day activities.25 “You have to get [officers’]
buy-in because they’re less responsive to direct orders. There just isn’t the capacity or the
will there to have really close supervision. But that means you have to get people’s buyin, because otherwise they’ll just do their own thing.”26
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Ratcliffe has worked closely with the HunchLab team. In addition to introducing Robert
Cheetham to the near-repeat pattern, he has also been hired as a consultant to advise on
HunchLab’s development. His position both as a criminologist and former police officer puts him
in a uniquely qualified position to do this.
26
Jerry Ratcliffe, personal communication, Sept. 28, 2016.
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The second tension that animates questions of performativity for HunchLab stems
from the impossibility of evaluating predictive accuracy after deploying predictions in
decisions about patrol allocations. Many observers of predictive policing have pointed
out that even the most accurate predictions are only as good as the decisions that police
departments make with them.27 But as soon as “the field” is introduced into the
equation—or, more accurately, as soon as predictions are introduced into the field—a
new insurmountable tension is introduced. This tension arises from a pair of competing
probabilities resulting from the use of predictions to guide patrol: detection and
deterrence. Detection refers to the increased likelihood that officers will observe crimes
taking place in the predicted grid cells by dint of their being there, while deterrence refers
to the increased likelihood that her presence will prevent crime from taking place there.
The optics of patrol, in other words, go in both directions. This is why accuracy
measurement becomes impossible after jurisdiction-wide implementation.28 Jeremy

27

For example, this point was stressed by Philadelphia Police Department Commissioner Richard
Ross at the “Technology and Criminal Justice” Symposium at the Quattrone Center at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. Noting the saturation of law enforcement conferences
with technology vendors, he described some of his criteria for selecting which products to
purchase: “Technology is only as good as what you look at, the way you can use it, and the stuff
you can do with it.”
28
Of course, police departments could use a randomized control trial (RCT) methodology and
select control groups against which to compare to evaluate predictive policing’s efficacy. Control
groups could be comprised of districts or precincts from another jurisdiction and which are not
using the software. But this introduces a new set of confounding factors since different
departments might use different tactical responses and different jurisdictions might experience
different levels of various crime types. Lee Hunt at the Greensboro PD conducted an experiment
in which certain shifts received the “treatment” (predictions) and others did not; this allowed
them to compare efficacy not only within the same jurisdiction but within the same precinct and
under the same command. See “HunchLab Predictive Missions at Greensboro PD: ‘Tell me what
I don't know!’” Webinar. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-QdYqZzQhY
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explained this tension to reporters at the Marshall Project as they did preliminary research
for a report on St. Louis County’s adoption of HunchLab:

If we gave [the Philadelphia Police Department] HunchLab mission areas across
the entire city, and they start putting officers in those mission areas throughout the
city, at that point we can no longer accurately measure our ability to select the
right locations. Because if they're going to those locations, they’re going to have
some effect in terms of detecting new events—because they're there—and
deterring events—because they're there. And those things work in opposite
directions. So it's very hard to have a clean measurement of accuracy once you
start using the output.29
If outputs are used across the jurisdiction, the detection-deterrence tension makes
comparison, and thus falsifiability, impossible. Evaluation can also be elided if “success”
is ambiguously defined. As mentioned above, there is no agreement at present as to
whether predictions should prioritize detection over deterrence or vice versa. Some
observers have even complained that PredPol—HunchLab's main competitor and likely
the most commonly purchased predictive policing product (Robinson & Koepke, 2016)—
capitalizes on this ambiguity.30
These two tensions illustrate how HunchLab operationalizes predictions’
performative effects. In response to the problems that performative effects present,
HunchLab has toyed with the idea of rebranding their services as “prescriptive” rather
than “predictive” policing—to emphasize strategies for harnessing crime predictions’
performativity toward desirable outcomes. Prescription is used in a specific sense here,
derived from business analytics. It sits as the apex of an analytic hierarchy that also
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Fieldnotes: phone call between HunchLab team and journalists at the Marshall Project, Oct. 1,
2015.
30
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, personal communication, Oct. 13, 2016.
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includes description and prediction. Descriptive analytics work to explain what happened
and, in some cases, how and why; predictive analytics regressively extrapolates rules or
models from descriptions in order to make educated guesses about future outcomes; and
prescriptive analytics tracks responses to predictions and measures how well they
perform relative to one another (Rouse, 2012). Applying this logic to predictive policing,
prescription suggests a move away from questions of accuracy and predictive precision to
focus instead on the effects that the implementation of predictions has on the conditions
being represented within the model—or, in other words, on wrangling with predictive
policing’s performative effects. The remainder of this section details three strategies that
illustrate HunchLab’s version of a prescriptive policing—and how they approach the
intertwining of technical and ethical questions raised by predictions’
performativity: randomization, diversification, and experimentalization.

Randomization; or Capturing the Distribution of Risk
HunchLab’s Predictive Missions function creates a granular grid through which crime
risk is predicted across urban spaces and police jurisdictions. But there is another
function that is designed to sort through and select amongst the grid cells—to determine
which cells are selected for patrol over others and become Predictive Missions for
officers to patrol. This is called the “Allocation Engine,” and is a relatively recent
addition to the HunchLab product suite. Jeremy introduced the function in a webinar
titled “Beyond the Box: Towards Prescriptive Analysis in Policing,” posted to YouTube
in September, 2014. It has since become a key component to the team’s sales pitch and
their vision of what a prescriptive form of policing might look like.
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The Allocation Engine selectively, strategically, and explicitly inserts
randomization into the prediction process. Rather than directing patrol to the grid cells
with the highest risk profiles for crimes each shift—what HunchLab was doing prior to
the Allocation Engine and what competitors continue to do—the algorithm now directs
officers instead to the second, third, fourth, or fifth riskiest places according to a
probabilistic selection process that nonetheless hinges on randomization.31
As a strategy, randomization has proved strategically polysemic. The HunchLab
team members invoked the randomization of the Allocation Engine differently on
different occasions, to appeal to varied stakeholders’ interests. When HunchLab’s
interlocutors were police department command staffs learning about HunchLab for the
first time, randomization would be invoked to address concerns about the predictability
of police patrol, officer boredom, or the efficient use of patrol resources in terms of
avoiding the diminishing returns of lengthy expenditure. In other instances, when
responding to social justice and civil rights advocates’ concerns, randomization was
invoked as a way to mitigate the potential for geographic bias in patrol.
From a criminological perspective, the mathematics behind the Allocation
Engine’s randomization have to do with observed patterns of diminishing returns in
patrol. This extends from a well-known axiom in experimental criminology called the
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The Allocation Engine involves a set of mathematical rules that dictate how mission areas
should be selected. These rules can be “tweaked” by clients in order to prioritize certain criteria
or to meet strategic goals; for instance, the threshold distinguishing between a low and medium
risk location can be adjusted. Risk forecasts are transformed into z-scores, which represent the
number of standard deviations from the mean in statistics. The z-scores of all the risk forecasts
are then used to filter out cells below a certain threshold, thus eliminating low-risk cells from
being allocated as a Predictive Mission. Within the filtered collection of cells, weights are then
used to differentiate between medium and high risk locations, and randomization is introduced in
order to ensure that officers are not sent only to the highest risk cell every time.
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“Koper Curve” (Koper, 1995). The Koper Curve identifies dosing strategies for hot spot
patrolling that optimize the “residual deterrence” of an officer’s presence. Studying
targeted patrol interventions in the 1990s, Christopher Koper found that merely driving
through a hot spot resulted in significantly smaller deterrent effects when compared to
squad cars stopping in a hot spot for ten minutes. However, after about fifteen minutes, a
pattern of diminishing returns can be detected, suggesting an inefficient use of
department resources. HunchLab recommends that when patrolling predicted high crime
areas, officers apply this principle and spend no more than fifteen minutes in the grid
cells per hour. They have even developed a mobile app for squad car computer terminals
called Sidekick that uses GPS to notify officers when they are in a predicted Mission
Area and then tells them when the fifteen minutes has passed.32
But the Allocation Engine also extends this logic out of the individual police shift
and into cross-shift resource allocation decisions: for instance, if a high risk place is
visited for ten to fifteen minutes every hour during shifts one and two, perhaps it is not
necessary to go there at all during shift three according to this same principle of
diminishing returns.
This implies a trade-off, however. The benefits of randomization are matched by
compromises in predictive accuracy. Not selecting the highest risk cell every time means
that, were one to compare the Allocation Engine’s grid cell outputs against “ground
truth” data, the system would be less accurate in predicting a crime event in the cell.
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Many departments using HunchLab do not use Sidekick since their mobile computer terminals
can be outdated and unable to support the software. Instead, field commanders print out PDF
copies of the Missions and hand them to officers during roll call. In St. Louis County, which I
visited with HunchLab during the department’s launch of the HunchLab software, the department
was at first using paper printouts but was planning to switch to Sidekick at a future date.
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These compromises are seen as necessary for gaining control over unwieldy performative
effects. “If we're just trying to maximize our predictive accuracy,” Jeremy explained in
the “Beyond the Box” webinar, “then, absolutely, selecting that [highest risk] cell every
time would be what we'd do. But that's not the case here. You're going to act on [these
predictions] and so you're going to start to skew things, displace crime, and so forth.”33
Whether crime is displaced as a result of targeted interventions is not unique to
predictive policing. Criminologists have examined the displacement effects of directed
patrols on entire neighborhoods (e.g., Bowers et al., 2011). Given that predictive policing
promises a more granular variation of traditional hot spot patrol, however, concerns have
been raised anew. Without randomization in grid cell selection, deployments to the
highest risk grid cell every shift would saturate the highest risk places, while leaving
other areas with less coverage. If these patterns became recognizable to potential
criminals, this could lead to more granular displacements. The object thus becomes
decreasing predictability. “Pretty quickly your offenders can start figuring out where
you're at and where you're not at… With this Allocation Engine, we're explicitly
introducing some randomness, and that makes it nearly impossible for [potential
offenders] to figure out where you're going to be on any given shift.”34
Another perceived benefit that randomization brings is its engagement with patrol
officers’ user-experience and buy-in. Part of HunchLab’s efforts to ensure buy-in involve
tackling officer boredom. This issue came up repeatedly when HunchLab team members
spoke to officers. For example, in December, 2015, I joined Jeremy and HunchLab
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product specialist Adele Zhang as they met with two former police officers to discuss
improving HunchLab’s tactical recommendations. At the meeting, the former officers
explained that boredom would be one of the biggest challenges that HunchLab would
face. From their own experiences on patrol, they felt that boredom resulted both from
being assigned to the same beat everyday but also from a lack of “collars”—from not
making any arrests. The preventive function of patrol—the stated purpose of predictive
policing—is not nearly as exciting as the “crime fighting.”35 One of the officers
commented on what he had heard about the Seattle Police Department’s officers’
reactions to PredPol, HunchLab’s principal competitor:

In Seattle, they’ve had to shelve [PredPol] within a handful of months because the
officers had no idea what to do and they were saying, “I’m bored.” They didn’t
know what to do… they didn’t know enough to say, “Hey, nothing’s going on, I’ll
walk into the business and talk to the owner about listing his surveillance camera
with the [city database].” […] When rubber hits the road, everyone looks at each
other and shrugs their shoulders.36
The sense that these former officers communicated was that strict adherence to predictive
policing engenders new forms of boredom and malaise, which can distract from triedand-true patrol practices, such as talking to business owners and recruiting for
surveillance camera programs. “The boredom thing is something that we’re hearing
everywhere,” Jeremy responded. “I don’t think it’s something police departments have
really thought about and figured out what to do.”37 The idea that officers get bored on the
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This reflects many ethnographic accounts of policing, which suggest that police officers “value
the opportunity for crime-fighting” and “always anticipate the possibility” (Phillips, 2015, p. 4-5;
see Herbert
, 2001; Muir, 1979).
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Fieldnotes, Dec. 18, 2015.
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job contrasts sharply with typical depictions of police work in film and television,
wherein even beat officers’ engage in the exciting work of policing—running down
thugs, thieves, and otherwise bad guys. That boredom is a significant concern among
officers and command staff illustrates the way that algorithmic predictions can become
intertwined with mundane experiences and malaise.
Given the propensity toward boredom, predictive systems that send patrols to the
same high-risk grid cells risk exacerbating the problem, losing officers’ trust—and even
lowering morale—as a result of their predictability. This was found to be the case in a
recent survey conducted with the Burbank Police Department in California, in which
PredPol-directed deployments were resulting in officer boredom and disinterest
(Tchekmedyian, 2016). Randomization, HunchLab maintains, gets officers into new
places—streets, corners, alleys, neighborhoods—that they might not have thought to go
to, thereby introducing an element of surprise and unpredictability.
When HunchLab’s interlocutors were social justice and civil rights advocates,
randomization was invoked again—not to earn officer trust but to counteract
performative feedback loops stemming from geographic bias in crime data. Critiques of
predictive policing suggest that vicious looping effects result when algorithms send
officers to areas where racial or ethnic-minority populations are already
disproportionately targeted by police. In his book Against Prediction (2006), social
theorist and legal scholar Bernard Harcourt describes a similar phenomenon with
offender-based predictions. He refers to the discriminatory potential of predictive
feedback loops as a “ratchet effect,” emanating from the distortion caused by
disproportionate targeting of poor and minority communities. “This distortion produces a
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ratchet effect if law enforcement... relies on the evidence of the resulting correctional
traces—arrests, convictions, supervision—in order to reallocate future law enforcement
resources” (Harcourt, 2006, p. 8-9). As an antidote to the ratchet effect, Harcourt
promotes the use of randomization to temper distorted targeting—as a way to mitigate the
potential for a geographical variation of the ratchet effect.38
Jeremy invoked the Allocation Engine’s randomization in a similar way at an
event at the Brennan Center for Justice titled “Policing and Accountability in the Digital
Age” (NYU School of Law, 2016). During his panel, titled “Uneasy Partnerships: Private
Industry and the Public Trust,” Jeremy shared the stage with Julie Angwin, an
investigative reporter at ProPublica who uncovered racial bias in sentencing algorithms
used by judges (Angwin et al., 2016); Jim Bueermann, president of the Police
Foundation; and Aliya Rahman (quoted above), director at the progressive non-profit
Wellstone. Responding to the moderator’s question as to whether the police technology
sector should be more regulated, Jeremy described the Allocation Engine as a mechanism
of good faith—that HunchLab was cognizant of the discriminatory potential of
algorithmic predictions and that they were actively seeking ways to prevent that potential
from taking shape:

If you’re a police department and you’re not using an algorithm, you’re probably
using a hot spot map. You are basing that hot spot map on crime reports and that
hot spot map has probably not changed very much for a long time. So what we do
in HunchLab is, we sometimes don’t send [patrols] to the highest risk place.
Because then we can see what happens when we don’t send them there and we
send them to a lower risk place, right? So we use that kind of — it’s a bit of a
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disagreed with certain premises, agreed with the book’s advocacy for the inclusion of
randomization in predictive analytics.
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randomization based upon the analysis to help us gain more insight into what it
would look like when you don’t saturate an area with police. Because maybe we
don’t have that in the training data and we need to gain that knowledge. (NYU
School of Law, 2016; emphasis reflects speech)
Even within this one statement, the Allocation Engine’s randomization is mobilized
toward different ends. It suggests simultaneously that HunchLab is aware of and
responding to critics’ concerns about algorithms’ propensity to entrench distortions in the
allocation of police resources in low-income and minority communities, while also
pointing to an implicit failure on critics’ part to fully grasp that discriminatory policing
does not originate with the algorithm. If hot spot mapping is the current best practice in
policing (as suggested by criminologists and major law enforcement organizations; e.g.
Braga, 2005; Braga, Papachristos & Hureau, 2012; COPS, 2013; NIJ, 2015; Weisburd &
Braga, 2006), then HunchLab’s predictive policing would not be a source of bias but
rather an update to a blunt and biased tool already in need of major refinement.

Diversification; or Systemic Bias is Real
The second strategy for dealing with predictive policing’s performative effects has to do
with the sources of data used to train algorithms. HunchLab’s modeling incorporates
varied and unrelated crime and non-crime-related data sources. This diversity of data—
which might include anything from weather records to concert and sports event schedules
to moon phases (Chammah, 2016)—is made to represent different criminological theories
within the machine learning algorithms and to capture any correlations that might not yet
have been hypothesized. When HunchLab compares its predictions with ground truth
data prior to an implementation, its accuracy rates are remarkably high, sometimes in the
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92-97% accuracy range. The diversity of data sources is likely a contributor to these high
levels of precision.
But using multiple data sources has other benefits. Other predictive policing
products, like PredPol, limit the types of data used to train their algorithms to the most
basic information about crime events: crime type, location, and date/time. HunchLab
views these limited data sources as restricting what departments or analysts might learn
about the factors driving crime and how best to respond to them. As Robert Cheetham put
it, “If you just rely on crime data, you can get a long ways towards that goal [of
predictive accuracy]. But what you can't do is… use the system to figure out what is
actually driving the risk.39 The diversity of data included in HunchLab’s modeling allows
them to create visualizations of predictive models for their clients, highlighting the
different variables driving predictions for each crime type (Figure 4.3). These
visualizations illustrate the complexity and granularity of their models to lay viewers
through color-coded juxtapositions. This, in turn, is seen to allow police department
command staffs to gain “insights into the dynamics within [their] own data.”40 Providing
access to the “composition” of a prediction in this way, HunchLab suggests, could
“inform the type of tactics and decisions that [a police department] might make and give
us some sense of the right prescription to apply to a given location.”41
But beyond these technical issues, the idea is also that including a greater
diversity of data sources allows for a dilution of the bias that might be detectable in any
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one data source. A diversity in the data sources works to minimize the types of feedback
loops that derive from distortions in the crime data already in use. Most police
departments are currently using hot spot mapping to direct patrol resources, and these
maps are typically produced with one data source—crime reports. If crime reporting is
already shaped by biases in officer discretion and the systemic over-deployment of patrol
resources in poor and minority communities, then most police departments are already
subject to the types of pernicious feedback looping that critics fear will be ratcheted by
predictive policing—and yet they have not done anything about them. HunchLab’s
suggestion is to mitigate these biases by diversification. Whether or not extant feedback
loops can be addressed—whether the performative effects of bias prior to predictive
policing can be mitigated—depends on the extent to which new sources of data can be
modeled and incorporated into analysis.
Diversity in the data is also seen as a way to improve the fidelity with which
crime data cohere to the social, legal, and material worlds that they purport to represent.
It introduces new granularity and specificity to the modeling. Because most predictive
policing systems only employ the most basic crime data, there have been confusions
about what these systems are able to represent. For instance, in her book Weapons of
Math Destruction (2016), mathematician Cathy O’Neill critiques predictive policing, but
does so on the premise that the algorithms are trained on arrest data—not publiclygenerated incident reports or calls for service. This assumption is quite widespread (e.g.,
Smith, 2016). But as HunchLab team members lament, using arrest data as evidence for
the geographic and temporal dimensions of crime would be entirely wrongheaded, and in
obvious ways. HunchLab uses calls for service data (911 and emergency services calls)
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instead of arrest data—not only because of the easily detectable bias of arrest data (since
arrests rely on the discretion of the arresting officers), but because arrest data is not a
representation of crime. It represents police activity—or, at most, encounters between
police and the public that result in an arrest. As Cheetham explained, complaining about
assumptions that HunchLab used arrest data,

I don’t know [any technology vendors] using arrests to do predictive policing.
That’s utterly unhelpful: it just tells you where an arrest was made and maybe
where police activity is taking place; it doesn’t tell you about crime. We don’t
think you should limit yourself to even incident [report data], which, while they
are largely citizen-report driven, they’re not a perfect representation or even a
great representation—they’re just a pretty good representation of where there are
complaints. But at least they’re largely citizen-driven. There’s still a source of
bias, in terms of what a crime gets classified as is still up to the police officer. But
we advocate for using a broad set of data that isn’t necessarily controlled by the
police department.42
Another issue is that certain crime types are more or less likely to be influenced
by police bias. HunchLab takes this into account, restricting the crime types that they
model to those less likely to be plagued by officer discretion and systemic biases. Lum
and Isaac’s (2016) analysis of PredPol’s algorithms illustrates how discriminatory
predictive policing systems trained on drug arrest data would be. But this discrimination
is not only because they used arrest data, but also because narcotics infractions are more
likely to be police officer-initiated rather than publicly reported. HunchLab thus omits
Part II offenses. These include “quality of life” crimes, like prostitution, drug possession,
and vandalism—all of which are more likely to be officer- initiated than Part I offenses,
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such as robbery, aggravated assault, burglary (breaking or entering), larceny-theft, motor
vehicle theft, and arson,43 which are typically reported by victims.
Criminologists have long known that “quality of life” crimes are heavily affected
police discretion, at both the individual officer and precinct-levels. As one criminologist
wrote, it is “absolutely axiomatic” that data on Part II offenses “are in no way reflective
of the level of that type of crime… [T]hey are reflective of the level of police agency
resources dedicated to its detection” (Klockars, quoted in Robinson & Koepke, 2016, p.
5). Diversifying data sources—bringing in data sets generated publicly, from
victimization reports to census data—is seen to mitigate the potential for biases that result
when police control the data.

Experimentalization; or Tried-and-True Tactics Might be Part of the Problem
A third way that HunchLab addresses performative effects is through the
experimentalization of police patrol tactics. A feature called Advisor is designed for
clients to be able to automate experimentation with police tactics. The emphasis on the
experimentalization of police patrol has gained traction amongst leading criminologists
and police intellectuals. Jim Bueermann, president of the Police Foundation, predicted
that by 2022 every police department would have a resident criminologist in-house,
conducting research on patrol tactics and strategies (COPS, 2012). Similarly,
criminologist Lawrence Sherman (2013) forecasted that by 2025, all departments will be
using GPS to track officer locations in the field in order to test crime fighting strategies.
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These prognostications reflect a broad turn toward the use of data technologies to “track
and trace” the movements of patrol officers (Kanngieser, 2013). Understanding where
officers are in the field relative to crime events, is necessary for testing the effectiveness
of different patrol strategies and tactics.
Pragmatically, however, experimentation can be burdensome and expensive for
local departments to conduct. Experiments require recruiting an academic criminologist
to partner with, securing funding for researchers and possibly overtime for officers, and
conducting the experiment within the academic temporal horizon of data analysis,
writing, and publication. “All of this could easily take three years,” Jeremy says in the
webinar. “And if we think about our ability to iterate, if we’re on a three year cycle, that
doesn’t allow us a lot of opportunities to try new things. So we better make sure that,
when we decided to go into this experiment, that we likely had the right answer to begin
with, because it’s just such a big endeavor.44
During the HunchLab webinar introducing Advisor,45 Jeremy points to further
institutional pressures that can be additionally prohibitive of experimentation. In the era
of CompStat and intra-departmental accountability demands, pressures on district
command staffs to demonstrate strategic effectiveness and crime reductions “can lead to a
sort of risk aversion” in terms of what departments are willing to try.46 The result is that
many commanders wind up being “less likely to experiment with things… because if we
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can just keep things generally as they are, they will likely turn out the same way at the
next CompStat meeting—and so that’s a safe move.”47
HunchLab Advisor is marketed as capable of overcoming these issues—through
automation, easy-to-use interface design, and lower thresholds for significance. The idea
is to compress the amount of time and resources necessary to evaluate and iterate police
tactics in relation to location-specific crime risk models. Advisor consists of three distinct
“initiative” types: Field Test, Experiment, and Adaptive Tactics. Field Test is designed
for departments to evaluate the effectiveness of a specific tactic in response to a particular
crime type. For example, a department could use Field Test to study a strategy for
preventing motor vehicle thefts by having officers perform a specific tactic—for instance,
“writ[ing] their reports while they’re parked in their patrol cars at high risk locations for
motor vehicle thefts.”48 Field Test monitors the level of motor vehicle thefts that take
place while the tactic is implemented, and then compares that rate “to what likely would
have happened had you not been doing the field test,”49 based on HunchLab’s Predictive
Missions function. From this, HunchLab can then estimate the likelihood (in the form of
a percentage) that this particular tactic, in these particular locations, had an effect on
crime.
Just as randomization involves a trade-off for predictive accuracy, the Field Test
also compromises the exactitude and statistical rigor of an academic randomized control
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trial: it does not segregate areas or times to not receive the treatment as a control, but
rather uses its own predictions as a control. Experimental validity, statistical significance,
and predictive precision are exchanged for pragmatic experimentalism:

[Field Test] might say that you had an 86% chance that you actually reduced
crime based upon this initiative in this particular district. And so if you think
about that, this is not 95% certainty, [which would be] statistically significant in a
typical RCT. But at the same time, you’ve selected one district for a few months
and you tried something out, which is a much lower ask and level of effort than
conducting a fully randomized control trial, and you’ve still gotten some
information about whether this is likely a good strategy or not.50
The second initiative type, Experiment, is similar. But Experiment expands the
Field Test to the whole of a department’s jurisdiction, randomly assigning different beats,
districts, or precincts as control or treatment groups—essentially replicating a
randomized control trial in terms of methodology. Like Field Test, Experiment promises
certain advantages over traditional RCTs—a lower threshold for significance, rapid
implementation, and a low barrier to entry for department command staff who may not
have advanced degrees in statistics. Experiment does not measure the accuracy of crime
predictions against control groups, but rather the efficacy of police activities in predicted
crime areas against areas not using a directed tactical intervention.
The third initiative type, Adaptive Tactics (or simply “Tactics”), is somewhat
different. Tactics is not confined to an experimental timeframe; it is an ongoing data
collection initiative designed to “adapt” tactical recommendations to increases or
decreases in crimes relative to previous police activity. For Tactics to work, department
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command staff create a short list of tactical recommendations in response to a specific
crime problem—for instance, residential burglaries. Every time a residential burglary is
predicted, Advisor will make a tactical recommendation and record its execution in
relation to the risk profile for the grid cell. This begins as a randomized assignment, with
zero confidence in its recommendations, but over time accumulates enough data to begin
making recommendations with higher levels of certainty about their efficacy.
Adaptive Tactics uses a statistical stratagem called the “Multi-Armed Bandit”
(Burtini, Loeppky & Lawrence, 2015), typically employed in online advertising to
measure the effectiveness of ads in terms of marketplace behavioral outcomes—e.g.,
“click-through” rates. In the context of Adaptive Tactics, the algorithm tracks how many
times a tactic has been deployed in order to estimate the outcome of its application—in
other words, how likely a specific tactical response to a specific crime prediction will
result in a desirable outcome (which can be determined by departments). The random
generation of tactics at the start of the process jumpstarts data collection, leading to an
analysis of the relationship between police activity and crime rates.
This type of software-assisted experimentation reflects larger trends in machine
learning-based data mining (Andrejevic, Hearn & Kennedy, 2015; Andrejevic & Gates,
2014). This includes a departure from the precept of falsifiability as integral to
knowledge production (e.g., Mayer-Schönberger & Kukier, 2013). In the context of
online advertising, the algorithms target consumers by seeking predictive correlations
between granular demographic profiles with purchasing preferences. A similar dynamic
is at play with Advisor, albeit toward different ends.
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These mathematical and statistical connections across commercial and security
platforms are suggestive of the way that solutions can come to frame problems in smart
city interventions like predictive policing. As with Google’s efforts “to turn something
like a search engine into an experimental setting in which interactions between people
and media become the target of predictive modelling” (Mackenzie, 2015, p. 443),
Advisor experimentalizes crime predictions to represent and intervene unto their
performative effects (Hacking, 1983; Miller & Rose, 2008). But this begs a new set of
questions. Is Advisor—and Adaptive Tactics specifically—pursuant to HunchLab’s
commitments to mitigate bias and discrimination in police patrol? Or are they merely a
tool for better managing—for finding new efficiencies and optimizations in—
interventions in already-over-policed communities? I address these questions in the next
section, by situating HunchLab’s vision for a prescriptive policing within a long lineage
of police media technologies.

PREDICTIVE POLICING AS “POLICE MEDIA”
The problematics of performativity in predictive policing arise as a result of
entanglements between algorithmic crime analysis and ambiguities that have shaped
public police patrol since its earliest days. Policing has long been dogged by limitations
that attend its liberal public mandate: to enforce laws as a non-military force. This leads
to ambiguities that have never been resolved—for instance, in discrepancies between the
police’s power to intervene preemptively in civilian life and criminal law’s retrospective
orientation, which views citizens as innocent until proven guilty in a trial by peers
(Dubber & Valverde, 2006; 2008). Limitations were placed on modern police forces early
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on, influenced by liberal utilitarian thought in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
According to criminological historian Willem De Lint (2000, p. 55), this model of
“liberal constraint policing” rests on a “delicate balancing of respectful protection and
intrusive penetration… a liberal respect for autonomy and self-governance, and an
administrative claim to knowledge in the collective interest in the security of the polity.”
This balance is at the heart of efforts to securitize urban spaces—promoting circulation
and freedom (for privileged classes, at least) at the same time that it seeks control,
administration, and regulation (Foucault, 2007)—and the police patrol has proven to be
central to how these tensions play out.
Reeves and Packer’s (2013) conceptualization of “police media” highlights the
role that transportation and communications media play as technological extensions of
the police patrol. Police media refers to the technologies used by police to measure and
respond to crime at increasing removes, both in terms of time (i.e., evidence maintenance
and forensics) and space (i.e., surveillance). Predictive policing bridges these two
orientations, utilizing statistical representations of historical crime data to enhance
control over space.
But as Thomas Nail (2016) and others have argued (De Lint, 2000), the police
patrol itself can be considered in terms of its mediating functions. Viewing patrol as a
medium highlights the ways in which the circulation of constabulary officers within
urban spaces performs a multifaceted inscription of time and space, emanating from both
the seeing and being seen of the patrol officer in physical spaces. Early police
intellectuals even considered the patrol officer to operate as “an ambulating lighthouse,”
illuminating criminality while simultaneously performatively embodying surveillance
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(Nail, 2016, p. 122). The promise of predictive policing is its ability to remediate and
enhance these functions and to render them amenable to computational techniques, which
in turn make them inter-operable, universally searchable, and mobile.51
Situating HunchLab’s problematization of data performativity within the longer
history of police media helps to contextualize the smart city’s emphasis on digital
solutionism. The boosterism around predictive policing as a panacea to the woes of the
police patrol shrouds its historical antecedents. Consider that prediction has long been a
core dynamic of patrol strategizing (Ashworth, Zedner & Tomlin, 2013; Dubber &
Valverde, 2006; 2008). Since the earliest modern public police forces, predicting where
and how potential offenders would move through the urban environment has shaped
where and how constabulary beats would be assigned. For example, according to Patrick
Colquhoun’s Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames, published in
1800, the distribution of patrol resources and personnel would be “based upon the
mobility demands of the fleeing criminal and the communication imperatives of a
responsive/preventive police apparatus” (Reeves & Packer, 2013, p. 363). These demands
took into account “a location’s capacities for communication and flow (lodge houses and
horse coachmen, e.g.), locale (urban or rural), and the class and perceived moral quality
of a business’s clientele (bars were targets, for example)” (p. 364). The idea was to
“embarrass” the “Designs of evil-disposed persons” according to a “System of Police
Economy” that would be enacted by nascent constabulary patrols (Colquhoun, quoted in
Reeves & Packer, 2013, p. 363).
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While our language for describing the contextual determinants of crime has
certainly changed, this historical precedent suggests that predictive policing’s algorithms
are part of an enduring project to secure urban spaces through the economization of patrol
resources. Grasping these connections, what needs to be considered then are the
consequences of using patrol resource allocation as the standard against which predictive
policing systems are to be evaluated. Even when produced with the best of intentions, and
even when issues of performativity are taken into account, setting resource
economization as a benchmark for predictive policing systems inevitably reinforces
uneven distributions of police surveillance. This is because the most economical or
optimal distribution of patrol resources are figured within urban geographies already
carved by disinvestment and systemic inequalities in access to community resources,
capital, employment opportunities, etc. (Harvey, 2006; Hirt, 2014; Kargon & Molella,
2008; Katz, 2012; Katznelson, 1982; Massey and Denton, 1993; Sugrue, 2014).
Economizing police response to patterns of crime, by analyzing its spatial and temporal
distributions, does nothing to mitigate the social processes responsible for crime’s
coalescence in low-income communities of color in the first place.
HunchLab’s emphasis on randomization, diversification, and experimentation
take concerns about the potential for self-fulfilling statistical prophecies and vicious
feedback loops seriously. But at the same time, those strategies are designed to shake up
or disrupt traditional patrol thinking for the sake of discovering new efficiencies—for
instance, by sending officers to unsuspecting locales (through the Allocation Engine); by
detecting new, ambient correlations between crime and its contextual deterrents (through
the inclusion of diverse, publicly-generated data sources); or by using analytics to track
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different tactics’ efficacy at curbing different crime types (through Advisor and the
Adaptive Tactics function). This is similar to how data analytics are employed by
retailers like Walmart and Amazon, which helped to inspire the development of
predictive policing technology (Beck & McCue, 2009): to economize resource allocation
in search of new, value-added efficiencies (cf. LeCavalier, 2016). New benchmarks,
criteria, and goals must be incorporated into predictive systems. What is needed is a more
equitable project of policing and law enforcement, not the optimization of status quo
interventions.
Looking forward, the future of predictive policing may see its integration with
myriad other surveillant police media technologies, such as the body-worn camera, shot
spotting technologies (which use audio to triangulate the location of a gunshot), smart
gun holsters, GPS or AVL (automated vehicle tracking) on police squad cars,
biometrics—and even non-police equipment, such as the surveillance of LinkNYC’s
kiosks.52 Like HunchLab’s vision for a prescriptive policing, some of these other police
technologies are framed as progressive, since they entail a surveillance not just of crime
and criminals but also of police officers on patrol. There is speculation that, by
integrating predictive policing analytics with technologies for tracking police officers in
the field (cf. Sherman, 2013), new avenues for officer accountability might be fostered.53
Initiatives are underway to improve “early intervention systems” to identify officers “at
risk for adverse events” before they are committed. In such a system, indicators could be
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created to flag for excessive use of force or officers with a high level of bias in
unwarranted stops, before officers go on to cause more harm than protection in the
communities they serve (e.g., Carton et al., 2016).
Tracking officers for early intervention is promising, but the louder calls are
coming from initiatives that resonate with the broader themes of smart city digital
solutionism—to track police officers with the goal of improving patrol and response
efficiencies, not mitigating police harm. For example, criminologist Lawrence Sherman
(2013, p. 9) has argued that tracking police officers will become as vital as targeting
crime locations and testing out strategic and tactical responses through field experiments:
“No matter what targets are selected for police resources, no matter how well the police
methods are tested, the central management question will always be, ‘what are police
doing to accomplish our objectives, when, where, and with what apparent result?’”
But even these new directions reflect older patterns in the integration of
transportation and communications media in police patrol. As De Lint (2000, p. 70,
emphasis added) writes, “With each new [patrol] technology, a fuller and more
penetrating gaze has been envisioned, both of the police into the polity and of police
supervision on police officer mobilization.” As the integration of predictive policing
algorithms with other surveillant technologies ratchets up, the risk is that technical checks
and balances—like those that HunchLab has attempted to design into its software through
the strategies of randomization, diversification, and experimentalization—may lose favor.
Accountability, in this imaginary, is guaranteed by technical mechanisms of surveillance
oriented towards officers as well. If police body-worn cameras were to be integrated with
predictive policing systems, for example, the cameras’ purported accountability could be
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marshaled to justify moving away from some of the checks and balances on predictive
policing.54 One can easily imagine that with body-worn cameras running, police
command staffs could call for the incorporation of arrest data and “quality of life” crimes
(such as narcotics and prostitution) into the training data for predictive algorithms—
despite HunchLab’s recommendations to use only publicly-reported crimes. The risk is
that relying on surveillance mechanisms for accountability conflates “the act of
surveilling citizens with the mechanisms by which police conduct is evaluated”
(Mateescu, Rosenblat & boyd, 2016, p. 122).
Technical and ethical problems intersect and overlap in the realm of police
technologies. Neither is reducible to the other, and neither is likely to be resolved
independently. Focusing exclusively on the ethical dimensions of new technologies can
overlook the extent to which policing practices are already flawed by bias and
discrimination—as in hot spot policing (as well as more entrenched and legislative issues,
like mandatory minimum sentencing). An exclusive focus on the technical side of
problems can be even more troublesome, since this conflates deep-seeded issues of
structural inequality with efficiencies in resource allocation. The police media
perspective that I have presented here suggests that even sophisticated, technical attempts
to take crime predictions’ performative effects into account can fall short as a means of
police reform. Extensions of the police’s gaze into the polity have long been paralleled by
new supervisory and accountability mechanisms for patrol officers. As mechanisms of
control, police media work in both directions, but have nonetheless expanded the police
power, not contained it (Dubber & Valverde, 2006; 2008).
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CONCLUSIONS: PREDICTION AND REFORM
This chapter argued that HunchLab’s strategies to grapple with problematics of data
performativity betray a discrepancy between predictive policing’s place in institutional
narratives of police technology and its messy reality. In institutional narratives, predictive
policing is framed, first, as the telos of a trajectory in which police technologies are
increasingly refined, and second, as a return to the tenets of patrol outlined by early
police theorists and intellectuals like Sir Robert Peel. As I showed in subsequent sections
however, proponents’ claims about the certitude that predictive policing would bring to
police patrol management—“the ability to truly identify where there may be the next
crime occurring and get in there ahead of time to prevent it” (Bratton, 2014)—are much
more fraught and, in many cases, fraudulent than proponents might be willing to admit.
In HunchLab’s vision for prescriptive policing, performativity is problematized in
two ways. The first has to do with officer psychology—their willingness to buy into the
software’s predictive power—while the second is about the uncertainty that derives from
the “optics” of police patrol, in the dual sense of “seeing” and “being seen”—detection
and deterrence. These problematics locate predictive policing within a much longer
lineage of police media—the technological and embodied dimensions of the police patrol
as a mediation of urban space and an economization of patrol resources—even as
HunchLab frames them as progressive antidotes to sources of bias and discrimination in
policing’s current best practices.
These problematizations of crime data’s performativity place HunchLab in a
unique position within the field of predictive policing and police technology—a
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conscientious and technically-sophisticated option within the ethically-fraught industry of
police technology. Nonetheless, there are no guarantees that their software will be used as
designed. Their vision of a prescriptive policing entails an engagement with the
complexity of predictive performativity, but its individual components in the software
can easily be eschewed.
For example, consider a six-month randomized control trial that Jerry Ratcliffe
and other criminologists at Temple University conducted between 2015 and 2016 with
the Philadelphia Police Department. The study, titled “The Philadelphia Predictive
Policing Experiment,” was funded by the National Institute of Justice. The Philadelphia
Police Department, working in partnership with the criminologists, used HunchLab’s
software to conduct “the first place-based, randomized experiment to study the impact of
different police strategies on violent and property crime in predicted criminal activity
areas” (Temple Department of Criminal Justice, n.d.). The experiment divided twenty of
Philadelphia’s police precincts into four groups: first, a control group, receiving no
treatment; second, a group that simply received crime predictions from HunchLab but
was given no specific tactical direction; third, a group that received crime predictions and
was required to dedicate a marked patrol car solely to the predicted crime area; and
finally, a group that placed an unmarked unit in the predicted crime area. In these
different allocations, the study experimentalized variations of the two performative
tensions that HunchLab identifies, officer psychology and detection-deterrence.
Awareness of a predicted crime area was itself part of the treatment—the officer
psychology component –while the marked and unmarked patrol units sought to measure
the probability of detection against that of deterrence. Compartmentalizing these different
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variations on the treatment would allow researchers to isolate distinct combinations of
conditions and gauge both the accuracy and efficacy of predictions in deployment.55
The trouble is that, even with this granular, methodic approach, the Temple
criminology research managed to avoid HunchLab’s problematization of—and technical
responses to—the performative effects of predictive patrol. Rather than following the
Koper curve rule for diminishing returns, the study required that officers in groups three
and four (the marked and unmarked patrol cars) be situated in the predicted mission area
for the entire duration of their shift—a methodology that contradicts HunchLab’s
recommended usage. Jeremy Heffner often used the instructions given to officers during
the experiment—that they should “go to the box” and “stay in the box”—as an anecdote
for what departments should not do with HunchLab’s predictions.56 The study did take
advantage of the Allocation Engine to introduce some randomization into grid cell
selection, which Jeremy believed “should be beneficial on the officer experience side of
things and we believe at an overall crime reduction perspective.”57 But by having the
field teams stay put in their grid cells for the duration of their shifts, the study nonetheless
created highly controlled and somewhat disingenuous conditions that reflect neither how
departments that subscribe to HunchLab actually use the software suite nor the full scope
of HunchLab’s technical engagements with predictions’ performativity.
As HunchLab has increasingly oriented toward capturing the patrol-crime
relationship as an ever-shifting target, this study suggests that policing has yet to connect

55

At time of writing, the Temple criminology team has not yet released data from the study. See
Temple Department of Criminal Justice, n.d.
56
Fieldnotes, Feb. 11, 2016; Nov. 4, 2016.
57
Jeremy Heffner, personal communication, Aug. 13, 2017.
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an engagement with the performative effects of predictive policing with their full ethical
implications. Until this gap is closed, the debate over predictive policing will remain
incapable of grappling with the interdependence of crime prediction’s technical and
ethical problems— of the dangerous potential of a non-falsifiable epistemology that is
unwilling to confront insidious feedback loops and “self-fulfilling statistical prophecies”
(Brayne, Rosenblat & boyd, 2015).

239

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION: A REPOLITICIZED
SMART CITY?
At any one point urban space is made up of the historical layering of
networks connected by infrastructures. These are the conduits that dictate
which flows of religious and cultural ideas move and therefore which
social relations get mobilized in their wake. Their historical layering helps
explain why dormant cultural, religious, and economic forms can
suddenly gain purchase again, be reawakened and reenergized in a new
situation.
—Larkin, 2008, p. 6

The case studies presented in this dissertation illustrate that the “smart city” could have
been—and still could be—different. If cultural-political struggles and contestations shape
how urban problems are defined and how digital solutions are negotiated, then alternative
visions and technological configurations are also possible. Chapter 2, “Interface,
Imaginary and the Future of Public Space,” showed that how interfaces are designed
implicates broader smart city imaginaries—how the digital upgrading of physical
infrastructures is conceptualized in relation to the city, its citizenries, and its public
spaces. However, what started as a “blue sky” exercise to engage publics in articulating
urban futures was quickly overcome by corporate interests. How LinkNYC was designed
and implemented was not an inevitable process; alternative designs could have structured
our engagement with urban data infrastructures differently. Given the narrowness by
which smart city systems are designed, Chapter 3, “Autonomy and Control in the OnDemand Economy,” follows this path to show that what began as a discourse around
flexibility and openness is overtaken by subtle techniques of control. Such techniques
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appear to be an inevitable consequence of the profit structure that on-demand firms have
built for themselves, which relies on a designation of workers as independent contractors
rather than employees. The chapter illustrates how this does and does not affect workers
in their on-the-job decision-making. Finally, Chapter 4, “Performance and Performativity
in Predictive Policing,” shows how attempts to control police officers through
algorithmic resource allocations ultimately produce unwieldy effects. It examined how
the producers of a crime prediction software wrangle with data’s performative effects as a
way to mitigate its potential for harmful feedback loops. For HunchLab, the unwieldiness
and uncertainty that performativity introduces provides an opportunity for intervention;
but by the same token, they also produce indeterminacies that are fundamentally
unresolvable.
One major limitation of this study is that by focusing so intently on the strategies,
designs, and imaginaries of technological producers and system managers, it failed to
engage with the demand side of the equation. Technological solutions, and the
conveniences that they promise, are only taken up when there is a market for them—
whether that demand comes from municipal governments or police departments, hoping
to extend their shrinking budgets through the discovery of new efficiencies, or from
individual consumers who take up and advocate for services (like those on offer in the
on-demand economy) without reflecting on their own complicity in maintaining
structures of inequality. Much of the smart city discourse assumes a uniformity to urban
publics as information consumers. But as might be inferred from the difference between
“users” and “abusers” in the LinkNYC case study, this is certainly not the case. More
work is needed on the uneven and inequitable distribution of informational goods in
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smart city systems. It is a question of uneven access, both in terms of information and
physical space. Who accesses information and how, and what advantages and
disadvantages does this afford differently-positioned socioeconomic and minority
groups? And who accesses the city and how? What forms of mobility and immobility are
prioritized and monotized, and which become new “problems”?
To conclude the dissertation, I identify four themes that emerged across these
three case studies, before discussing what the implications of these might be for cities
grappling with technological solutions.

Maintaining Legitimacy
First, in each case study, system managers use discursive frames to maintain the
legitimacy of their intervention when challenged by critics. The legitimacy of smart city
interventions hinges on their claims to public benefit and social good. Nonetheless, each
case study reveals that these claims are often undermined by a range of concerns—about
whether an urban-technological system’s data-gathering mechanisms violate citizens’
privacy or if its algorithmically driven resource allocations discriminate against alreadymarginalized populations. These betray the cultural-political and political-economic
realities of the smart city, and in particular the contradictions introduced by the logistical
demand for efficiency. Institutional, corporate, and state actors’ pursuits of technological
efficiencies often run counter to ideals of civic good and public benefit. The producers
and promoters of urban technologies and data infrastructures—the system managers of
LinkNYC, of on-demand economy companies, and at HunchLab and their law
enforcement agency clients—thus find themselves constantly having to justify and
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motivate buy-in for their interventions, often among diverse constituencies with
competing interests. The result is a process of negotiation, whereby practitioners seek to
maintain a project’s legitimacy through discursive framings, rhetorical devices, and
public performances of participation or transparency—even as the practices driving the
concerns remain fundamentally unchanged.

Interface design and information asymmetry
Second, in each case study, the system designers and managers develop means to control
the flow of information to end users. On the one hand, this control takes place at the level
of programming and code, with algorithmic operations that make allocation decisions
based on information inputs from sensors or updated databased. With LinkNYC, this
would be the dynamic pricing for advertising based on the number of people near a kiosk;
in the on-demand economy, this would be techniques like surge- or dynamic pricing,
which create incentives for workers to go to places with high levels of demand; and in
predictive policing systems, this is the algorithmic code that creates the predictions and
sends officers to certain grid cells. But on the other hand, information is also structured
through the design of the user-facing interfaces—the Link kiosks, on-demand companies’
working-facing apps, and the software that police officers see with HunchLab. Interfaces
mediate interactions between end users and sociotechnical systems. In urban data
infrastructures, this mediation functions as an integral design component to logistical
mandates. What information is made available, when, and how thus become vital
variables to be tweaked by system managers to motivate or constrain user actions. In all
of the case studies presented in the dissertation, information is displayed selectively and
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asymmetrically—system managers and operators always have more access than users,
despite the legitimating rhetorics of transparency and openness that often attend such
interventions. Interfaces, and their algorithmic coding, are thus understood as part of a
broader calculative operation to mobilize users, to intervene unto urban circulations, and
exploit new efficiencies as sources of logistical value.

Fleets and Statistical Aggregates
Third, from the perspective of the urban-technological systems examined here, users are
more productively conceived as members of mobile urban populations—not as
individuals. Smart city operations, propelled by demands for optimization and efficiency,
are closer to a modulation of forces than to a disciplining power (Deleuze, 1992).
Operators tweak inputs and alter parameters—often through the interface. What emerges
across the case studies, however, is that the effects of these tweaks and modulations can
only be realized—measured—at the statistical-aggregate level. Of course, individual
users may still be addressed in the singular (and often in the second-person through
interface personalization). But for control to be effective, it must operate on the
aggregate—on the fleet. Unlike individuals, whose responses to an input or tweaked
variable might vary by day or be influenced by some unforeseen circumstance, the fleet’s
responses can be tracked and traced, often using real-time sensor data, to measure how
effective certain options are for achieving desired effects (Kanngieser, 2013). In each of
the case studies, historic data are used to establish fleet-level statistical norms. These, in
turn, allow managers to make algorithmic predictions about future events or to alter
inputs in response to events happening in real-time. Perhaps most importantly, users are
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rarely privy to their alienated collectivization—to their aggregation as members of a
fleet—nor are they given access to the rationales and historic trends that influence such
decisions.

“Culture-in-the-loop”
Despite rampant rhetoric around automation and machine-to-machine communication—
for example, in Internet of Things (IoT) discourses (Forlano, 2013)—much of the
infrastructure of smart city solutions is too costly or complex to fully automate.
Moreover, the data upon which smart infrastructures rely are inherently reductive: the
abstractions of cartographic data minimize the complexity and ambiguity of urban social
geographies and cultural landscapes; algorithmic predictions reduce individual user
behaviors and actions to fleet-level probabilities. And while this incompleteness may
seem like it should be inimical to smart city systems, the case studies presented here
reveal that it is absolutely vital to systems’ operability. Smart city technologies and
infrastructures rely on their human components to make sense of ambiguity and
uncertainty. Crucially, this involves more than individual actors’ decisions and actions,
which can be modeled as inputs in “human-in-the-loop” systems. Rather, dealing with
uncertainty requires the human actors to invoke their local knowledge of urban
geographies, their desires and affective judgements, their beliefs in or suspicions of
automated decision-making methods. Smart city systems should thus be seen as
inherently cultural assemblages—a “culture-in-the-loop” system—in which the on-theground practices, contingencies, routines, beliefs, and tactics of system users become
intertwined with institutional, corporate, or state actors’ strategic interests,
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decontextualized data analytics and predictions, and mobile ICTs’ capacities for
networked sensing

LAYERS OF “SMARTNESS”
Taken together, the themes outlined above reveal how computational media technologies
leverage new infrastructural relations between people, objects, mobilities, and
environments, but in ways that serve institutional and corporate actors’ interests and not
necessarily the public good. Indeed, one could say without much controversy that such
systems are parasitic. They enroll urban populations into those new relations and create
new aggregations or fleets; in doing so, far more value is generated for system managers
than for members of those populations.
As the quote from Brian Larkin in the epigraph suggests, urban spaces have
always been comprised of intersecting and layered infrastructural relations. When new
structuring technologies emerge, they do not replace their predecessors, but rather
remediate and form new junctures between existing relationships—reshaping but not
upending social and technical systems (Marvin, 1988; Mazzarella, 2004). Perhaps, then,
the ideology of the smart city hinges on the idea that computational media technologies
will radically alter these relationships. To render the city and its problems as amenable to
statistical analysis and aggregation, logistical coordination, and informational
consumerism, is nothing less than a dream of the city as entirely editable and
programmable, like a computer model. In a computer model, the cost of experimentation
is low, and populations and environments can be tweaked with the click of a mouse or
with a few simple commands.
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But in viewing the city as computable, urban citizenries and publics are reduced
to statistical populations; complex urban geographies are abstracted to minimal spatial
and temporal environmental determinants; and experimentation proceeds without
awareness of historical context or consequence. In each of these abstractions, the city is
increasingly removed from questions of politics, of the city as a commons, and of
inequality.
To conclude, then, I want to consider what a re-politicized smart city could look
like. How might we counter the smart city’s ideological predilection to depoliticize urban
problems—to reimagine entanglements between data infrastructures and urban spaces as
in their fullness, complexity, and ambiguity? A useful starting place is to begin
foregrounding informed speculation about what smart city interventions might mean for
urban populations if taken to their logical extreme. This is not the same as the type of
speculative designs discussed in Chapter 2, which can be used to coalesce communities
of anticipation around a specific vision of the future city. Rather, it would entail
considering the lack of checks and balances for technologies—to think through the ways
that logistical affordances could be used to control and exploit urban populations.
For example, at present, the LinkNYC privacy statement notes that Link kiosks
are equipped with environmental sensing equipment, cameras, and microphones
(LinkNYC, 2017), but does not outline how these will and will not be used.
Representatives at Intersection have responded to concerns by insisting that the
equipment is not turned on at the moment and that even if it were, the company protects
personally identifiable information (e.g., Orf, 2016). But as the New York Civil Liberties
Union (NYCLU, 2016) rightly points out, the lack of policy leaves much wiggle room,
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specifically for information sharing with New York’s law enforcement agencies. A
similar dynamic plays out with predictive policing. Individuals on the product team at
HunchLab insist that press coverage and academic critiques routinely mistake the data
used to train machine learning algorithms in predictive policing to be arrest data, not
other forms of crime reporting (such as calls-for-service data). Given the lack of policy
directed at curtailing abuses of predictive policing systems at federal, state, or local
levels, there is no reason to assume that police departments will not use arrest data in the
future (Shapiro, 2017). Lum and Isaac’s (2016) experiment—applying PredPol’s
predictive analytics to drug arrests— shows how already-discriminatory and biased
police patrols could become even more skewed in their targeting if they were to be
trained on data shaped by officers’ geographic biases in arrest hits.
These issues have only been intensified in the wake of the 2016 election of
Donald Trump. Smart city technologies’ potential for abuse at their logical extremes has
been left open for the “law and order” candidate, who routinely makes comments
intimating his approval of police violence against minority communities (e.g., Fabian &
Seipel, 2017). One of the most extreme arenas in which Trump’s mandates are playing
out is in immigration enforcement. Under Trump, the Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) has initiated a crack-down on undocumented migrants living in the
US, and especially in sanctuary cities—where law enforcement and criminal justice
institutions refuse to comply with ICE directives at information or prisoner transfer.
Trump has authorized ICE field agents a much greater degree of discretion relative to
prior administrations (Blitzer, 2017). This has led to an increase in arrests of non-criminal
migrants, breaking up families and leaving federal courts clogged. Average deportations
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per month are down relative to the Obama administration, but only because private
prisons are filling up with migrants awaiting sentencing. Indeed, stocks in prison
companies have risen dramatically as facilities and government contracts expand to
handle rising overflow of immigration detainees (Gomez, 2017; Sommer, 2017).
There are signs that these hypocritical and nationalist imperatives are colliding
with many of the issues raised by the smart city’s computational media technologies.
Data will soon become a core component to ICE’s strategizing. In 2014, ICE contracted
with secretive Silicon Valley data analytics firm Palantir to update and expand its
Investigative Case Management (ICM) system (Woodman, 2017). Palantir was cofounded by Peter Thiel, a transition advisor to Donald Trump, with investment from InQ-Tel, the venture capital arm of the National Security Agency. Since launching in 2004,
Palantir has enjoyed numerous government contracts, from predicting the locations of
improved explosive devices (IEDs) in Fallujah, to stock market analysis, to predictive
policing in Los Angeles (Peretti, 2017). Working with ICE, Palantir was tasked with
upgrading the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS)—a data
management system that had not been updated since its creation in 1987.
In contrast to TECs, the new ICM system integrates multiple federal law
enforcement databases, including the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of
Alocohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the FBI (Woodman, 2017). As
Woodman (2017) has reported for The Intercept, ICM has been subject to various forms
of mission creep. Its jurisdictional purview expanding from Homeland Security
Investigations (the investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security) to include
ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Office (ERO). This would allow ICE-ERO agents to
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track a suspect’s trail through government databases, which could include everything
from biometric information (fingerprints, retinal scans, tattoos), to automobile
registration, to data on a subject’s border crossing history. It would also allow agents to
streamline the processes for obtaining search, seizure, and arrest warrants.
In addition to the fact that its predictive policing product links Palantir to the
smart city market, the ICM platform is exemplary of how the same computational media
technologies deployed in the smart city can be taken to their logical extremes. Database
integration—a core feature of ICM—is a baseline function peddled by many smart city
vendors. Think of IBM’s partnership with the City of Portland, Oregon, mentioned in
Chapter 1. IBM sought to “develop an interactive model of the relationships that exist
among the city’s core systems, including the economy, housing, education, public safety,
transportation, healthcare/wellness, government services and utilities” (IBM, 2011), and
to provide the city the necessary analytic tools to parse through this data to discover
actionable insights. With the ICM platform, ICE agents, unfettered from regulations
thanks to the Trump administration, will be able to apply similar machine learning
techniques to target undocumented migrants, using algorithmically-generated correlations
between suspects, events in a temporal sequence, and locations to determine actions (cf.
Amoore, 2009). These potentialities need to be considered in tandem with the discourses
around smart city solutions, since at present we have few (if any) policies to limit how
information and communications technology can be used.
These logical extremes suggest that the smart city can no longer maintain any
pretense of political neutrality. We need to start looking to examples of urban
sociotechnical entanglements that respond to the violent potential of data infrastructures
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that remain unfettered by ethical, political, or legal constraint by making their politics
explicit.
Consider as one example the “Sanctuary in the Streets” initiative, launched by the
New Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia in response to the Trump and Obama
administrations’ efforts to ramp up deportations (NSM, 2017).1 The New Sanctuary
Movement of Philadelphia is an interfaith social justice organization, focused on
providing shelter, legal aid, and community support to immigrants, regardless of their
immigration status, ethnicity, faith, or country of origin. The Sanctuary in the Streets
initiative commenced in May, 2016, in response to increased ICE activity in Philadelphia
during the Obama era (NSM, 2016). Starting out, Sanctuary in the Streets was only able
to attract a trickle of interest, but after Trump was elected the following November, the
number of community members active in the network jumped from about sixty to more
than one thousand (Whelan, 2017).
The principal objective of Sanctuary in the Streets is to enlist community
members who are not at risk for deportation to conduct protests and civilly-disobedient
actions at the site where ICE raids are taking place, as they are in progress. This presents
the kind of communications challenge to which the smart city’s logistical media
affordances is best suited: real-time coordination. In particular, the question is how to

1

President Obama claimed that his administration was to be invested in deporting “felons not
families”—immigrants with violent criminal histories. However, investigative journalists have
shown this to be false (Thompson & Flagg, 2016; Woodhouse, 2017). Reporters at the Marshall
Project discovered that about 60 percent of deportations in the last two years of the Obama
administration were of immigrants “with no criminal conviction or whose only crime was
immigration-related, such as illegal entry or re-entry” (Thompson & Flagg, 2016). That said, the
rate of deportations under President Trump’s term has still been higher on average than under
Obama (Law, 2017).
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organize a sizable crowd rapidly enough to meaningfully disrupt an ICE raid as it is
happening. Hotline phone numbers are distributed to members of local immigrant
communities through institutions such as churches and businesses, with a New Sanctuary
Movement volunteer manning a designated cellphone to field calls 24 hours a day. When
a raid is in progress, community members call the hotline to report it, including as much
information as possible. A text message (SMS) and email alert is then distributed
throughout the Sanctuary in the Streets network of activists using a system called
ReadyAlert. This relays information about the location and time of the raids. In some
cases, this might involve simply a planned “check-in” with ICE. In recent months, there
have been countless examples of undocumented residents attending planned check-in
meetings with immigration officials only to exit under arrest (Rose, 2017). Community
members not at risk for deportation and who have undergone a training on civil
disobedience, show up at the site, leading song and prayer. A smaller group of
individuals willing to risk arrest may also be convened and engage in more direct actions
(NSM, n.d.).
Sanctuary in the Streets is exemplary of the ways in which the smart city can be
re-politicized. Taking advantage of the logistical affordances of information and
communications’ technology, the initiative creates an infrastructure of human support for
some of the city’s most vulnerable community members—undocumented residents. It
illustrates how technical affordances can be made to serve the imperatives of community
and care, rather than subsuming the human element in order to achieve goals like
efficiency, optimization, and private benefit—as well as mass surveillance and law
enforcement targeting (Jackson, 2014). This type of effort needs to be considered
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alongside the more traditional type of smart city interventions. Doing so opens a space
for actively engaging technology and infrastructure, but without reducing urban issues to
technical problems.
In February, 2017, I attended the training that the New Sanctuary Movement
requires its members to undergo before participating in raid disruptions. The training
instructors emphasized the tactic whereby places of worship are provisioned as spaces of
sanctuary, arguing that this was an ancient tradition associated with many different
spiritual and religious groups. This conjunction of the new with the old reflects Larkin’s
(2008) quote in the epigraph. The relatively new affordances of information and
communications technologies—mobile telephony and email alert systems—connect the
ancient cultural practices of sanctuary with contemporary urban politics and
mobilizations. Just as Peters (2013, p. 41) noted for the logistical mediation of calendars,
clocks, and towers, “[n]ew media return us to old.” These palimpsest-like relations call
for more nuanced understandings of the city in its relation to technology—the city not
only as a space of techno-innovation, but as a space of contestation and contingent
resolutions, of repair, maintenance, and care (Jackson, 2014). The “smart city of the
future” may need to start looking backward as well as forward. It needs to take into
account not only technological novelty but also the dormant cultural, social, and
economic forms that have already proven to be (at least partially) successful in the
ongoing project of infrastructuring support for people, not just things.
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APPENDIX A
REINVENT PAYPHONES INTERVIEWS
Interview Schedule
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Jonathan Jaffe, “TeleNY.” Dec. 7, 2016.
Jonas Damon (Frog Design) “Beacon.” Dec. 9, 2016.
Wendy Brawer, “Ecosystem Services.” Dec. 9, 2016.
Mark Bearak, Karen Bookatz, and June Kim, “NYC Loop.” Dec. 12, 2016.
Ann Chen and Nick Wong, “Windchimes.” Dec. 13, 2016.
Andrew Shea, “MANNY,” Dec. 13, 2016.
Claire Napawan, “Smart Sidewalks.” Dec. 14, 2016.
Christian Kaulius, “An Augmented Reality.” Dec. 17, 2016.
Alex Levin and Meredith Popolo, “NYC Via.” Dec. 29, 2016.
Will Arnold and Andrei Juradowitch, “Digital Democracy.” Jan. 10, 2017.

Interview Questions
•

•

•

Design competition
o How did you hear about the design competition? Why did it interest you?
o Did you submit alone or as part of a team?
o If you submitted it as a team, how did you convene your team?
Entry
o Can you describe the entry? What was its distinguishing feature? How did you
come up with the core idea for the submission? Does it relate to other work that
you have done?
o How did the idea of the payphone and the role it plays in urban public life shape
your design?
o How did you build your design prototype? Out of physical material or digitally,
for example, in a video or digital photo rendering?
o What kind of information did you imagine your design would convey to users?
how were these decisions made? What types of information did you decide to
omit from the user interface?
o What kind of information or data did you imagine your design would gather about
users or public spaces? Who did you imagine using this data and toward what
ends?
o Did you imagine an advertising dimension to your design?
LinkNYC
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o Are you familiar at all with LinkNYC, the final outcome of the design
competition? If so, how does it differ from your design?
o Did your design have anything the LinkNYC system does not have?
o If you have been following the implementation of LinkNYC in New York, what
shortcomings do you see with the final design? What could be different about it?
o What do you imagine the LinkNYC franchise holders will do with the data the
system generates about users and urban life? How could this be improved or done
differently?
QUESTIONS POSED TO STANLEY SHOR
I was put in touch with Mr. Stanley Shor, Assistant Commissioner, Franchise
Administration at the New York City Department of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (DoITT), by the Community Outreach representative at
Intersection. Mr. Shor asked that, before scheduling an interview, I email him a list of the
questions that I wanted to ask. I forwarded him these questions, to which he responded,
after consulting with DoITT’s legal staff, that most of these questions prompted
confidential information and could not be answered.
•
•
•

•

•
•

•

What specifications from the RFP were taken from winning designs in the Reinvent
Payphones challenge?
What, if any, ideas were considered from designs that did not make it to the finalist or
semi-finalist stage?
DoITT drafted a Request For Information that was sent to business and community
leaders prior to the Reinvent Payphones design competition. Language in the RFI
suggests that DoITT had a pretty good idea of what it wanted to be included in the
RFP - for instance, the two- rather than three-panel design of LinkNYC vs. the
traditional payphone, a focus on Wi-Fi and advertising, etc.. Was there a vision for
the new public communications structures at DoITT prior to the design competition,
and if so, how close is it to LinkNYC?
Did DoITT plan to award the franchise bid exclusively to one company or consortium
of companies rather than a situation similar to the 1999 payphone franchise? If so
why? If not, why did DoITT decide to go this route?
Were folks at DoITT aware of Titan's installation of bluetooth beacon tech on
payphones in Oct. 2014 and did this play a role in selecting CityBridge?
Were other responses to the RFP significantly different from LinkNYC in their
functioning? For instance, did most other submissions feature a two-paneled structure
with digital LED advertising signage and free Wi-Fi? Did other applicants seek to
install sensors in the kiosks as LinkNYC has?
What kinds of compromises had to be made between DoITT and CityBridge in
hammering out the franchise agreement?
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•

•

Given the lawsuit with Verizon for not completing its fiber network in New York,
will the LinkNYC infrastructure open up new avenues for gigabit speed ISPs for folks
who don't happen to live in immediate proximity to a Link?
Does LinkNYC include any mechanisms to ensure that it will maintain power during
extended outages such as those that occurred during and after Hurricane Sandy? Does
it include any other measures geared toward natural disaster or environmental
concerns?

In his response, Mr. Shor did indicate that specifications in the RFP conformed to
Department of City Planning (DCP) guidelines and regulations. And he noted that “Staff
at DCP did examine the winning designs [from the Reinvent Payphones Challenge] and
may have been influenced by them.” He also wrote that LinkNYC has environmental
resiliency features, as detailed in a report that CityBridge released on July 20, 2017.
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APPENDIX B
ON-DEMAND WORKER INTERVIEWS
List of interviews
Caviar
• “Suzanne,” Dec. 14, 2015.
• “Kevin,” Jan. 14, 2016.
• “Mike,” Jan. 16, 2016.
• “Janet,” Jan. 19, 2016.
• “Paul,” Feb. 12, 2016.
• “Serge,” Feb. 13, 2016.
• “Charlotte,” Feb. 13, 2016.
• “Matt,” Feb. 16, 2016.
• “Steve,” Feb. 22, 2016.
• “Bob,” Feb. 24, 2016.
• “Mitchell,” Mar. 2, 2016.
• “Gary,” Mar. 7, 2016.
Lyft
• “Matthew,” Feb. 14, 2016.
• “Charlie,” Feb. 28, 2016.
• “Amelia,” Mar. 3, 2016.

Postmates
• “Karl,” Feb. 16, 2016.
• “Marcus,” Feb. 17, 2016.
• “Alexandra,” Feb. 19, 2016.
• “Cameron,” Mar. 1, 2016.
• “Gregory,” Mar. 13, 2016.
• “Joseph,” Mar. 14, 2016.
• “Barry,” Mar. 15, 2016.
Uber
• “Harry,” Feb. 22, 2016.
• “Charles,” Mar. 1, 2016.
• “Anita,” Mar. 15, 2016.
Zoomer/GrubHub
• “Nelson,” Feb. 12, 2016.

Interview Questions
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

When did you first start working for [company]?
How did you hear about [company]?
What other companies have you worked for that use an app for work order
information?
How do you set your schedule? On a given week, what types of things do you think
about when you’re scheduling? How many hours do you typically work? Are there
fluctuations throughout the year?
What kinds of expenses have you incurred as a result of this job? Do you feel like the
pay and business is good? Has it offset any expenses you’ve had to make?
Have you ever been in an accident on the job? Do you have job-related insurance?
What information do you think could be added to the app that would be helpful?
What do you like about working for on-demand companies that is different from a
regular part-time job?
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What changes in the app or in management have you noticed since you've started
working here?
Have you developed any tricks on the job? For instance, how do you maximize orders
or find time to get a bite to eat?
Do you feel like you have a sense of how the algorithm works—for instance, for
order allocation? Or how it calculates pay-outs?
How often do you interact with other workers, either at your company or for other
companies? Do you ever go on online discussion forums?
Do you feel like the pay makes sense for the orders all the time, sometimes, rarely, or
never? Do you feel like it always/usually/sometimes/rarely prices orders
appropriately? Have you had experiences where you feel like the app or algorithm is
not consistent in its payouts?
How much do you think that order allocation is done by a human versus an
algorithm?
For Caviar and Postmates couriers:
How do you deal with restaurants that are consistently slow?
Do you bike only or drive also? Did you have experience doing deliveries or working
as a courier prior to Caviar/postmates? How does it compare?
Describe experiences with restaurant staff or building staff or customers that have
made the job more difficult. How could it be easier?
How often do you interact or text with dispatchers? What are some memorable
experiences dealing with dispatchers that made the job either easier or more difficult.
Have you ever complained to a dispatcher about the job? If so, what was your
complaint about and how did they react?
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APPENDIX C
ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH WITH HUNCHLAB
List of Ethnographic Observations
•

Mar. 26, 2015. First meeting with Jeremy Heffner to discuss ethnographic research.
Tour of Azavea offices.
• Sep. 9, 2015. First meeting with HunchLab team.
• Oct. 15, 2015. Sat in for phone call between HunchLab and Adventos, police
technology vendor and producer of SmartForce data management system.
• Oct. 16, 2015. Participant observation, Geospatial Insights team at Azavea. Sat in for
HunchLab team phone call with Lee Hunt at Greensboro Police Department.
• Oct. 20, 2015. Participant observation, Geospatial Insights team. Team setting points
for their work. Implementation check-in with programming lead and product
specialists.
• Oct. 22, 2015. Addressing issue in code for prediction software. Issues with
programming team. New work conflicts with priorities of fixing old bugs, “technical
debt.”
• Oct. 28, 2015. Interviewed programmers.
• Nov. 3, 2015. Phone call. Discussed terms of contract between Azavea and another
company using HunchLab’s predictions in its system.
• Nov. 4, 2015. Interview, criminologist Jerry Ratcliffe.
• Nov. 5, 2015. Interview, Jeremy Heffner.
• Nov. 9, 2015. Phone call, Seattle Police Department.
• Nov. 11, 2015. Sales meeting.
• Nov. 24, 2015. Phone call with St. Louis County Police Department crime analyst,
Sgt. Colby.
• Dec. 2-4, 2015. Trip to St. Louis County with HunchLab team.
o Dec. 2. CompStat meeting; officer training on use of HunchLab.
o Dec. 3, Ride-along with St. Louis County PD officer using HunchLab for the first
time.
• Dec. 15, 2015. Meeting with Jeremy Heffner to review what happened in St. Louis
County.
• Dec. 16, 2015. Phone call with Rachel Carson, UK rep for HunchLab sales.
• Dec. 18, 2015. Meeting with police consultants about HunchLab Tactics.
• Feb. 3, 2016. Meeting with City of New Orleans employees in talks with HunchLab.
• Feb. 11, 2016. Meeting with Jeremy Heffner.
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Feb. 18, 2016. Participant observation. Training to create a HunchLab instance for a
particular jurisdiction.
Mar. 11, 2016. Meeting with Jeremy Heffner.
Apr. 21, 2016. Phone call meeting with Athens and Clark County police departments.
May 5, 2016. Participant observation. Content generation for HunchLab webinar
series.
May 19, 2016. Webinar rehearsal.
Aug. 1, 2016. Meeting with Jeremy Heffner. Shows me mock-ups for potential
product called HarmStat to measure crime + police harm in communities in form of
monetary costs to communities.
Oct. 3, 2016. Meeting with Jeremy Heffner. Shows updates to Dashboard feature.
Oct. 13, 2016. Interview with Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, criminologist and law
professor.
Oct. 14, 2016. Interview with David Alan Sklansky, criminologist.
Oct. 26, 2016. Interview with David Robinson of UpTurn.
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